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1. Political Support and Mass Media: Relevance and Objectives of this 
Study 
This study investigates the impact of the mass media on citizens’ political support. 
More precisely, the main interest of this work lays in the effects of the way in which 
mass media present political processes. Political processes in this study refer to day-
to-day discussions of possible solutions to political problems and decision-making 
within the government, the parliament, or the political administration. The term 
“political support” is used in this study to refer to “an attitude by which a person 
orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or nega-
tively” (cf. Easton, 1975, p. 436). Although political support might refer not only to 
evaluative attitudes but also to behavior (cf. Easton, 1975, p. 436), the interest of 
this study is limited to the aspect of political support as empirically observable 
evaluative attitudes of citizens.1 Thus the study focuses on confidence or trust2 in 
political institutions, political actors, and democracy. Trust is understood as the 
belief that the government or any other political institution is operating according to 
one’s normative expectations of how they should function (A. H. Miller, 1974, p. 
989) and individual interests of the citizen are attended to even without scrutiny (cf. 
Easton, 1975, p. 447; Gamson, 1968). Consequentially, political distrust is “a realis-
tic critique of political performance and/or of fiduciary responsibility in the light of 
accepted democratic values” (Barber, 1983, p. 80f.).  
In order to investigate the impact of media presentations of political processes on 
political support, this study focuses on the example of Switzerland as a typical con-
sensus democracy. As regards political decision-making strategies, bargaining is the 
dominant modus in consensus democracies (Czada, 2000; Lehmbruch, 2003; 
Lijphart, 1999). The endeavor to find collective compromises between diverging 
interests is the main purpose of bargaining procedures (Marcinkowski, 2005). Mass 
media, in contrast, tend to focus on discord instead of compromises and emphasize 
the behavior of single actors instead of collective actions (Grande, 2000; 
Marcinkowski, 2005). The distinct presentation of political processes by the mass 
media, hence, may challenge citizens’ political support (Marcinkowski, 2000, p. 
211; Sarcinelli, 1998, p. 553).  
 
1  This study’s focus on evaluative attitudes is motivated by two factors. First, for economic 
reasons the scope of independent variables that are of interest in this study had to be restric-
ted. Second, according to the value-attitude-behavior hierarchy, changes in behavior are a re-
sult of attitude changes (Bentler & Speckart, 1981; Homer & Kahle, 1988). In line with this, 
political participation was found to result from party identification and beliefs about govern-
ment responsiveness (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982), for instance. 
2  In literature the terms confidence and trust are often used interchangeably. 
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Confidence in political institutions and actors is an important resource for the sta-
bility of modern societies (Kaina, 2004). Modern societies are highly fragmented 
and characterized by functional differentiation. It is political confidence or trust in 
particular that serves the reduction of complexity and facilitates individual behavior 
as well as collective actions (Luhmann, 1989). Although political support is consi-
dered a relevant resource, it is generally found to have declined in a majority of 
western democracies over the last quarter-century (Lipset & Schneider, 1983; Pharr, 
Putman, & Dalton, 2000; Walz, 1996). On the whole, citizens in Switzerland are 
more confident in their government and their parliament than their neighbors in 
Germany or Austria (Linder, 2005). Nevertheless, Swiss citizens’ confidence in 
political institutions has also declined in recent years (Freitag, 2001). In 1989, close 
to twice as many citizens had confidence in the parliament than in 1996, as indicated 
by data from representative surveys (Brunner & Siger, 1997). Similarly, the survey 
data showed that in 1989 eight out of ten citizens had confidence in the government, 
compared to five out of ten respondents in 1996. This pattern appeared to be rather 
stable: At the beginning of the year 2009 also about five out of ten Swiss citizens 
had confidence in the government, compared to four out of ten citizens that ex-
pressed their disapproval (gfs.bern, 2009a). 
Among other causes, mass media appeared to be an important factor that may 
contribute to a decline of political support. A variety of studies attest the influence 
of indicators such as economic growth, unemployment, and inflation (Citrin, 1974; 
Gilley, 2006). Furthermore, institutional structures (Norris, 1999) and aspects of 
political processes (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002) were found to explain levels of 
political support. In addition, there are studies which show that the mass media’s 
news coverage also contributes to the political malaise. Most studies consider mass 
media not as the only or even primary factor influencing political attitudes (Cappella 
& Jamieson, 1996; Maurer, 2003; Nye Jr, 1997). However, media are considered to 
be an important factor, because media information is a relevant source of political 
information (Blödorn, Gerhards, & Klinger, 2005; Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997). 
Moreover, the media coverage does not merely mirror political realities. Rather, the 
political information in the mass media is shaped by selection and interpretation 
processes of journalists (Altheide & Snow, 1979; Marcinkowski, 2000; Maurer, 
2003a, 2003b; Sarcinelli, 1998). Being shaped by journalistic rules of selection and 
interpretation, media content is found to be increasingly negative (Ehmig, 1991; 
Floß & Marcinkowski, 2008; Hallin, 1992; Kepplinger, 1998; Lipset & Schneider, 
1983; M. M. Miller & Denham, 1994; Nye Jr, 1997; T. E. Patterson, 1996). These 
findings fuel the assumption that there is a distinct impact of media information on 
political attitudes that goes above and beyond the impact of political reality aspects. 
In general, then, Wolling (1999, p. 43) maintains that the three empirical phenomena 
mentioned above – the increasing political dissatisfaction of citizens, the important 
role of media as a source of political information, and the increasing negativity of 
media content – warrant the assumption that media may be a significant cause for 
political dissatisfaction. 
Thus, the mass media’s impact on political support has been extensively studied 
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in recent years. Although considerable research has been devoted to the impact of 
election campaign coverage, rather less attention has been paid to the effects of 
media presentations of political decision-making processes. The majority of research 
on mass media’s impact on political attitudes is interested in the effects of election 
campaign coverage (Benoit, McKinney, & Stephenson, 2002; Cappella & Jamieson, 
1997; Kleinnijenhuis, van Hoof, & Oegema, 2006; Pfau, 1987; Rhee, 1997; 
Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr, 2001; Valentino, Buhr, & Beckmann, 2001), effects 
of media information on certain policy issues (Iyengar, 1989; Iyengar & Simon, 
1993; Krosnick & Brannon, 1993; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997), or the impact 
of media information on campaign issues (De Vreese, 2004, 2005; De Vreese & 
Semetko, 2002). Previous research on media effect has neglected to consider the 
effects of media depictions of routine decision-making processes such as the discus-
sion of possible problem solutions and the formation of binding decisions (Arnold, 
2004; Morris & Clawson, 2007). However, there is research in political science that 
shows that not only what was decided but also how a decision was made has an 
impact on citizens’ confidence in political actors and institutions (Hibbing & Theiss-
Morse, 2002).  
“Our analysis also demonstrates that media coverage of the legislative process is a significant 
determinant of mass approval for Congress. While some recent studies have discussed the pub-
lic’s disdain for legislative processes (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Hibbing and  
Theiss-Morse 1995; 2002), there have been no attempts to tie media coverage of legislative 
process to citizen approval” (Morris & Clawson, 2007, p. 3).  
Hence the first objective of the present study is to contribute to media effects re-
search by investigating the impact of media presentations of political decision-
making processes on political support. 
Previous research has shown that exposure to negative or critical media content 
may be associated with a decrease in political support (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; 
Kepplinger, 1998, 2000; Kleinnijenhuis, et al., 2006; Maurer, 2003b; Min, 2004; T. 
E. Patterson, 1996; Wolling, 1999). The majority of studies focuses on outcomes 
and neglects the investigation of effect mechanisms and processes, however. Hence 
there is a need for future studies to gain an “improved theoretical understanding of 
why strategy-oriented media coverage is associated with negative civic outcomes” 
(Besley & McComas, 2005, p. 429f.), for instance. The second objective of the pre-
sent study, then, is to explore the mechanisms by which media information about 
political processes affects citizens’ political support.  
Moreover, the media’s impact on political attitudes was found to vary as a func-
tion of different contextual factors (cf. Maurer, 2003b; Moy & Pfau, 2000; Moy, 
Pfau, & Kahlor, 1999). It would seem, therefore, that further investigations are 
needed in order to specify the conditions under which media information contributes 
to a decrease in political support. Whereas research in political science shows that 
the relationship between political perceptions and related preferences is a relevant 
predictor of political support (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002), media effects re-
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search has neglected to consider whether media’s impact on political support differs 
as a function of individual preferences.3 Hence the third objective of the present 
study is to contribute to media effects research by exploring the conditions under 
which media information about political processes affects political support. More 
precisely, this study endeavours to examine the impact of media information about 
political processes on political support as a function of individual preferences as 
regards political processes. Because, as of yet, no standardized scale to measure 
process preferences and perceptions exists (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-
Morse, 2001a, p. 147), a further objective of this study is the development and vali-
dation of such measures. 
In general then, the aim of the present work is to extend previous research in three 
respects. First, this study aims to investigate the impact of mass media’s presenta-
tions of political decision-making processes on citizens’ political support. Second, 
efforts are made to examine the processes by which the effects occur. And third, this 
study explores the conditions under which those effects are particularly strong by 
considering the role of individual process preferences. Thus, this study’s research 
question is: How and under which conditions do mass media’s presentations of 
political decision-making processes affect citizens’ political support?  
In order to provide theoretical answers to this question, this study draws on two 
strands of literature, namely discrepancy theory and cultivation theory. In order to 
explain how the media presentations of political decision-making processes affect 
support, the study builds on cultivation theory (W. P. Eveland, Jr., 2002). Regarding 
political decision-making procedures at the national level, the media impact on per-
ceptions is presumed to be strong, because people have fewer opportunities to con-
firm or deny the medium’s depictions based on firsthand experiences. Hence this 
study argues that regular patterns in how the media presents political decision-
making processes may account for changes in the perception of political processes. 
Media information about political processes within the parliament, for instance, was 
found to focus on discord and to be characterized by a general negative tone (Lichter 
& Amundson, 1994; Morris & Clawson, 2005, 2007). Thus, the media may foster 
the audience’s perception that political processes within the government are shaped 
by discord. The perception of political processes, in turn, is assumed to predict lev-
els of political support. Hence the media may contribute to a decline of political 
support by en-hancing the perception that political processes are fraught with con-
flict, for example.  
In order to examine the conditions under which the impact of media presentations 
of political processes on support is particularly strong, this study draws on findings 
from cognitive psychology and, specifically, discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987). 
 
3  The term preferences in this study refers to “a comparative evaluation of (i.e. a ranking over) 
a set of objects” (Druckman & Lupia, 2000, p. 2). While acknowledging that the role of pref-
erences in the sense of ideological orientations (e.g. Zaller, 1992), for instance, has been in-
vestigated in previous research, it is that special type of preferences in the sense of individual 
importance attached to certain aspects that is the interest of this study. 
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This theory basically assumes that “evaluations of individual, social or political 
objects are partly grounded in disparities between expectations and perceptions” 
(Kimball & Patterson, 1997, p. 703). Accordingly, studies from political science 
show that the relationship between perceptions of political realities and related pref-
erences explains variances in support for political actors and institutions (John R. 
Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 2001a; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Kimball 
& Patterson, 1997; S. C. Patterson, Boynton, & Hedlund, 1969). Whereas congru-
ence between perceptions and preferences may enhance confidence, incongruence 
was found to decrease political confidence. For instance, Patterson, Boynton, & 
Hedlund (1969) found high levels of support for citizens who feel that what the 
legislature is like comes close to what they expect of it. In contrast, low levels of 
support were found for citizens who perceive wide gaps between their perceptions of 
the legislature and the way they would prefer it to be. Building on discrepancy the-
ory, this study assumes that the effects of process perceptions on political support 
vary as a function of individual preferences regarding political processes. More 
precisely, the study assumes that the impact of certain perceptions of political  
processes is particularly strong, if those aspects of political processes are considered 
to be important. An example might illustrate this assumption: A person perceives 
decision-making processes within the parliament to be inefficient. However, this 
person considers it important that political processes in the parliament are efficient. 
For this person, efficiency preferences are strong, but political processes within the 
parliament are perceived to be inefficient. Hence there is a discrepancy between 
process preferences and perceptions. As a consequence, this person presumably will 
have low levels of confidence in the parliament. In contrast, imagine another person 
who also perceives political processes to be inefficient but does not consider effi-
ciency to be important. All else being equal, this person probably has higher levels 
of confidence in the parliament than the first person. With regard to the media’s 
impact, this study, then, argues that the impact of the media via the perception of 
political processes on political support is particularly strong for those citizens that 
hold strong related preferences regarding political decision-making processes.  
Empirically, this study approached the research question by investigating the im-
pact of both routine use of political information in the mass media and exposure to 
specific news articles on political support. This was done based on standardized 
online surveys with 523 participants from the German-speaking part of Switzerland 
with an experimental study embedded.4 In addition, data from a comprehensive 
content analysis of news coverage in Switzerland and Germany5 were used to inform 
 
4  The German-speaking part of Switzerland was selected because this enabled the comparison 
of results from the content analysis as well as findings from the pilot surveys on measuring 
process preferences and perceptions without having language differences. For financial rea-
sons, the Italian- and French-speaking parts could not be included in this study. 
5  The content analysis and the present work were conducted within the framework of the pro-
ject “The Dynamics of Political Institutions in Mediated Democracies: Political Bargaining 
and the Transformation of the Public Sphere”, led by Frank Marcinkowski. The project is 
embedded in the National Centre of Competence in Research: Challenges to Democracy in 
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the development of stimulus material for the experimental study and to provide 
background information for the interpretations of findings concerning the impact of 
media use on the perception of political processes and political support.  
In general, the study’s results lent support to the assumption that mass media may 
contribute to a decrease of political support by shaping the perception of political 
processes. In addition, in line with this study’s expectations the findings indicate that 
the media’s impact on political support was particularly strong for those respondents 
for whom the related aspects of decision-making processes are particularly impor-
tant. However, the perception of those aspects of political processes that are deeply 
anchored in political beliefs and ideologies of the citizens was found to be rather 
resistant to media effects. In the main, this study presents first empirical results 
regarding the role of individual preferences – in the sense of evaluative rankings – as 
moderator of media effects. The findings may contribute to a differentiation of the 
rather general claim that negative or critical media information results in a decline of 
political support. 
The outline of this work is as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the lit-
erature on mass media’s impact on political support. In Chapter 3 a theoretical 
model is developed which is designed to capture individual-level differences in 
political support and takes central account of the relationship between media infor-
mation, individual perceptions of political processes and individual preferences 
regarding political processes. Chapter 4 presents the investigation of characteristic 
patterns in media presentations of political decision-making processes. The de-
velopment of a scale to measure citizens’ process preferences and perceptions is 
described in Chapter 5. The short-term effects of news articles on process percep-
tions and political support were investigated in an experimental study that is pre-
sented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 refers to the long-term impact of media use on proc-
ess perceptions and political support and takes central account of the role of individ-
ual process preferences in shaping the relationship between media use and political 
support. Finally, Chapter 8 offers a general discussion of this study’s findings and 
suggests implications for future research. 
 
the 21st century (NCCR Democracy). Germany was selected as reference case in the content 
analysis in order to be able to compare patterns of news coverage in Switzerland as a consen-
sus democracy with data from a rather competitive democracy. 
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2. The Impact of Mass Media on Political Attitudes 
As outlined in the previous chapter, this study’s research question is: How and under 
what conditions do the mass media’s presentations of political decision-making 
processes affect citizens’ political support? The mass media’s impact on political 
support has been extensively studied in recent years. The aim of this literature re-
view, then, is to provide an overview of the state of research that investigates the 
relationship between political media information and the recipients’ political atti-
tudes in order to stimulate the development of a theoretical model that attempts to 
explain the impact of the mass media’s presentations of political decision-making 
processes on political support. Hence studies that investigate the relationship be-
tween mass media and political attitudes are the focus of the literature review in this 
chapter. Two criteria were formulated in order to guide the selection of the studies. 
With regard to the independent variable, studies that look at the media’s impact on 
evaluative political attitudes related to political support are selected. The review 
therefore includes studies on the media’s impact on trust in political institutions or 
politicians, political malaise, political cynicism, political efficacy, or political alien-
ation. Studies that investigate the media’s impact on evaluative attitudes not related 
to political aspects, such as media effects on social trust (Norris, 2002) or the me-
dia’s impact on confidence in the news media, the court system or public schools 
(Moy & Pfau, 2000), are not included. Also excluded from this overview are studies 
exploring the association between media use and political behavior, for instance 
research interested in media effects on mobilization or political participation (Moy, 
Xenos, & Hess, 2005; Newton, 1999). The same applies to studies that examine the 
media’s impact on political knowledge (Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997; Chaffee, Zhao, & 
Leshner, 1994; W. P. Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Tan, 1980). With regard to the de-
pendent variable, studies that investigate the impact of political media information 
are chosen. Studies investigating the impact of entertainment media content on po-
litical attitudes are not the focus of this review.  
Studies that fulfill both criteria and probe the impact of political media informa-
tion on evaluative political attitudes were included in the literature review. The table 
in Appendix 10.1 presents an overview of the studies that are included in this litera-
ture overview. The studies are based on various theoretical approaches, such as 
videomalaise theory, framing effects theory, and priming theory. A comprehensive 
overview of these theories would go beyond this study’s framework. Instead, this 
chapter focuses on substantial findings with regard to the relationship between  
political media information and citizens’ political attitudes. Only in cases where I 
consider it necessary for the understanding of research findings will I refer to the 
theoretical foundations. The state of scientific debate concerning three core ques-
tions is reflected. Section 2.1 gives an overview of different aspects of political 
media information that were found to have an impact on citizens’ political support: 
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Routine media use of political information, exposure to certain aspects of media 
content and exposure to strategy frames are distinguished. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to provide answers to the question of which aspects of media presentations of 
political decision-making processes may affect citizens’ political support. Section 
2.2 focuses on the question of how media information affects attitudes and reflects 
mechanisms and mediating variables. Some studies, for instance, investigate 
whether the media influence political support by shaping the perception of political 
realities. Section 2.3 discusses conditions under which the mass media’s impact on 
political attitudes is particularly likely. For instance studies provide evidence for the 
assumption that high levels of general trust in the media might enhance the likeli-
hood of media effects. Based on this overview, those moderator variables that are 
most applicable for this study’s research interest are selected. Generally, methodo-
logical aspects of the studies are considered in all the sections in order to inform 
methodological choices of the present work. Section 2.4 summarizes identified re-
search gaps and their implications for the present study. 
2.1. Political Media Information as a Predictor of Political Attitudes 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of studies investigating the 
relationship between political media information and political attitudes. In Section 
2.1.1, studies that, in the tradition of videomalaise theory, explore the relationship 
between routine use of political media information and political attitudes are pre-
sented. Based on the previously described selection criteria for the literature review, 
I focus on those studies that are interested in effects of the use of political informa-
tion. Section 2.1.2 presents studies investigating the impact of specific aspects of 
media content on citizens’ political attitudes. More precisely, studies that explore the 
impact of content aspects which are presumed to have negative effects on citizens’ 
political attitudes are the focus of attention here. Relevant studies investigate the 
impact of a variety of media content aspects, such as media attention to political 
scandals, the media’s conflict-orientation, and media criticism. A rather narrow 
conceptualization of media aspects associated with negative effects on political 
attitudes are media strategy frames. Thus, I present studies on the effects of strategy 
frames in a separate section (Section 2.1.3). Section 2.1.4 discusses identified re-
search voids and suggestions for the present study. 
2.1.1. The Impact of Routine Use of Political Media Information 
Various studies focus on routine media use as a predictor of political attitudes. The 
“videomalaise” hypothesis by Robinson (1975, 1976, 1977) has been particularly 
influential. According to this hypothesis, television is held responsible for a decline 
of political support due to its “interpretive, sensational, aggressive, and anti- 
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institutional news items” (Robinson, 1976, p. 426), its “extraordinary emphasis on 
negativistic reportage” and the “predilection for violence and conflict” (Robinson, 
1976, p. 428). Compared to the press, television is supposed to have a profound 
effect on political attitudes due to its high credibility and large audience. In order to 
investigate the impact of this presumably negativistic television news coverage on 
audience attitudes, media use measures were used as surrogates for media content 
data. Based on cross-sectional survey data, Robinson (1976) demonstrated that  
people who solely rely on television6 during political campaigns show lower levels 
of political efficacy7 than subjects relying on some other medium. This finding led 
the author to conclude that television news foster political cynicism. In general, the 
empirical evidence for this claim provided by Robinson is rather weak. The majority 
of results are based on cross-tabulations.  
The work of Robinson (1975, 1976, 1977) stimulated a variety of subsequent 
studies, producing ambiguous results. A multitude of studies indicate that there is no 
significant relationship between media use and political attitudes, especially if the 
results are controlled for socio-demographic variables and/or other relevant factors. 
Recent studies from the U.S. showed that media use is a weak predictor of cynicism 
(Bennett, Rhine, Flickinger, & Bennett, 1999; Hetherington, 1998; Pinkleton & 
Austin, 2002; Pinkleton, Austin, & Fortman, 1998). For example, a study by Moy et 
al. (Moy & Pfau, 2000; Moy, et al., 1999) investigated the relationship between 
people’s use of specific communication sources (newspaper, television, political talk 
radio) and political attitudes.8 The study encompasses media content analyses and 
surveys that were conducted over a two-year period. Based on regression analyses 
that control for other relevant predictors, the authors found a relative lack of media 
effects on confidence in presidency and Congress. This finding is supported by other 
 
6  Television exposure was measured with the question: ‘Of all these ways of following the 
campaign, which one would you say you got the most information from - newspapers, radio, 
television, magazines?’ 
7  Political efficacy was measured with the following five items (Robinson, 1976): ‘Sometimes 
politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand 
what’s going on’, ‘Voting is the only way that people like me can have a say about how the 
government runs things’, ‘People like me don’t have any say about what the government 
does’, ‘The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country’, 
‘I don’t think public officials care much about what people like me think.’ 
8  Media use of political news is measured not only as exposure to a communication source but 
also as attention paid to that source. The media use variable was built as an average index of 
media use and attention measures. Confidence in institutions was measured on three levels: 
the global attitude toward institution (based on six differentials, i.e. foolish/wise, favor-
able/unfavorable, wrong/right, negative/positive, unacceptable/acceptable, bad/good), trust in 
institutions (untrustworthy/trustworthy) and confidence in institutions (‘How much confi-
dence would you place in the institution?’). The content analysis employed the same  
measures that were used in the survey. The data analysis is not based on individual level data, 
however, because subjects were not assigned to indices of that media content which they ac-
tually have used. Rather, media use was included as an independent variable in the analytical 
models. The link with the content data was established when interpreting the results. 
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studies in the context of the presidential election campaigns (O'Keefe, 1980) and in 
the framework of an off-year election (Leshner & McKean, 1997). 
Expanding the U.S. focus of research, Holtz-Bacha (1990) found that for Ger-
many the assumption of the videomalaise theory does not hold. Findings based on a 
survey of the West German electorate suggest that high levels of exposure to politi-
cal information in both television and print media are associated with lower levels of 
political alienation.9 Instead, it was exposure to entertainment content in print and 
television that explained higher levels of political distrust. For Great Britain, a study 
by (Newton, 1999) provided findings that challenge the videomalaise assumption. 
The author used data from the 1996 British Attitudes Social Survey and showed that 
neither the use of political information in tabloid newspapers nor the use of political 
information in television was associated with political malaise. Consistently, taking 
a national comparative perspective, Norris (2000) found no association between 
television use and civic malaise in many advanced industrialized democracies based 
on World Value Survey data. 
Recent research extends the analysis of the relationship between media use and 
political attitudes and investigates the effects of internet use (Johnson & Kaye, 2003; 
Wolling, 2009). Findings based on an online survey among web users in the context 
of U.S. election campaigns suggest that reliance on the internet is associated with 
lower levels of trust in the government (Johnson & Kaye, 2003). In contrast, a study 
by Wolling (2009) with citizens of Germany found that the use of political informa-
tion on the internet does not result in a decrease of confidence in democracy. The 
ambiguous findings on the role of the internet in these studies might be due to dif-
ferences in the conceptualization of independent variables. 
Other studies indicate that the relationship between media use and political atti-
tudes is more complex than videomalaise hypothesis suggests. For instance, a study 
by Becker & Whitney (1980) suggests that the effects of media use on political atti-
tudes are contingent upon the object of attitude, i.e. national or local government. 
Based on survey data, the authors investigated the relationship between media de-
pendency10, trust in the national government, and trust in the local government. With 
age and education being controlled for, television use had a significant negative 
effect on trust in the local government, but a non-significant effect on trust in the 
national government. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse (1998) argue that the impact of  
 
9  Political alienation was measured with the following six items (Holtz-Bacha, 1990): ‘Politics 
in a democracy depends on the individual citizens’, ‘Politicians forget their voters once they 
are elected’, ‘People like me don’t have any influence on the effectiveness of our govern-
ment’, ‘Politics is a dirty business’, ‘Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated 
that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on’, ‘Politicians never say what 
they really think.’ 
10  People are dependent upon a medium if they rely on that medium, use it regularly, and pay 
attention to information on local and national political affairs in that medium. Media depend-
ency, hence, not only accounts for the use of a certain medium but also describes the relation-
ship between the use of this particular medium and the use of other media (Becker & 
Whitney, 1980). 
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media use on political attitudes is different for emotional reactions compared to 
cognitive responses. “When people make judgments based on emotions, they react 
from the gut, which means they often react instinctively” (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 
1998, p. 479). Using data from a national survey of public attitudes, the authors did 
not find an effect of media use on cognitive evaluations of Congress. But those who 
rely on television or the radio – compared to newspapers – as their main source of 
political information were more likely to have negative emotions toward Congress.11 
Hence political media use appeared to be associated with emotional but not cogni-
tive responses. 
2.1.2. The Impact of Certain Aspects of News Coverage 
The studies presented in the previous section investigate the relationship between 
media use and political support. Hence they cannot provide answers to the question 
of which precise aspects of media content may be responsible for a decline of politi-
cal support. This question is the focus of research presented in this section. This 
overview focuses on studies that examine the impact of media content aspects that 
are presumed to have negative effects on political attitudes.  
For instance, research suggests that the interpretative style of news is associated 
with a decrease of political support (T. E. Patterson, 1993, 1996). The interpretative 
style goes along with journalistic cynicism, because journalists “constantly question 
politicians’ motives, methods, and effectiveness” (T. E. Patterson, 1996, p. 103). 
Based on a content analysis of the election coverage from 1990 to 1992, Patterson 
(1993) found an increase in interpretative and horse-race journalism. The author 
reported parallel trends of an increase of interpretative news in the media coverage 
and a decrease of voters’ satisfaction with political leaders, Congress and the  
presidency in the U.S. Because of this parallelism, the author concluded that the 
interpretative news style leads to citizens’ dissatisfaction with political leaders and 
institutions.  
Other studies indicate that media presentation of political actors may contribute 
to a decrease in citizens’ political support. For Germany, Kepplinger (1998, 2000) 
showed that negative presentations of political actors in the media coverage in-
creased since the late 1960s. For the same time period, the author noted a decline in 
support for the political elite in Germany. Based on these parallel trends, the author 
concluded that negative depictions of political actors in the media decrease citizens’ 
trust in political leaders. A study by Maurer (2003a, 2003b) provides more confi-
dence regarding the assumed causality of the relationship between media presenta-
tions of political actors and citizens’ political attitudes. Based on a data set that 
combines media content data and panel survey data on the individual level, the  
 
11  Emotional evaluations of Congress are measured with questions referring to anger, unease, 
fear, and disgust. 
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author found that negative presentations of political actors12 resulted in a decline of 
political support.  
Miller et al. (1979) investigated the impact of media criticism on trust in the gov-
ernment.13 Critical newspapers are those containing a high proportion of articles that 
criticize aspects of the political sphere. The authors combined data from a content 
analysis of 94 newspapers’ front pages with survey data. For each respondent, the 
survey data were matched with content data from those newspapers which were 
actually read by that respondent. The authors found that readers of highly critical 
papers were more distrustful of government than others. This finding is consistent 
with results from a study by Kleinnijenhuis, van Hoof, & Oegema (2006). The au-
thors investigated the impact of news coverage of the 2002 electoral campaign in the 
Netherlands on political attitudes of the citizens. The data analysis is based on media 
content and survey data that were linked on the individual level. For each respon-
dent, only that part of the media coverage that this respondent could actually have 
been perceived, was included in the analysis. Based on the results, the authors con-
cluded that critical statements in conflict-oriented and party-related news discourage 
trust in political leaders.14 In line with this finding, Durr, Gilmour, & Wolbrecht 
(1997), based on a distributed-lag time series regression model, found that the nega-
tive tone of media coverage of Congress decreases public approval for Congress. A 
study by Wolling (1999) probed the effects of negative statements in media articles 
based on a combination of media content analysis and survey data. In the data set, 
each person was assigned media content values that describe the media outlets used 
by this person. The results show that negative statements in the media decrease  
respondents’ identification with the political community. There were no significant 
effects of negative media information on subjects’ legitimacy of the political system 
or their perceived efficiency of the political system, however.  
Research in the field of political sciences showed that trust in government signifi-
cantly decreases when political scandals arise (Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000). In 
line with this finding, media scientists have investigated the role of media attention 
 
12  The index describing the media’s presentation of political actors was built as the arithmetical 
difference between negative and positive presentations of political actors in the media. 
13  Trust in government was measured with the standard National Election Survey (NES) trust in 
government scale. The scale encompasses the following items: ‘Do you think that people in 
the government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste 
very much of it?’, ‘How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in 
Washington to do what is right – just always, or only some of the time?’, ‘Would you say the 
government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is 
run for the benefit of all people?’, ‘Do you feel that almost all of the people running the gov-
ernment are smart people, who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a 
few of them don’t seem to know what they are doing?’, ‘Do you think that quite a few people 
running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of 
them are crooked at all?’ (A. H. Miller, et al., 1979). 
14  The dependent variable trust in political leaders was measured with two questions; the first 
referring to how one would rate a politician as a political leader, the second one asking how 
one would rate a politician’s capacity to be aware of the people’s problems. 
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to political scandals as a predictor of citizens’ political attitudes. A study by Morris 
& Clawson (2007) tests the hypothesis that media attention to political scandals 
weakens public approval of Congress. In order to test this assumption, the authors 
analyzed the evening news coverage of the U.S. Congress from 1990 through 2006 
in the New York Times (NYT) and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). The 
authors coded whether the newscasts contained information on congressional scan-
dals.15 Based on time-series models, the results indicate that approval of Congress16 
drops, if media attention to scandals in Congress increased. The results are con-
trolled for economic expectations and presidential approval. In contrast, a study 
investigating the impact of media attention to scandals on political support in Ger-
many (Wolling, 2001) does not support the assumption that media attention to scan-
dals decreases support. Based on the combination of media content and survey data, 
Wolling (2001) showed that media coverage of political scandals17 is not related to 
the perceived legitimacy of the political system, if variables such as media use and 
perception of the economy are included as control variables. The ambiguous fin-
dings might be due to differences in the conceptualization of independent variables. 
Whereas the study by Morris & Clawson (2007) looked at the media’s impact on 
approval of Congress, Wolling (2001) investigated media effects on system legiti-
macy, i.e. satisfaction with democracy. 
Morris & Clawson (2007) probed the effects of media depictions of political 
processes on public approval. The authors found that media attention to legislative 
maneuverings18 results in significant declines of public approval and supposed that 
this finding indicates that “the masses do not enjoy viewing the bureaucratic 
elements of the lawmaking processes, such as committee procedures, markups, floor 
proceedings, amendments, veto threats, etc.” (Morris & Clawson, 2007, p. 18). In 
addition, the authors probed whether references to political conflicts or political 
compromises in the media affect political attitudes. Conflict-oriented news was 
hypothesized to decrease approval of Congress. The results, however, showed that 
neither media attention to political conflict nor media attention to political 
compromises significantly contributed to a decrease in support for Congress. In 
contrast, as individual, partisan, or within-party conflicts increase in the media, 
public approval for Congress was found to increase. Other studies, in contrast, 
indicate that media attention to conflict and discord enhances the political malaise. 
For instance, Mutz & Reeves (2005, p. 3), based on an experimental study, found 
 
15  An article was coded as scandalous congressional news, if it contains illegal or unethical 
misdeeds in which Congress was directly or indirectly involved. 
16  Public approval for Congress was included in the data analysis as a single item-measure 
based on a variety of questions such as ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is 
handling its job?’, or, ‘Do you have a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little confidence in 
Congress?’ 
17  Media articles that refer to illegal, illegitimate or unethical political behavior were coded as 
scandal coverage. 
18  Legislative maneuvering was coded when the articles refer to activities in the law-making 
process, such as filibusters, hearings, vetoes, etc. 
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that exposure to political debates that are shaped by incivility significantly decreases 
subjects’ trust in politicians, trust in Congress, and trust in the government.  
2.1.3. The Impact of Media Strategy Frames 
Research on media framing constitutes a very broad and diverse field and this study 
cannot provide a comprehensive overview. An extensive overview of media framing 
research was recently provided by Matthes (2007b), for example. Nevertheless, 
some clarifying remarks on the media frames concept are considered to be important 
in order to outline the underlying assumptions of the studies presented here. Most 
studies in political communication research are interested in emphasis or issue fram-
ing effects (Druckman, 2001a, 2004; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Matthes, 2007b), in 
contrast to equivalence framing rooted in psychological research (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). Whereas equivalent framing refers to logically equivalent ver-
sions of a message (for instance Version A of a message informs about 400 people 
that will lose their jobs and Version B of this messages informs about a 1/3 probabil-
ity that nobody will lose its job and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will lose their 
jobs), emphasis framing refers to differences in the salience of several considera-
tions. For instance, a hate group can be framed in terms of free speech or it can be 
framed in terms of public safety, each frame emphasizing different considerations 
(Druckman, 2004). The most relevant definition of emphasis framing stems from 
Entmann (1993, p. 52) and reads:  
“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communication test, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal inter-
pretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”  
This literature review includes studies examining framing effects on political atti-
tudes. The framing of political news in terms of strategic considerations in particular 
is found to foster political cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson, 1996; De Vreese, 2005; 
Valentino, Beckmann, et al., 2001; Valentino, Buhr, et al., 2001). Media strategy 
frames are characterized by the following elements: 
“(1) winning and losing as the central concern; (2) the language of wars, games, and competi-
tion; (3) a story with performers, critics, and audience (voters); (4) centrality of performance, 
style, and perception of the candidate; (5) heavy weighing of polls and the candidate’s  
standing in them” (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 33).  
Several experimental studies conducted by Cappella & Jamieson (1996, 1997) 
provide the first empirical evidence for the impact of media strategy frames on re-
cipients’ political cynicism.19 A series of experimental studies (post-test-only design 
 
19  The authors defined political cynicism as an attitude that implies “that the self-interest of 
political actors is their primary goal and that the common interest is secondary at best or 
played out only for its political advantage” (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 142). The political 
cynicism index was developed in order to measure attitudes addressing political events such 
 
31 
with control group) showed that strategy frames in political news are activating 
cynicism about political campaigns, policy, and governance. The experiments dealt 
with different political news contexts, including news reports on political ads, elec-
tion campaigns and a complex public policy debate (the health care reform debate of 
1994). 
Subsequent research delivers further evidence for the assumption that strategy 
frames decrease political support. For instance Valentino and collaborators 
(Valentino, Beckmann, et al., 2001; Valentino, Buhr, et al., 2001) explored the effect 
of strategy frames on campaign evaluations and trust in government. In general, the 
authors found that strategy framed campaign news foster strategy oriented thoughts 
and reactions and increase negative evaluations of the campaign. Moreover, strategy 
frames appeared to reduce confidence in government, but this effect was not statisti-
cally significant for the general sample.  
A study by De Vreese (2004) contributes to framing research by examining  
strategy framing effects in a non-U.S. context and in a non-election setting. In addi-
tion, this study is not only interested in short-term effects but also explores longer-
term effects of strategy frames on political cynicism. 20 The author investigated the 
impact of media frames in the news coverage of debates about the enlargement of 
the EU on political cynicism. Because “recent studies of the effects of strategic news 
coverage have focused on the press but predicted that television might be an even 
more powerful medium for effects of strategic news” (De Vreese, 2004, p. 197), the 
author looked at the effects of television newscasts. The impact of strategy frames 
was tested based on a two-wave experiment with immediate and delayed (one week 
after the treatment) posttests. Subjects who received the story with the strategy 
frame showed significantly higher levels of political cynicism than subjects who 
received the story with the issue focus. This effect was significant only in the im-
mediate posttest, but not in the delayed posttest. De Vreese (2004) concluded that 
strategic news affects cynicism also outside the context of election campaigns. How-
ever, these effects were found to disappear over time when individuals were not 
frequently and repeatedly exposed to strategic news. A study based on a two-wave 
panel survey in combination with media content data by De Vreese (2005) increases 
 
as campaigns and debates, especially the trustworthiness of deliberative processes and the 
motivation of actors. The index is related to standard measures of trust in the government, 
confidence in the government and political efficacy without being highly redundant with the 
other measures. Cynicism was measured through a series of questions about the motives of 
politicians, their honesty, superficiality and self-interest. The items focus on “manipulative-
ness of advocates (candidates in campaigns and representatives of groups in policy debates), 
dishonesty, winning and getting ahead, looking good, using fear, the absence of real choice, 
and the role of big money” (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 143). 
20  Political cynicism was measured with the following four items derived from Cappella & 
Jamieson (1997): ‘Politicians are too superficial when dealing with enlargement’, ‘Politicians 
are too concerned with public opinion about enlargement’, ‘The debate about enlargement is 
more about strategy then content’, and ‘Politicians are clear and honest in their arguments 
about enlargement.’ 
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the generalizability of findings from experimental research. The results indicate that 
“strategic reporting is not per se cynicism-invoking”; rather the effects appeared to 
be contingent upon the level of strategic reporting in news coverage (De Vreese, 
2005, p. 284). 
2.1.4. Summary and Conclusion 
Regarding the effects of routine media use, the videomalaise theory has been par-
ticularly influential. The empirical evidence for the videomalaise assumption, how-
ever, is thin and videomalaise research has been subject of intense criticism. Besides 
methodological concerns, the primary point of criticism refers to the underlying 
assumption that there is a homogeneous critical and negative character of media 
content. This assumption is not tested empirically in most studies. Furthermore, 
studies in the tradition of videomalaise theory are not able to provide answers to the 
crucial question of which precise characteristics of news media coverage have an 
impact on political attitudes (Wolling, 1999). Critics of the videomalaise assumption 
argue that it is not so much the intensity of news consumption; instead, the explana-
tion of political attitudes lies in characteristics of the news (Kleinnijenhuis, et al., 
2006, p. 89).  
Studies that investigate the effects of specific aspects of news content on political 
attitudes provide answers to the question of which aspects of news coverage may 
contribute to a decrease of political support. Whereas negative media content is 
found to weaken approval, positive media content does not necessarily strengthen 
support (Maurer, 2003b). Likewise, research shows that the effect of negative in-
formation on political attitudes is larger than the effect of positive information 
(Allen & Burrell, 2002; Lau, 1982). In general, the literature review shows that 
media content aspects such as negative statements in the media, media cynicism, and 
a negative tone of news coverage impact on the audience’s political attitudes. With 
regard to this study’s research interest in the effects of media presentations of politi-
cal processes, negative media information on political processes will be considered 
as a predictor of political support. Previous research on the impact of news coverage 
of political processes suggests that attention to political discord or conflicts (Durr, et 
al., 1997; Mutz & Reeves, 2005) and the presentation of legislative maneuverings 
(Morris & Clawson, 2007) decrease political support. Thus, the impact of media 
information about political processes will be investigated in the present work by 
focusing on the role of media attention to political conflicts and legislative maneu-
verings. 
Other studies provide evidence for the assumption that media strategy frames 
shape political attitudes. The majority of studies on strategy framing effects are 
experimental studies that focus on short-term effects (Bertram Scheufele, 2004a, 
2004b). The posttests were conducted directly after the stimulus treatment, a sce-
nario that does not reflect realistic decision-making situations. “The high internal 
validity of experimentation comes at the price of unnatural viewing environments 
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and forced exposure” (De Vreese, 2005, p. 287). In general, it seems rather less 
applicable to consider strategy frames as an independent variable in the present 
work, because the impact of strategy frames on political attitudes results from their 
influence on the perceptions of motivations and strategies of political actors 
(Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Thus, strategy frames appear to be less relevant for 
the analysis of media presentations of political decision-making processes. More-
over, strategy frames were found to be characteristic for election campaign coverage 
(Cappella & Jamieson, 1996), but are less dominant in public policy news 
(Lawrence, 2000). It seems warranted to suggest that strategy frames are also less 
characteristic for media presentations of day-to-day political decision-making  
processes. 
In general, the literature review shows that the mass media’s impact on political 
attitudes is investigated by using a variety of different conceptualizations of political 
attitudes. For instance, studies investigate the impact of media information on politi-
cal trust, political cynicism, political malaise, or political alienation. For a recent and 
comprehensive overview of these concepts see Wolling (1999). In the present study, 
conceptualizations of political support will not include references to benchmarks of 
political evaluations other than yardsticks referring to aspects of political decision-
making processes, so that this study’s participants are not “distracted” from the role 
of political processes when forming attitudes of political support. Such benchmarks 
of evaluation are included in many measures, however. For instance, items of the 
political efficacy scale imply the expectation that public officials should care about 
what people think. The cynicism scale implies benchmarks of evaluation, such as 
politicians’ honesty, their conscientiousness and issue orientation. Similarly, the 
trust in government scale includes yardsticks for assessment, such as considering the 
interests of all the people and being smart. The same refers to measures of political 
alienation, which refer to politicians’ honesty, for instance. Because the concept of 
political culture is very diverse and in general encompasses behavioural components 
as well as evaluative attitudes, it is also considered somewhat less appropriate for 
the purpose of this study. This study, then, will focus on the media’s impact on con-
fidence in political institutions and the evaluation of their performance. Different 
objects of evaluation are distinguished in the literature and will be considered in this 
study. Wolling (1999) for instance differentiated between authorities, regime, and 
political community. Pickel & Walz (1997) distinguished between parties, political 
authorities, political institutions, and democracy. Easton (1975, p. 437) argues that 
the distinction between people running institutions, that is the “incumbents of  
offices”, and the political institutions as such is useful. In this study government, 
parliament, democracy, and political actors are distinguished as objects of political 
support.  
Three points of criticism apply to all three strands of the research, i.e. studies on 
the impact of media use, media content aspects and media strategy frames on politi-
cal support. First, the majority of studies focus on the effects of election and cam-
paign coverage (Benoit, et al., 2002; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; De Vreese, 2004, 
2005; De Vreese & Semetko, 2002; Kleinnijenhuis, et al., 2006; Pfau, 1987; Rhee, 
1997; Valentino, Beckmann, et al., 2001; Valentino, Buhr, et al., 2001). Thus, little 
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is known about the impact of strategy frames outside the election context, for in-
stance (De Vreese, 2004, p. 191). Second, research interested in the direct relation-
ship between media negativity and political attitudes focuses on outcomes and  
neglects the investigation of effect mechanisms and processes. For instance, there is 
a need for future studies to gain an “improved theoretical understanding of why 
strategy-oriented media coverage is associated with negative civic outcomes” 
(Besley & McComas, 2005, p. 429f.). In order to inform the conceptualization of 
effect mechanisms in this study, research that considers effect mechanisms is pre-
sented in Section 2.2. Third, research neglects to consider the conditions under 
which political attitudes are particularly susceptible to media effects. In order to 
inform the choice of possible conditions, an overview of studies exploring the condi-
tionality of media effects is given in Section 2.3. 
2.2. Mechanisms by which Media Information has an Impact on Political Attitudes 
This section provides an overview of studies that examine the effect mechanisms in 
order to explain how media information alters political attitudes. The investigation 
of process mechanisms is an important aim in research:  
“Establishing relationships between variables is important, because correlation is a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for claiming that two variables are causally related. Of even 
greater scientific interest is explaining how or by what means a causal effect occurs” (Preacher 
& Hayes, 2008, p. 879).  
In order to investigate how the media affect political attitudes, research considers 
variables that mediate the relationship between media information and political 
attitudes. “Questions about cause–effect relations invoke the idea of mediation, the 
process by which some variables exert influences on others through intervening or 
mediator variables” (Preacher & Hayes, 2008, p. 879). Despite potential non-
significant direct associations between media and political support, there might be a 
significant indirect effect. Such a significant indirect effect, then, would describe the 
effect of media information on political support via the influence on a third variable. 
The overview of variables that mediate the relationship between media information 
and political attitudes in this section will inform the choice of possible mediators in 
the present study. More precisely, plausible explanations for the way in which media 
depictions of political decision-making processes may evoke a decrease in political 
support will be developed. Because only a few studies on the media’s impact on 
political support consider mediating variables, the present section expands the focus 
on studies that investigate the media’s impact on attitudes of political support and 
also includes studies on the relationship between media and attitudes towards policy 
issues, in order to provide a rather broad overview of possible mediators.  
Research, for instance, suggests that the mass media may decrease political sup-
port by shaping the perception of political realities (Section 2.2.1). Other studies 
propose that simple media attention to certain political issues may shape presidential 
evaluations, because these issues then serve as a benchmark for the evaluation (Sec-
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tion 2.2.2). Further studies indicate that media information may foster fear and anger 
which might in turn lead to an increase in political distrust (Section 2.2.3). The  
media may not only serve as an obstacle to political support but also contribute to it 
by enhancing citizens’ political knowledge (Section 2.2.4). Seciton 2.2.5 summa-
rizes the findings and discusses suggestions for the present study. 
2.2.1. Trough Effects on Social Reality Perceptions  
Some research suggests that social reality perceptions might mediate the media’s 
impact on political attitudes. Although the mass media’s influence on social reality 
perceptions is at the core of cultivation research (see Section 3.2.1), this section is 
not about cultivation research, because cultivation research perceives reality percep-
tions as an independent variable. Instead, this section focuses on the role of reality 
perceptions as a variable that mediates the relationship between media information 
and political attitudes. 
For instance, a study by Hetherington (1996) investigates the relationship be-
tween media use, the audiences’ perception of the economy and vote choice in the 
framework of the 1992 U.S. national election. The author found a highly significant 
and negative effect of both media consumption in general and attention to the presi-
dential campaign in particular on voters’ perceptions of the national economy. In 
addition, there was a highly significant effect of economic evaluation on vote 
choice. Hence, the author concluded that mass media had an “indirect impact on 
vote choice through contribution of negative retrospective economic evaluations” 
(Hetherington, 1996, p. 383). The study does not provide a test of mediation in the 
strict sense, because the effect of economic evaluations on vote choice is not con-
trolled for media consumption (cf. Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  
Other studies showed that attributions of responsibility function as a mediator of 
media effects. Those responsibility attributions can be described as a distinct aspect 
of social reality perceptions. In a series of experimental studies, Iyengar (1987) 
explored the effect of media framing of political issues. Two versions of media 
framing are distinguished: Framing issues in terms of societal outcomes (issue  
framing) and framing issues in terms of particular victims and individual fates (epi-
sodic framing). These media frames were found to alter the attribution of responsi-
bility. Results indicate that issue frames foster the attribution of responsibility for 
political problems to the political system and episodic frames foster the attribution 
of responsibility to individual persons. The attribution of responsibility to the politi-
cal system, in turn, was linked with the assessment of presidential performance. 
“The more individuals attribute problems to structural or systemic causes, the more 
critical they are of President Reagan’s performance” (Iyengar, 1987, p. 828). The 
assumption of indirect framing effects was not tested empirically in a strict sense, 
because the effects of responsibility attributions on presidential evaluation were not 
controlled for the impact of media frames. Iyengar & Simon (1993) replicated the 
experimental findings reported above with survey data.  
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2.2.2. Trough Effects on Issue Accessibility or Perceived Issue Importance 
Another explanation for the mechanisms by which media information affects politi-
cal attitudes is suggested by priming theory.21 Some scholars argue that priming 
effects provide an explanation for the mechanisms by which negative media infor-
mation affects political attitudes, because most of the stimuli used in priming ex-
periments have been bad news, not good news (Kosicki, 2002, p. 76). Building on 
the idea of agenda-setting, researchers formulated the hypothesis that media cover-
age influences citizens’ assessment of the presidential performance by altering the 
importance that citizens describe to national policy issues (Iyengar, Kinder, Peters, 
& Krosnick, 1984; Kosicki, 1993; M. E. McCombs & Shaw, 1993). The priming 
hypothesis assumes that “by focusing on some issues and not others, the news may 
determine the standards by which a president’s performance is evaluated and may, 
as a result, provoke surges and declines in presidential popularity” (J. M. Miller & 
Krosnick, 1996, p. 80). Iyengar & Simon (1993) examined the priming hypothesis in 
the context of the Gulf crisis based on a combination of content analysis and survey 
data. The content analysis of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) news 
coverage between August 1990 and May 1991 showed that the Gulf war received an 
increasing amount of media attention. As a parallel trend, citizens were found to 
perceive that the crisis was the most important problem facing the country. As a 
consequence, they assigned greater weight to their beliefs and opinions concerning 
foreign policy when forming attitudes towards George Bush. These attitudes were 
shown to override the role of economic assessments, and, in turn, made the percep-
tion of George Bush more positive. Similarly, Krosnick & Brannon (1993), based on 
survey data from the National Election Panel Study (NES), found support for their 
assumption that the media’s focus on the Gulf crisis increased the impact of George 
Bush’s handling of the crisis on his overall job performance. In a study on the Iran-
contra disclosure, Krosnick & Kinder (1990) found the same effect pattern. The 
authors assumed that for citizens who had been interviewed after the disclosure, the 
issue of the U.S. intervening in Central America had a greater impact on their presi-
dential evaluations than for citizens who had been interviewed before the story 
broke. Other studies showed that although priming effects may explain presidential 
evaluations, they are less applicable to predict evaluations of political groups 
(McGraw & Ling, 2003). In all these studies, the assumed indirect priming effects 
were not the subject of strict empirical tests, however. 
 
21  Discussions on how priming and framing effects differ go beyond the scope of this paper. For 
further information see, for instance, Price & Tewksbury (1997). 
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2.2.3. Trough Effects on Emotions 
Most research in the field of political media effects focuses on cognitive, not on 
affective responses. Hence, Kinder (1998, p. 190) argues that “about the emotional 
requirements of citizenship, or the emotional foundations of political opinion, little 
is heard”. Until now, only a few studies have explored the relationship between 
media information, emotional responses and political attitudes. For instance 
Schemer (2009) reported findings that indicate that the news coverage in tabloids 
fuels negative emotions. Those negative emotions, in turn, affected subjects’ politi-
cal attitudes. Based on data from a three-wave panel survey the author showed that 
political media information in the context of a referendum on the asylum law in 
Switzerland raised negative emotions, such as fear and anger. These emotions were 
found to have consequences for policy judgments, more precisely attitudes towards 
the modification of the asylum law, in turn. This finding is consistent with results 
from a study by Sotirovic (2001). The author showed that fear acts as a mediator of 
media use on attitudes towards punitive policies. In line with these results, Holbert 
(2004) found that police reality show viewing predicts fear of crime. Fear of crime, 
in turn, was found to lead to the endorsement of capital punishment and handgun 
ownership.  
2.2.4. Trough Effects on Political Knowledge 
A variety of studies indicate that media information increases the audience’s politi-
cal knowledge (Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997). For instance, Benoit, McKinney, & 
Stephenson (2002) found that watching primary campaigns enhanced the viewers’ 
knowledge of the candidate’s policy positions. Studies that address the question of 
how media effects on political knowledge are related to changes in political attitudes 
are rather rare. Interesting findings in this respect are provided in a study by Moy & 
Pfau (2000). Using structural equation modeling, the authors not only investigated 
direct effects of media information on confidence in political institutions, but also 
indirect effects through the media’s impact on political knowledge. Findings indi-
cate that newspaper use increased political knowledge, which in turn enhanced trust 
and confidence in the presidency and Congress. Talk show viewing, in contrast, had 
a negative indirect effect on trust and confidence in Congress via political know-
ledge. Overall, the authors found more positive indirect effects than negative indi-
rect effects. On the whole, then, the findings suggest that media’s impact on political 
knowledge might lead to an increase of political support. Findings from a study on 
trust in the World Trade Organization (WTO) do not confirm this assumption (Moy, 
Torres, Tanaka, & McCluskey, 2005). The authors found no indirect effects of me-
dia reliance through institutional knowledge on trust in the WTO. 
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2.2.5. Summary and Conclusion 
A variety of studies presented in this section give explanations for the question of 
how media information influence political attitudes. Studies investigating the rela-
tionship between media information, perceptions of social reality and political atti-
tudes provide some evidence for the assumption that reality perceptions act as a 
mediator of the mass media’s impact on political attitudes. On the side of the inde-
pendent variable, studies investigated effects on individuals’ policy satisfaction and 
satisfaction with the performance of political leaders. It seems plausible to argue that 
the results may generalize media effects on political support. Thus, conceptualizing 
perceptions of political decision-making processes as a factor that mediates the rela-
tionship between media presentations of decision-making processes and political 
support appears to be promising. 
Studies in the tradition of priming research provide evidence for the assumption 
that perceived issue accessibility or perceived issue importance might mediate the 
relationship between media information and political attitudes, and presidential 
evaluations in particular. In general, research so far has tended to neglect the ques-
tion whether citizens consider the national importance of an issue and, hence, en-
gage in a cognitive process, or whether priming is just a function of accessibility and 
occurs unconsciously (J. M. Miller, 2007). The influence of the assumed mediating 
variables is not explicitly investigated in most studies: “Despite the normative im-
plications of the conventional wisdom that accessibility mediates agenda setting, to 
date the hypothesis has not been subject to empirical tests” (J. M. Miller, 2007, p. 
691) because “in virtually every past agenda-setting study, content and accessibility 
are confounded” (J. M. Miller, 2007, p. 707). The same is true with respect to prim-
ing research.  
Other studies provide empirical evidence for the assumption that emotional re-
sponses may mediate the effects of media information on policy attitudes. Although 
emotions appeared to be a relevant mediator of the relationship between media in-
formation and policy attitudes, little is known at present with respect to the role of 
emotions as a mediator of the media’s impact on attitudes towards political institu-
tions, actors or democracy. It appears that emotions are less likely to mediate the 
relationship between media presentations of day-to-day political decision-making 
processes and political support.  
Political knowledge may mediate the effects of media information on confidence 
in political institutions. The findings are rather diverse, indicating positive indirect 
effects of media exposure on confidence in some cases and negative indirect effects 
in other cases. With regard to the research purpose of this study, I may assume that 
political knowledge might mediate the relationship between media information 
about political processes and citizens’ political support. By increasing the know-
ledge about political processes, the media might also shape their perception. The two 
concepts, hence, appear to be closely related in that case. 
The majority of studies which investigate media effects and consider mediating 
variables did not apply the data analytical procedures to estimate indirect effects in a 
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strict sense. Hence most of what is known about the mediating impact of social 
reality perceptions, for instance, is based on plausible theoretical argumentations 
rather than on a solid empirical basis. Whereas a mediating variable is influenced by 
the independent variable and then, in turn, influences the dependent variable, a mo-
derating variable specifies the conditions under which a given effect occurs, as well 
as conditions under which the strength or direction of an effect varries (cf. Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; Holmbeck, 1997). The following section provides an overview of 
variables that may moderate the relationship between media information and politi-
cal attitudes.  
2.3. Conditionality of the Media’s Impact on Political Attitudes 
This section provides a brief overview of variables that specify the conditions under 
which media effects on political attitudes are particularly likely. The purpose of this 
section is to inform the selection of moderator variables that might be relevant with 
respect to the present study’s research interest. In order to provide a rather broad 
overview of possible moderators, the present section expands its focus on studies 
that explore the media’s impact on political support and also includes studies on the 
relationship between media and attitudes towards policy issues. Several studies 
indicate that media effects are particularly strong, if the audience’s trust in media is 
high (Section 2.3.1). Other studies indicate that media’s impact on political attitudes 
varies as a function of individuals’ political sophistication (Section 2.3.2). Further 
studies investigate whether media effects are contingent upon the general intensity 
of media use (Section 2.3.3). More recently, the modus of information processing 
has been the focus of scholars’ attention. Section 2.3.4 provides an overview of 
research exploring the moderating role of online vs. memory-based processing of 
media information. Section 2.3.5 presents studies that explore the moderating effects 
of individual predispositions. Finally, Section 2.3.6 summarizes the findings and 
discusses suggestions for the present study. 
2.3.1. The Role of Media Trust and Media Credibility 
The perceived trustworthiness or credibility of mass media22 is considered a relevant 
precondition for the media to have an impact on political attitudes. More precisely, 
media effects are supposed to be stronger if trust in media information is high 
(Matthes, 2007b, p. 187). This argument traces back to the classical persuasion stud-
ies by Hovland & Weiss (1951). Empirical support for the assumption that media 
credibility enhances the likelihood of media effects is given in an experimental study 
 
22  The terms are used interchangeably in media effects research (Kohring & Matthes, 2007, p. 
231f.). 
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by Druckman (2001b), for instance. The framing of news from a credible source 
(New York Times) was found to have a greater impact on attitudes than news frames 
from a source considered non-credible (The National Enquirer). Consistently, J.M. 
Miller & Krosnick (2000) found that priming effects are more likely to occur among 
people with high levels of general trust in the media compared to individuals with 
low trust levels.23 The assumptions of moderation were tested by including interac-
tion terms as well as the original predictor and moderator variables in the regression 
models. Similar findings were provided by Garramone (1984). Wolling (1999) also 
reported results which indicate that credible media sources exert stronger influence 
on political attitudes than less credible media sources.24 Media credibility was found 
to moderate the media’s effects on the evaluation of government performance and 
the assessment of implementations of political decisions. The media’s impact on 
other political attitudes was found to be independent of media credibility, however. 
The author therefore concluded that media credibility moderates the media’s impact 
only in part (Wolling, 1999, p. 216f.). In contrast to the majority of findings, Mat-
thes (2007b) reported results that do not support the assumption that trust in media 
moderates the strength of media effects. The findings are based on empirical tests 
using group comparisons (low vs. high trust respondents) in structural equation 
modeling. The author explained that the low variance in the trust variable might 
account for this finding. 
2.3.2. The Role of Political Sophistication 
A variety of studies suggests that the mass media’s impact on political attitudes is 
contingent upon the level of political sophistication of the audience or other related 
concepts such as political expertise, political awareness, political knowledge and 
political involvement. The term political sophistication refers to the “cognitive com-
plexity about politics” and is related to a person’s political belief system (PBS) 
 
23  Trust in the media was measured as self-reported measures, captured with three questions 
referring to the media in general. 
24 The assumption of moderating effects was tested based on the inclusion of interaction vari-
ables into regression models. In order to compute the interaction variables, for each media 
outlet the author recoded high credibility levels with ‘1’and low credibility levels with a value 
of ‘0’. These values were then multiplied with the value that was assigned to the media out-
lets based on findings from the content analysis (Wolling, 1999, p. 279). Those product indi-
cators were included in the regression analysis, the original media content indicators were ex-
cluded from the regression analysis. This procedure seems problematic for two reasons. First, 
the values of the product term for the non-credible media content will all be zero, as the prod-
uct of any other number and zero is zero. Hence, no variance on the interaction variable for 
the non-credible media content existed. Moreover, not including the original predictor vari-
able and moderator variable in regression analyses with product interaction terms is con-
sidered problematical, because the results are not controlled for the effects of both predictor 
and moderator variable on the dependent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1175f., 
Friedrich, 1982). 
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(Luskin, 1978, p. 861). High sophistication is given when the belief system is large 
(high number of political cognitions), wide-ranging (dispersion of cognitions among 
categories), and highly constrained (strong interconnectedness of cognitions). The 
three characteristics of the PBS – size, range and constraint – are interrelated. In the 
information-processing literature such an extensive, organized knowledge is referred 
to as expertise. Hence, “political sophistication is political expertise”, Luskin (1978, 
p. 861) concluded. Zaller (1992) also remarked on the similarity of concepts such as 
political expertise, sophistication, and involvement. He preferred the term “political 
awareness” because it encompasses both the “reception and comprehension of com-
munications from the political environment” (Zaller, 1992, p. 21). Zaller operation-
alizes political awareness as political knowledge. In general, then, political exper-
tise, political awareness, political knowledge, and political sophistication are related 
concepts.  
The traditional dosage-resistance perspective in media effect research assumes 
that “the more knowledge one has, the more resistant one should be”, because 
knowledgeable people are assumed to have a variety of other sources for political 
information beyond media that might shape their political judgments (Krosnick & 
Brannon, 1993, p. 956).25 Empirical evidence for the assumption is, for instance, 
given in a study on the association between talk radio use and political confidence 
by Pfau et al. (1998). The relationship between talk radio use and political confi-
dence was found to be particularly strong for people who are less interested in poli-
tics. Hence, the authors came to the conclusion that for the politically less interested 
subjects, mass media depictions exert much greater impact than for the political 
experts (Pfau, et al., 1998, p. 732). Consistently, Valentino, Beckmann, et al. (2001) 
reported that politically sophisticated individuals were mostly unaffected by strategy 
framing effects, whereas the least sophisticated are particularly vulnerable to strate-
gic campaign news coverage. Political expertise appears to reduce not only the like-
lihood of cognitive reactions to media content, but also emotional reactions. Hibbing 
& Theiss-Morse (1998) found that the relationship between media exposure and 
emotional attitudes was especially strong for political novices compared to politi-
cally experienced individuals. 
Zaller (1992) argued that two conditions must be fulfilled so that political aware-
ness enhances the likelihood of resistance to media’s impact. First, the media infor-
mation needs to be inconsistent with individual predispositions. Second, the link 
between information and predispositions needs to be rather abstract. Conversely, 
“the more simple and direct the link between a predisposition and an issue, the less 
important awareness is likely to be in regulating responses to political communica-
tions on that issue” (Zaller, 1992, p. 48). Taking the two conditions into account, the 
 
25  An alternative explanation of the mechanisms at work is given by research from cognitive 
psychology. From this perspective, it seems plausible to argue that politically knowledgeable 
persons are more resistant to media impact because they have more tightly organized political 
thoughts (Lusk & Judd, 1988) and, hence, are more likely to possess more extreme attitudes 
and have a greater attitude consistency. Both aspects were found to hamper attitude changes. 
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empirical results provided by the author support the assumption that politically 
aware people26 are more resistant to media effects than individuals with low levels 
of political awareness. For instance, the author found that highly aware individuals 
were able to resist the dominant pro Vietnam War messages in media information in 
the period from 1964 to 1966. As a result, patterns of support differed for politically 
aware compared to politically unaware people.  
Others argue that political expertise is a factor that facilitated information storage 
and retrieval and, hence, increases the likelihood of media effects. For example, 
Price & Zaller (1993) found that the more political knowledge a person has, the 
better is the individual recall of media information. And Tewskbury (1999) showed 
that politically knowledgeable people are more likely to engage in systematic infor-
mation processing than people with low levels of political knowledge. Information 
storage and retrieval, in turn, may enhance media effects (Krosnick & Brannon, 
1993, p. 956). For instance, Krosnick & Brannon (1993) found greater priming ef-
fects for political knowledgeable, when the effects of political knowledge, media 
exposure and political interest were investigated simultaneously. Similarly, Wolling 
(1999) reported findings which indicate that the effects of negative media informa-
tion on perceived internal political efficacy are stronger if political interest is high. 
The author concluded that people need to be interested in political information and 
process the information thoroughly for the information to have an effect on political 
attitudes (Wolling, 1999, p. 215).  
2.3.3. The Role of Intensity of General Media Use 
The traditional dosage perspective in media effect research assumes that “the greater 
one’s dosage of media content, the more one should be influenced by it” (Krosnick 
& Brannon, 1993, p. 956). Empirical support for this assumption is given in a study 
by A.H. Miller et al. (1979, p. 75ff.), for instance. The results indicate that the im-
pact of media criticism on respondents’ political cynicism is greater for those re-
spondents with high media exposure levels compared to respondents with low media 
exposure levels. The alternative hypothesis, in contrast, assumes smaller media 
effects under the condition of greater dosages. This hypothesis is based on the as-
sumption that people who are only minimally exposed to the news “will absorb little 
other than the ‘big message’ contained in the lead stories and repeated regularly 
across media and across time” (Krosnick & Brannon, 1993, p. 956). In support for 
this assumption, the study by Krosnick & Brannon (1993) showed that media prim-
ing effects are stronger for people with lower levels of general media exposure com-
pared to individuals with high levels of exposure. 
 
26  Political awareness is measured with questions about factual knowledge about politics, be-
cause this captures “what has actually gotten into people’s minds” (Zaller, 1992, p. 21).  
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2.3.4. The Role of Information Processing Strategies 
Recent research investigates the mode of attitude formation as an important variable 
that moderates media effects (Matthes, 2007a, 2007b). Two strategies of attitude 
formation are discussed in the literature, namely memory-based attitude formation 
and online attitude formation. Memory-based models focus on attitude accessibility 
and assume that individuals form evaluative attitudes based on information that is 
“on top of their heads” and hence more easily available (D. A. Scheufele, 2000, p. 
299). Opinions are constructed at the time the judgment is expressed, attitudes rely 
on information recall and specific items must be retrieved from memory in order to 
construct an overall evaluation (Hastie & Park, 1986). Thus, in case of memory-
based attitude formation, there is a strong correspondence between retrieved infor-
mation in memory and the evaluative attitude (Hastie & Park, 1986; Lichtenstein & 
Skrull, 1987). Judgments that are built online are made at the time the information is 
acquired. The updated evaluation is then transferred to the long-term memory 
(Kinder, 1998, p. 184f.). Aspects that alter evaluations might vanish from memory, 
and people just retrieve the overall evaluation from memory “without reviewing the 
information upon which it is based” (Rahn, Aldrich, & Borgida, 1994, p. 193). 
Hertel & Bless (2000) mention that a precondition for online information processing 
is that there are pre-existing attitudes. Likewise, Tormalla and Petty (2001, p. 1600) 
state that if there was no opinion formed prior to information exposure, the judgment 
will be built in a memory-based fashion at the time a decision is required. Whereas 
some authors speak of contrasting models, others argue that both models “are ‘right’ 
but under different conditions” (McGraw, 2000, p. 813).  
The most current and comprehensive investigation of media effects as a function 
of the information processing strategy was recently provided by Matthes (2007a, 
2007b). The author argues that the impact of media frames is greater for memory-
based attitudes than for online-built attitudes. Using group comparison in structural 
equation modeling, the empirical results support this assumption. This finding is in 
line with empirical results from other studies in media effects research (Druckman & 
Nelson, 2003; Krosnick & Brannon, 1993). However, these studies fall short in 
actually investigating the role of information processing strategies and merely refer 
to such strategies when explaining the obtained results. 
2.3.5. The Role of Individual Predispositions 
Considering the role of individual predispositions, the “reception-acceptance model” 
of attitude change by Zaller (1992) is of particular relevance in public opinion re-
search. Zaller (1992, p. 22) defined predispositions as “stable, individual-level traits 
that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communications a 
person receives.” Predispositions are argued to be part of lifetime experiences, to be 
shaped by socialization and to depend on personality factors and tastes. Moreover, 
political predispositions are assumed to be rather independent from mass media 
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information, a type of elite-supplied information: “Elites are not assumed to have an 
important role in shaping people’s political predispositions” (Zaller, 1992, p. 23). If 
predispositions are influenced by media information, then this impact is argued to be 
subject to long-term changes. Zaller (1992, p. 23) conceptualizes political values as 
one “of the various different types of predispositions” and the central moderators of 
attitude changes. Values are understood by Zaller (1992, p. 23) as “general and en-
during standards” that have a more central position than attitudes in individuals’ 
belief systems.27 The author assumes that the likelihood of media effects decreases 
with the distance between individual values and the value coloration of the mes-
sages. Based on surveys from the Center for Political Studies (CPS) and data from 
the National Election Studies (NES), the author found support for the assumption 
that political values hamper the influence of contradictory information on attitudes. 
The effects were consistent over a variety of measures of political predispositions. 
For instance political values were measured as hawk-dove attitudes (Zaller, 1992, p. 
213ff.), attitudes concerning domestic politics and foreign politics, left-right orienta-
tion, and values regarding job guarantees, government services, and minority aid 
(Zaller, 1992, p. 344f.). The applicability of “reception-acceptance model” is re-
stricted to specific circumstances: “The model applies only to cases in which one 
can demonstrate or plausibly assume the existence of particular change-inducing 
messages having distinct ideological colorations” (Zaller, 1992, p. 301). No empiri-
cal support for the model was found, for instance, with regard to the explanation of 
trust in government (Zaller, 1992, pp. 299-301).  
Other predispositions considered in media effects research are viewer expecta-
tions. For instance, Pfau (1987) studied the influence of televised intraparty political 
debates during the 1984 presidential campaign as a function of viewer expectations 
with regard to appropriate communication behavior. Drawing on expectancy theory 
(Burgoon & Miller, 1985)28 the author argued that if the language used in the in-
traparty political debates violates these viewer expectations, the support for political 
actors involved in the debates will decrease. Survey data based on a quasi-
experimental design supports this assumption. Hence, the author concluded that 
“expectancy theory should be incorporated into further studies of political debate 
influence. As in this study, it is likely to better predict attitude change than standard 
explanations (such as attitudes about issue positions, leadership, and personality)” 
(Pfau, 1987, p. 695).  
A study by Mutz & Reeves (2005) focused on the role of personality factors as a 
moderator of media effects. More precisely, the authors hypothesized that the indi-
vidual propensity for conflict avoidance moderates the impact of exposure to uncivil 
discourse in a televised political debate on political trust. The results showed that 
respondents who are generally uncomfortable with face-to-face disagreement had 
much lower levels of political trust as a result of exposure to the uncivil condition 
 
27  According to Zaller (1992) values constitute “domain-specific organizing principles”. The 
term “ideology”, in contrast, refers to a more general left-right scheme. 
28  Expectancy theory assumes attitude changes in relation to expectations about language use. 
45 
compared to exposure to the civil condition. For respondents who find disagree-
ments somewhat enjoyable, exposure to the uncivil condition generated slightly 
higher levels of political trust than exposure to the civil condition. 
Predispositions can also be understood in terms individual schemas. For example, 
Shen (2004) suggested that media framing effects are moderated by individual dif-
ferences in political schemas. Schemas are defined as knowledge structures that 
describe chronically accessible and organized knowledge about a given concept. A 
schema is hypothesized to moderate media effects by influencing the “encoding, 
selection, abstraction, […] storage […], retrieval and interpretation of information” 
(Shen, 2004, p. 133). Based on an experimental study, the author showed that sub-
jects with different schemas responded to media stimuli significantly differently. 
Individuals with issue political schemas were more likely to draw upon issue-related 
thoughts after being exposed to issue messages than participants with character 
schemas. In contrast, individuals with character political schemas were more likely 
to draw upon character-related thoughts after being exposed to character messages 
than participants with issue schemas.  
2.3.6. Summary and Conclusion 
Research shows that a variety of factors may moderate the relationship between 
media information and political attitudes. Studies are largely consistent in their fin-
ding that media effects are stronger if trust in media is high. Although several  
studies indicate that political sophistication enhances the strength of media effects, 
other findings indicate less intense media effects for politically knowledgeable peo-
ple compared to novices. In general, then, the empirical evidence regarding the 
moderating role of political expertise is inconsistent (De Vreese, 2004; Krosnick & 
Brannon, 1993). The diversity of findings might to some extent be explained by 
different operationalizations of political sophistication, ranging from the single-item 
measures as the level of formal education (Valentino, Beckmann, et al., 2001), a 
combined index encompassing awareness of, interest in and knowledge about a 
political institution (Moy & Pfau, 2000), to factual knowledge (Zaller, 1992). In 
addition, Druckman & Nelson (2003, p. 732, emphasis in original) suggested that a 
possible confounding of political knowledge and prior opinions may explain the 
variance in research findings: 
“The problem with past work is that while individuals with prior opinions may be more 
knowledgeable, it is not the knowledge per se that is at work; rather, it is the existence of prior 
opinions based on other information that vitiates the impact of a new frame.”  
The differences in research findings might also be accounted for by varying context 
factors, such as trust in the media. For instance, Miller & Krosnick (2000) suggest 
that knowledge only enhances priming effects among people who trust the media. 
Moreover, the impact of political knowledge appears to differ with respect to the 
type of media effects under study. Whereas political knowledge is found to hamper 
the media’s persuasive impact on evaluative political attitudes (for instance 
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Valentino, Beckmann, et al., 2001), political knowledge contributed to the effects of 
media information on political cognitions (for instance Price & Zaller, 1993).  
With respect to the conditionality of media effects on the general intensity of me-
dia use, research also provides inconsistent findings. Whereas some studies indicate 
that a high intensity of media use might strengthen media effects, other studies re-
ported lower media effects in the condition of high intensity media use. Differences 
in the operationalization of media use might account for the diversity in findings. 
For instance, A. H. Miller et al. (1979, p. 75ff.) investigated the role of general ex-
posure to national politics in the media. And Krosnick & Brannon (1993, p. 966) 
built an index of media exposure that combined media use in general and media use 
about the 1990 elections. In addition, the lack of consideration given to context 
factors such as trust in the media might explain the diversity in findings. 
The findings on the moderating impact of the information processing strategies 
generally suggest that media effects are larger when judgments are made based on 
memory (Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Krosnick & Brannon, 1993; Matthes, 2007b). 
As of yet, only a few studies include explicit measures of the information processing 
strategy (for instance Matthes, 2007b). Other authors use proxy measures, such as 
the “Need to Evaluate” concept (for instance Druckman & Nelson, 2003). In order 
to facilitate the use of applicable measures of information processing, Matthes, 
Wirth, & Schemer (2007) discussed concepts to measure the mode of information 
processing in surveys.  
Other studies suggest that individual predispositions moderate the relationship 
between media information and political attitudes. Studies exploring the moderating 
role of political values, schemas, personality factors, or expectations about language 
use were presented. All these aspects of predispositions were found to act as signifi-
cant moderator of media effects. With respect to this study’s research question on 
the impact of media depictions of political processes on political support, literature 
from political science emphasizes the role of preferences regarding political deci-
sion-making processes (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). Hence process preferences 
as a form of predispositions will be the focus of the present study. To date, media 
effects research has tended to neglect the role of preferences regarding political 
processes.29  
With regard to the data analytical procedures applied to test the role of moderator 
variables, some studies do not provide solid empirical evidence for the assumed 
 
29  However, the argument that individual preferences matter shows some similarity with the 
assumption that priming effects depend on the relevance of an issue with regard to the evalua-
tive task (Iyengar, et al., 1984; Kiousis, 2003). But whereas the general relevance of an issue 
is conceptualized as characteristic of an issue, preferences in this study are understood as the 
individual perceived relevance of an issue and, hence, are conceptualized as characteristics of 
the individuals. For more information on the theoretical arguments of the present study see 
Chapter 3. The argument also seems compatible with the argument by Pfau (1987) that ex-
pectations regarding language use matter. Whereas Pfau considers expectations regarding lan-
guage use, the present study is interested in expectations regarding aspects of decision-
making political processes. 
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moderator effects (for instance Krosnick & Brannon, 1993). Regarding those studies 
that did so, a variety of approaches was found. Most studies included interaction 
terms as well as the original predictor and moderator variables into regression mo-
dels (J. M. Miller & Krosnick, 2000) or analysis of variance models (Mutz & 
Reeves, 2005). Another approach found in more recent studies is testing interactions 
by means of group comparisons using structural equation modeling (Matthes, 
2007b). 
2.4. Summary and Suggestions for the Present Study 
Based on the reviewed literature, it seems that the relationship between political 
media information and citizens’ attitudes can best be described as a dynamic  
process. The media’s impact on political support appears to be influenced by reality 
perceptions, issue accessibility or political knowledge, for instance, and is contin-
gent upon a variety of factors that describe the individual susceptibility to media 
effects, such as the perceived credibility of media information, the level of political 
sophistication or individual values. Overall, media effects on political support tend 
to be strongest when the level of political sophistication of the recipients is low 
(Zaller, 1992), the audience holds low levels of partisanship (Valentino, Beckmann, 
et al., 2001) and the media information is perceived to be highly trustworthy 
(Druckman, 2001b). Whereas negative media content is found to weaken approval, 
positive media content does not necessarily strengthen support (Maurer, 2003b). 
Several limitations of previous research were discussed. This section summarizes 
suggestions for the investigation of the impact of media presentations of political 
decision-making processes on political support in this study. First, the majority of 
studies focus on election and campaign coverage. Little is known about the impact 
of the media’s presentation of political decision-making processes on citizens’ po-
litical support: “There have been no attempts to tie media coverage of legislative 
process to citizen approval” (Morris & Clawson, 2007, p. 3). Studies from political 
science, however, indicate that political decision-making processes are an important 
factor in shaping citizens’ political support. “The frustrating conflict and unsatis-
fying compromise inherent in the process erode public confidence in the institution’s 
membership and leaders” (Morris & Clawson, 2005, p. 311). Hence, the present 
study will look at the effects of media depictions of day-to-day political decision-
making processes. Stimulated by findings provided by studies that investigate the 
effects of distinct aspects of media coverage on political attitudes, the impact of 
media presentation of political processes in terms of conflict-orientation and proce-
dural maneuverings will be the focus. 
Second, previous research concentrated on examining the direct relationship be-
tween media information and political attitudes. Thus, studies neglected to explore 
the way how media information affects political attitudes. The question of how the 
effects occur is addressed by studies that consider mediating variables in order to 
explore effect mechanisms. The overview of literature that is summarized in Appen-
48 
dix 10.1 shows that only 13 out of the 49 studies that are summarized in the table 
consider mediating variables. “We need to move beyond descriptions of whether an 
effect occurs or not and focus more on explaining why and how those effects occur” 
(Potter, 1993, p. 597). What Potter (1993) formulated with regard to cultivation 
research refers also to media effects research in general. A variety of studies have 
shown that media content might harm political support by shaping the perception of 
political realities. Hence, the present study focuses on reality perceptions as a me-
diator of the relationship between media information and political support. Reality 
perceptions are considered to be most applicable with regard to this study’s research 
question, because it seems very plausible to assume that media information about 
political processes affects the perception of these processes. The perception, in turn, 
may predict political support.30 Other mediators discussed in the literature are con-
sidered to be somewhat less appropriate. For instance, it seems less warranted to 
suggest that media information about day-to-day political processes (not distinct 
processes that might include potential for emotional arousal) raises emotional reac-
tions such as fear or anger.  
Third, research tends to neglect the considerations of conditions under which the 
media’s impact on political attitudes is particularly likely. In media effects research, 
“less common are studies that consider differential impacts among different catego-
ries of people. Yet, a strong theoretical literature suggests such work is precisely 
what is required in order to better understand media effects during campaigns” 
(Valentino, Beckmann, et al., 2001, p. 348). The overview of literature summarized 
in Appendix 10.1 shows that only 15 out of the 49 studies that are summarized in the 
table consider possible moderators of media effects. Considering moderating vari-
ables is important, as the failure to consider moderators might prevent researchers 
from finding significant effects and, hence, result in an underestimation of media 
effects. “One of the keys to uncovering this ‘buried’ stronger effects is to identify 
‘third variables’ that are suppressing the relationship” (Potter, 1993, p. 591). With 
respect to this study’s research question on the impact of media depictions of politi-
cal processes, literature from political science emphasizes the role of preferences 
regarding political decision-making processes (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). 
Hence, the role of role of individual preferences as a sort of predisposition will be of 
particular interest in this study.  
The literature review was also used to inform methodological choices for the pre-
sent study. The majority of research is based on aggregate level data that are criti-
cized for their inherent risk of ecological fallacy. Hence, this study will be based on 
individual level data. The data analysis, moreover, will apply multivariate models 
that simultaneously control multiple influencing factors. The use of socio-
 
30  Based on the literature reviewed, the present study assumes that routine media use may not 
predict attitudes of political support. However, media use may account for variances in the 
perception of political processes (see Section 3.2.1). Hence, there might be an indirect rela-
tionship between routine media use and political attitudes through the perception of political 
processes. 
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demographic control variables in the present study will be guided by explicit formu-
lations of indicator functions and intervention assumptions (Bertram  Scheufele & 
Wimmer, 2006). Although studies provide evidence for the assumption that negative 
media content is related to low levels of political support, the direction of causality 
is not explicitly addressed in the majority of studies. Most studies investigate the 
media’s impact on political attitudes based on cross sectional survey data. These 
studies are not able to provide evidence for the assumed causality of the relationship 
between media information and political attitudes. For instance, it seems plausible to 
argue that “cynical people are drawn to those communication sources that reflect 
their attitudes” (Pfau, et al., 1998, p. 741). Likewise, Tan (1981, p. 145) based on an 
analysis of survey data concludes “that causal models taking mass media use vari-
ables as effects rather than causes of political orientations have some validity, par-
ticularly for white samples”. Besides the implementation of experimental or panel 
designs, considering the mechanisms by which media distort or enhance political 
attitudes might contribute to the investigation of causality. Thus, by considering 
mediation the present study might contribute to the investigation of the causal 
mechanisms by which media information shapes political attitudes. The majority of 
studies presented in this chapter do not apply data analytical procedures that provide 
a strict test of mediation. In order to gain more confidence in the assumed mecha-
nisms, more applicable methods of data analysis will be applied in the present work.  
In general, this study makes efforts to contribute to media effects research by ex-
ploring the relationship between media presentations of political processes, citizens’ 
perceptions of political processes, individual preferences regarding political  
processes, and political support. The focus of the present work is in line with recent 
findings from political science showing, first, that aspects of political process ex-
plain political attitudes (for instance John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 
2001a) and, second, that the relationship between perceptions and preferences pre-
dicts political attitudes (for instance Kimball & Patterson, 1997). The following 
chapter elaborates the theoretical argument of the present study.  
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3. A Preferences-Perceptions Model of Media Effects on Political Sup-
port 
Based on the literature review in the previous chapter, I have formulated three  
suggestions for the present study. First, this study extends the focus of media effects 
research on the context of election campaigns by investigating the effect of media 
presentations of day-to-day political decision-making processes on citizens’ political 
support. It thus focuses on media depictions of discussions of possible solutions to 
political problems and decision-making processes within the government, the par-
liament, or the political administration. The impact of media presentations of refer-
enda or other processes that are geared towards citizens’ participation is not consi-
dered here. Second, this study aims to explain the mechanisms by which media 
information about political processes affects citizens’ political support. Drawing on 
cultivation theory and the assumption that subjects’ reliance on mass media accounts 
for perceptions of social reality (Eveland, 2002), this study investigates the role of 
audience perceptions of political processes as mediator of the relationship between 
media information and political support. Third, the present work endeavors to spe-
cify the conditions under which media presentations of political processes are par-
ticularly likely to have an impact on political support. Building on research that 
shows that the relationship between perceptions of political institutions and related 
preferences explains confidence levels (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Kimball & 
Patterson, 1997), media effects are assumed to vary as a function of individual pref-
erences as regards political decision-making processes.31  
Considering these three suggestions, this chapter develops a theoretical model 
that captures individual-level differences in political support and takes central  
account of the relationship between media information, perceptions of political  
processes, preferences as regards political processes, and political support. Citizens’ 
process perceptions as well as their process preferences and attitudes of political 
support are conceptualized as cognitive attitudes. In general, the definition of an 
attitude is “simply that it is a hypothetical construct involving the evaluation of 
some object” (Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2008). This definition by Roskos-Ewoldsen en-
compasses three aspects of attitudes: First, attitudes are hypothetical, meaning that 
they cannot be observed directly and need to be measured indirectly with a variety 
of different items. Second, attitudes involve evaluations. Third, attitudes are directed 
 
31  Research investigating the role of preferences with respect to policy issues does not fall 
within the scope of the present study. Policy preferences are considered in spatial models of 
voting, for example. These models compare the distance between voters’ and candidates’ po-
sitions on political issues in order to predict vote choices (Enelow & Hinich, 1990). Similarly, 
A. H. Miller (1974) argues that citizens hold low levels of trust in the government if they are 
unsatisfied with the policy alternatives offered to solve current problems. 
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towards objects, i.e. things, ideas, individuals, or groups. The concept of attitudes 
encompasses affective, behavioral, and cognitive components. Emotional reactions 
and feelings toward an object of evaluation are affective attitudes. The behavioral 
component encompasses actions directed towards the object of evaluation (Roskos-
Ewoldsen, 2008). Cognitive attitudes, which are the focus of this study, are thoughts 
and beliefs about an object of evaluation.  
Process preferences in this study are understood as citizens’ expectations of how 
political decisions should be made and how political institutions should operate. 
Hence, process preferences “determine what people want” (De Mesquita & 
McDermott, 2004, p. 276). More precisely, preferences are conceptualized as “a 
comparative evaluation of (i.e. a ranking over) a set of objects” (Druckman & Lupia, 
2000, p. 2). Building on this definition of preferences as a ranking of various op-
tions, process preferences in this study describe which aspects of decision-making 
processes are relatively important for an individual compared to other process as-
pects. The preferences are hypothesized to be stored in memory and to be drawn on 
when people make decisions (Druckman & Lupia, 2000, p. 2). The term “prefer-
ences” instead of “expectations” is used here in order to emphasize the role of com-
parative evaluations and judgments about the relative importance of different  
process aspects. The term “expectations”, which is used in some studies to describe 
what people want (Kimball & Patterson, 1997; S. C. Patterson, et al., 1969), is not 
used in this work, because it is mainly used in the literature to refer to what people 
think will happen in the future (Dolan & Holbrook, 2001, p. 28).  
Process perceptions refer to the pictures that citizens have in their heads about the 
way political decisions are made. Because “the world that we have to deal with 
politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind”, man makes “trustworthy pic-
tures inside his head of the world beyond his reach” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 29). Since 
perceptions of political processes are “attitudes and beliefs about others” (Shrum, 
2008), they can be conceptualized as social perceptions. Characteristic for social 
perceptions is that different individuals may hold diverse perceptions of the same 
group of other people, because social perceptions are an “active and constructive 
process” (Samochowiec & Wähnke, 2008). “How individuals interpret the real 
world around them” (Hoffmann & Glynn, 2008) is, for instance, influenced not only 
by experiences but also by individual expectancies and motivations (Shrum, 2008).  
The purpose of the preferences-perceptions model of media effects that will be 
developed in this chapter is to explain alterations in political support as responses to 
media-induced changes in the perception of political processes. In addition, the mass 
media’s impact on political support is assumed to vary as a function of individual 
process preferences. The model’s arguments are backed up with references to estab-
lished theories and selected empirical evidence. Section 3.1 refers to the role of the 
preferences-perceptions relationship as predictor of political support. Section 3.2 
elaborates the assumption that media presentations of political decision-making 
processes shape the audience’s perception of these processes. In addition, the chap-
ter elucidates the argument that process preferences are rooted in the political culture 
of a nation and discusses possibilities for media effects on process preferences. It  
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also presents research that investigates how the media depict political decision-
making processes in order to inform propositions about possible effects of the media 
on citizens’ perceptions of political processes and political support. Section 3.3 then 
summarizes the main assumptions and outlines the propositions of the preferences-
perceptions model of media effects. This study’s empirical program to test the 
model is presented in Section 3.4. 
3.1. The Preferences-Perceptions Relationship as Predictor of Political Support 
The role of process aspects as determinant of political evaluations is emphasized in a 
variety of studies. “Given that people are often ambivalent, agnostic, or uninterested 
in specific policy, citizens often use their views about process to inform their politi-
cal decisions” (Dyck & Baldassare, 2009, p. 552). Empirical research interested in 
the impact of procedural justice on public approval of authorities and institutions 
supports this assumption. “According to the procedural justice perspective citizens 
are not only sensitive to outcomes in evaluating leaders. In addition, they respond to 
their judgment of the fairness of procedures by which outcomes are allocated” 
(Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985, p. 703). For example, Tyler, Rasinski, & 
McGraw (1985) based on data from two empirical studies concluded that percep-
tions of procedural fairness and justice have more influence upon the approval of 
political leaders and institutions than do outcome-related concerns. Based on panel 
survey data Grimes (2006) showed that the perceived fairness of processes by which 
collective decisions are taken predicts public approval of political institutions. The 
perceived justice of procedures was also found to impact the approval of the Su-
preme Court (Tyler & Rasinski, 1991). In line with this result, Ramirez (2008) found 
that subjects exposed to information that presented Supreme Court proceedings as 
fair showed higher levels of support for the Court than subjects exposed to informa-
tion that presented the proceedings as unfair. Similar findings are reported by Baird 
& Gangl (2006). Besides the analysis of the impact of perceived procedural fairness, 
there is a “need to identify those procedures which citizens feel are fair” (Tyler, 
Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985, p. 721). This question, however, is not addressed in 
procedural justice research so far. 
This section elaborates the argument that the relationship between citizens’ per-
ceptions of political processes and their preferences concerning political decision-
making processes explains variations in political support. The role of the prefer-
ences-perceptions relationship as predictor of political support is based on the basic 
assumption that “evaluations of individual, social or political objects are partly 
grounded in disparities between expectations and perceptions” (Kimball & Patter-
son, 1997, p. 703). The notion that inconsistencies in a person’s beliefs system result 
in personal discomfort has a long history in social psychology, e.g. in concepts such 
as dissonance, imbalance, incongruence (cf. Higgins, 1987, p. 63).  
The argument that political support is shaped by the relationship between percep-
tions of political processes and according preferences is in line with findings from 
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studies in political science which show that confidence in political institutions or 
actors varies as a function of the relationship between citizens’ perceptions and 
preferences. These studies emphasize the point that it is not only the perception of 
political realities that explains evaluative attitudes. Instead, political preferences 
matter also. Patterson et al. (1969) were among the first researchers to investigate 
the role of perceptions-preferences relations as predictor of political support. Their 
study investigates the role of the perceptions-preferences differential on support for 
legislators:  
“We expect high levels of legislative support from citizens whose feelings about what the leg-
islature is like come close to their expectation of it. And, low levels of legislative support 
should be exhibited by those for whom there are wide gaps between their perceptions of the 
legislature and what they expect of it” (S. C. Patterson, et al., 1969).  
Perceptions were measured with items on a 10-point scale that indicate whether 
respondents think that legislators are influenced by several actors or agencies. In 
addition, items which measure the extent to which legislators have certain character-
istics were included in the survey. Expectations were measured with items on a 10-
point scale measuring whether legislators should be influenced by a series of actors 
or agencies and the extent to which members of the legislature ought to have certain 
characteristics. Hence, both perception and expectation items refer to two aspects of 
the representative legislature: influencing agencies and legislators’ characteristics. 
Using survey data from a representative sample of citizens in Iowa State, the authors 
assessed the impact of the relationship between perceptions and expectations on 
subjects’ support for legislators. In order to do so, the authors assigned the subjects 
to two groups, indicating congruence or incongruence between perceptions and 
expectations towards the legislators. The congruent group showed higher mean 
support scores than did the incongruent group. The authors interpreted these results 
as support for their hypothesis that congruence between perceptions and expecta-
tions fosters support, whereas incongruence leads to low levels of support. The  
authors concluded that perceptions-expectations differentials explain variance in 
support for the legislators.  
A study by Kimball & Patterson (1997) gives further empirical validity to this 
line of argument. The authors expanded previous research by investigating the im-
pact of the expectations-perceptions discrepancy on attitudes towards Congress in a 
multivariate explanatory environment. Using data from a 1994 post-election survey 
with citizens in Ohio State, the authors analyzed citizens’ expectations regarding 
motives and connections of incumbents as well as according perceptions. Based on 
calculations of the difference between expectations and perceptions, discrepancy 
items were built. By means of factor analysis, two dimensions of the expectations-
perceptions discrepancy concerning Congress were derived: A candidacy factor 
including attributes such as individual motivation and connections, and an exper-
ience factor embracing aspects such as training, experience, loyalty, and reelection 
interests. The multivariate estimation by means of multiple regression (including 
socio-demographic variables, party identification, political involvement) shows that 
the two discrepancy factors have a direct and significant impact on evaluations of 
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Congress. In order to compare the explanatory power of the two discrepancy factors 
against the predictive power of expectation and perception measures, the authors ran 
a multivariate model that included perception measures and expectation measures. 
This model showed lower levels of fit than the model that includes the two dis-
crepancy factors. Thus, the authors conclude that “public attitudes toward Congress 
hinge very much upon public expectations, [and] citizens’ perceptions of congres-
sional performance” (Kimball & Patterson, 1997, p. 722).  
More recent research on political support underscores the importance of political 
processes (John R. Hibbing & Elisabeth Theiss-Morse, 2001; John R. Hibbing & 
Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 2001a, 2001b; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). Hibbing & 
Theiss-Morse (2002) argue that citizens hold preferences not only with respect to 
political actors, but also with regard to political processes. “Dissatisfaction usually 
stems from perceptions about how government goes about its business, not what the 
government does. Processes, I argue, are not only means to policy ends but, instead, 
are often ends in themselves” (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002, p. 35). The authors 
assume that discrepancies between process preferences and the perception of politi-
cal processes account for variances in support levels (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 
2002). Their study on process preferences and public approval of government (John 
R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 2001a, 2001b; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 
2002) provides evidence for this assumption. The authors used a specially designed 
national survey of 1.266 randomly selected adults as well as focus group discussions 
in order to investigate the governmental procedures that people want and the percep-
tions of the working of government. In the focus group discussions, the authors 
found that  
“people tend to speak more directly and with more confidence about the flawed processes of 
government than they do about intractable policy dilemmas. The more I listened to them de-
scribe their perceptions of government, the more I was taken with the fact that people care 
deeply about procedures by which policies are produced” (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth 
Theiss-Morse, 2001a, p. 147).  
Using measurements of process perceptions and process preferences in the stan-
dardized survey32, the differential was built to obtain a measure for the perceived 
process gap. In a multivariate setting controlling for socio-demographics, political 
knowledge, party identification, and policy satisfaction, the authors found a signifi-
cant effect of the process gap variable on approval of the government. A process that 
matches an individual’s preferences as to how a political process should work in-
 
32  Citizens’ process preferences are measured with the questions: “Some people say what I need 
in this country is for ordinary people like you and me to decide for ourselves what needs to be 
done and how. Others say ordinary people are too busy and should instead allow elected offi-
cials and bureaucrats to make all political decisions. Still others say a combination would be 
best. Imagine a seven-point scale with 1 being ordinary people making all decisions on their 
own and 7 being elected officials and bureaucrats making all the decisions on their own while 
2,3,4,5, or 6 indicate in-between opinions on the two extremes. Which number from 1 to 7 
best represents …how you think government should work? ... how you think the national 
government in Washington actually works?” (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002, p. 412). 
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creases approval, whereas discrepancies decrease support. Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse (1995; 2002) maintained that aspects of political processes such as conflict, 
compromise, bargaining, intense debate and deliberation, competition between di-
verging interests, and procedural inefficiency are considered particularly unap-
pealing by the American public. Instead, Americans want efficiency and decisive-
ness from their government. The authors conclude that “the extent to which indi-
viduals believe actual processes are inconsistent with their own process preferences 
is an important variable in understanding the current public mood” (John R. Hibbing 
& Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 2001a, p. 145).  
Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997), in their study on congressional approval, 
came to a similar conclusion. The authors used time-series containing a quarterly 
measure of approval from 1974 to 1993 in order to analyze the impact of congres-
sional actions on public attitudes towards Congress. The authors assumed that at 
times when Congress acts as required by its institutional role, support declines be-
cause expectations of decisive action and efficiency are not being fulfilled. The 
findings indicate that mass support for Congress tends to drop when major legisla-
tion is under consideration, legislation via the veto override occurs, and the level of 
conflict within Congress is high: 
“As the representatives of a diverse and heterogeneous country, members seldom find them-
selves in agreement. The resulting contentiousness can permeate Congressional activity, frus-
trating those who look to Congress for decisive action and making the process appear overly 
political and petty. When it does act, particularly on broad issues culminating in major legisla-
tion, the inability of the outcome to satisfy all sides can reflect poorly on the institution. To the 
public, then, the very activities which characterize Congress and the legislative process – de-
liberation, debate, and decision making – cause it to appear quarrelsome, unproductive, and 
controversial, and thus diminish it in the public eye. In sum, I contend that changes in levels of 
Congressional approval are related to characteristics of Congress and the legislative and repre-
sentative tasks with which it is constitutionally charged” (Durr, et al., 1997, p. 176). 
The assumption that the perception of legislative work challenges citizens’ expec-
tation is part of the general argument: “Congressional approval can therefore be 
understood as a byproduct of Congress’ constitutionally-defined role and the pub-
lic’s perhaps unrealistic expectations.” (Durr, et al., 1997, p. 200). However, this 
assumption was not investigated empirically, as no measures of citizens’ expecta-
tions of Congress were applied in the study. Likewise, Patzelt (2001) argues that 
confidence in parliament decreases because quarrels and conflicts are visible, 
whereas people expect corporate actions instead.  
I, then, build on a solid foundation in assuming that the relationship between the 
perception of political processes and related preferences contributes to the explana-
tion of political support. This argument is consistent with studies from other fields. 
For instance, a study by Kehoe & Ponting (2003) shows that the degree to which 
respondents feel that health policy leaders share with them the support for the  
Canada Health Act value of ‘equal accessibility’ determines trust in health care 
policy actors and the health care system. In line with this finding, Boxx, Odom, & 
Dunn (1991) argue that value congruence fosters organizational commitment. Ac-
cording to the authors, organizational performance would be enhanced if the organ-
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izational culture is congruent with the values and beliefs of the employees. In line 
with their expectations, the authors found that commitment, satisfaction, and cohe-
sion are strengthened if the organization is shaped by values which employees be-
lieve should exist. In addition, there are studies which indicate that the preferences-
perceptions relationship affects consumers’ satisfaction with products. For example, 
Cadotte, Woodruff, & Jenkins (1987) showed that if a brand (in this case a fast food 
restaurant) performs worse than expected, the dissatisfaction with the brand de-
creases.  
Moreover, the argument that the relationship between preferences (i.e. some sort 
of a prototype or ideal image) and perceptions of reality predicts political support is 
in line with a variety of definitions of political trust or support. For instance, Miller 
(1974, p. 989) defined political trust as “the belief that the government is operating 
according to one’s normative expectations of how government should function”. 
And Barber (1983, p. 80f.) argued that political distrust is “a realistic critique of 
political performance and/or of fiduciary responsibility in the light of accepted de-
mocratic values.” Walz (1996) contended that political support is based on the as-
sumption that political institutions decide as expected. And Fuchs (1999a) main-
tained that one condition for the stability of democratic systems is the development 
of a political culture that is congruent with the implemented structure.  
3.2. The Media’s Impact on the Preferences-Perceptions Relationship  
Although the media is hypothesized to be an important source of political informa-
tion, previous research has tended to neglect the role of the media in shaping the 
preference-perception relationship. This section elaborates the media’s impact on the 
preferences-perceptions relationship. An exception to the tendency of research to 
neglect the role of the media is a study by Kimball & Patterson (1997). This study 
considers the media’s role in influencing the preference-perception discrepancy and 
the consequences for political support.33 The authors assumed that  
“citizens exposed to the admittedly negative political news emanating from the media, and 
particularly those exposed to the drumbeat of ‘Congress-bashing’, may thereby experience lar-
ger expectation-perception discrepancies and, accordingly, be less supportive of Congress than 
the media-underexposed” (Kimball & Patterson, 1997, p. 721).  
In order to test this assumption, the authors investigated the impact of attention paid 
to political news in the media on the discrepancy variables. The findings support the 
assumption: Subjects exposed to the media showed higher levels of preference-
perception discrepancies and, as a consequence, exhibited lower ratings of Congress. 
Thus, the authors concluded:  
 
33  For more information on the study by Kimball & Patterson (1997) see the description of this 
study in Section 3.1. 
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“Improving public perceptions of congressional integrity will depend upon changes in both 
Congress and the mass media so that citizens receive more positive information about mem-
bers of Congress. An adversarial press no doubt focuses public attention on congressional 
scandal, and on politicians’ motivations for pursuing power, status, and wealth (Kerbel, 1995; 
Patterson, 1993). But the changes for improvement seem not very good; if anything, press 
coverage of Congress has tended to be more, not less, negative in recent years (Mann & 
Ornstein, 1994).” (Kimball & Patterson, 1997, p. 723). 
The study by Kimball & Patterson (1997) does not provide empirical answers to 
the question whether media information shapes the preferences-perceptions relation-
ship by affecting preferences, perceptions, or both. Kimball & Patterson (1997) 
argue that the perception of political realities is based on direct experiences, social 
interactions and media information. In line with this assumption, the present study 
builds on cultivation research and assumes that the media affect citizens’ percep-
tions of political decision-making processes. Section 3.2.1 elaborates this 
assumption.  
As regards the question where preferences come from, Kimball & Patterson 
(1997) argue that socialization may be one important source for the development of 
ideas of an congressional ideal: 
“Citizens carry with them expectations, however rudimentary, about political institutions, 
Congress in particular, and about processes taking place within Congress. Such expectations 
may develop in the form of fuzzy images of the institution as a whole, arise from very partisan 
or ideological perspectives, biases, and distortions, focus on particular institutional actions or 
events, or concern the characteristics or attributes of the institution’s members. Citizens’ ex-
pectations about Congress may develop from specific socialization, perhaps in early life ex-
perience, about what Congress should be like. Civics textbook expectations about Congress’s 
constitutional function, its members and their conduct, its representativeness, its accessibility, 
or its reliability in passing legislation may shape citizens’ expectations, forming an image or 
‘prototype’ of the congressional ideal.” (Kimball & Patterson, 1997, p. 701f.).  
This assumption is in line with research showing that the political culture in 
which a citizen is socialized shapes preferences as regards political decision-making 
processes (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Kaase & Newton, 1995; Linder & 
Steffen, 2006). Seciton 3.2.2 elucidates the role of the socialization with a political 
culture in shaping citizens’ process preferences. The ways in which the mass media 
may affect the audience’s process preferences are also discussed. In order to inform 
propositions about the impact of media presentations of political processes on citi-
zens’ perceptions of such processes and their levels of political support, Section 
3.2.3 presents research that investigates how the mass media present political  
processes.  
3.2.1. The Media’s Impact on the Perception of Political Processes 
Moy & Pfau (2000, p. 42) argue that it is not the performance of political institutions 
per se but “the public’s perception of institutional performance that causes dissatis-
faction.” Hence, the authors contended that it is neither political processes nor per- 
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formances themselves that are vital for the support for political institutions but the 
citizens’ subjective perception of them (Moy & Pfau, 2000; Pfau, et al., 1998). The 
subjective perception is affected by both a person’s socio-demographic characteris-
tics and the information a person has obtained. Past research shows that knowledge 
of political objects (issues, actors, institutions) exerts more influence than socio-
demographic status (Pfau, et al., 1998, p. 731). Since in modern democratic societies 
citizens’ knowledge of political objects mostly relies on mass information, the media 
are considered a relevant source for the perception of political realities. “Whether or 
not the media accurately reflect events, the point is that the mass media function as 
the critical conduit of perceptions of democratic institutions” (Moy & Pfau, 2000, p. 
43). 
The assumption that media information accounts for the audience’s perception of 
political realities is in line with cultivation research. “Cultivation refers to the long-
term formation of perceptions and beliefs about the world as a result of exposure to 
the media” (Potter, 1993, p. 564). Hence, cultivation effects refer to the media’s 
impact on individuals’ conceptions of reality over time. “Public beliefs are often 
shaped by subtle but repetitive messages contained in news and entertainment media 
content that are not overtly persuasive” (W. P. Eveland, Jr., 2002, p. 691). Pfau, 
Mullen, Deidrich, & Garrow (1995, p. 309) put cultivation effects in the realm of 
second-order socialization34 (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) and describe media infor-
mation as an important source based on which people come to understand their envi-
ronment during adulthood. Experiences, if available, are considered to be the main 
source of influence on perceptions. However, in cases when direct experiences are 
absent, people might accept the media’s depictions of reality. “Television program-
ming’s depictions are influential mainly in those circumstances in which people 
have limited opportunity to confirm or deny television’s symbolic images firsthand” 
(Pfau, et al., 1995, p. 310). In cases where direct experiences and media information 
are consonant, media might amplify the impact of experiences on reality percep-
tions.  
Traditionally, cultivation research conceptualizes media use, television use in par-
ticular, as the factor influencing social reality perceptions (Gerbner, 1998; Gerbner, 
Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1980; Gerbner, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1982). Early 
cultivation research was interested in the impact of violent television programming 
on viewers’ perception of violence and criminality. Gerbner et al. (Gerbner, 1998; 
Gerbner, et al., 1980; Gerbner, et al., 1982) argue that television does not provide an 
accurate portrayal of reality and hypothesize that, as a consequence, heavy viewers 
perceive crime and violence as much more prevalent than they are in reality. “For 
heavy viewers, television virtually monopolizes and subsumes other sources of in-
formation, ideas, and consciousness” (Gerbner, et al., 1980, p. 14). The authors 
reported empirical findings that lend support to their assumptions. A reanalysis of 
 
34  Whereas secondary socialization occurs during adulthood, primary socialization occurs dur-
ing childhood. 
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the NORC35 General Social Survey data set, on which much of the empirical support 
for Gerbner’s hypothesis is based, revealed little support for this assumption, how-
ever (Hirsch, 1980). Mainstreaming and resonance hypotheses are further develop-
ments of the cultivation concept (Gerbner, et al., 1980). The resonance hypothesis 
describes an interaction effect: Media effects are greater when television content is 
consistent with real-life situations experienced by the viewer. The mainstreaming 
hypothesis proposes that original variances in attitudes diminish among heavy  
viewers as a result of television’s impact on their attitudes. This results in “the shar-
ing of that commonality among heavy viewers in those demographic groups whose 
light viewers hold divergent views” (Gerbner, et al., 1980, p. 15). As a consequence, 
the political spectrum is hypothesized to narrow down (Gerbner, et al., 1982). 
In further research, television viewing was found to be responsible for a variety of 
social reality perceptions above and beyond the audience’s impressions of violence 
and criminality. For instance, Pfau, Mullen, Deidrich, & Garrow (1995) investigated 
the influence of depictions of attorneys in television programming on the public’s 
perception of attorneys. The study encompasses a content analysis of prime-time 
programming aired during one week and a mail survey with a random sample of 
attorneys in a Midwestern city as a real world check. The public perception of attor-
neys was measured with a telephone survey of a random sample. The authors found 
that public perceptions of attorneys, in terms of gender, age, class and specialization 
in criminal law, were significantly related to television’s depictions of attorneys. 
Whereas traditional cultivation research does not provide explanations of how 
cultivation effects occur (Shrum, Wyer, & O'Guinn, 1988), more recent studies 
focus on psychological process explanations. The idea of a two-step process of 
cultivation effects is of particular relevance. For instance, Bilandzic & Rössler 
(2004) suggest that cultivation effects first encompass the encoding and storage of 
information (knowledge), and second the construction of a judgment about reality. 
Similarly, Hawkins, Pingree, & Adler (1987) assume that a “viewer […] uses the 
multitude of viewing experiences to create summative beliefs” (Hawkins, et al., 
1987, p. 555). These summative beliefs are, then, expected to influence reality per-
ceptions. The findings of their study did not support this hypothesis, however. Fac-
tual knowledge about reality (first-order cultivation effects) did not appear to be a 
mediator for the effect of television use on reality perceptions (second-order beliefs).  
Shrum (1996, 2001, 2004) tested the idea not of a two-step process of cultivation 
effects but of a two-part model of effects. Findings from an experimental study sup-
port the assumption of a two-part model of cultivation effects. In this study, first-
order cultivation effects refer to media’s impact on factual presentations of social 
realities, for instance in terms of how many percent of Americans have been in-
volved in a violent crime. Second-order cultivation effects refer to media’s impact 
on attitude and belief judgments such as being afraid to walk alone at night. The 
author suggested that demographic judgments (first-order cultivation effects) are 
 
35  NORC is the National Opinion Research Center. Its headquarters are on campus of the Uni-
versity of Chicago. 
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formed based on memory. Hence, the accessibility of certain aspects acts as a media-
tor for the media-judgment relationship. “Heavy television viewing creates an acces-
sibility bias, and that bias has an effect on real-world frequency estimates of things 
often seen on television” (Shrum, 1996, p. 499). Second-order cultivation effects, in 
contrast, are assumed to be built during the time of exposure to the information. 
Thus, second-order effects are proposed to be separate effects above and beyond 
first-order cultivation effects.  
In line with cultivation research, then, this study assumes long-term effects of 
media on the perception of political processes. Thus, regular patterns of information 
may account for changes in these perceptions. The media’s influence on these per-
ceptions is assumed to increase with a decrease in the impact of direct experiences 
(Pfau, et al., 1995, p. 310). Hence, in terms of political decision-making at the na-
tional level, media impact is presumed to be strong, because national decision-
making processes are considered to be circumstances for which people have less 
opportunity to confirm or deny the media’s presentations based on firsthand experi-
ences.  
3.2.2. The Media’s Impact on Preferences Regarding Political Processes 
Although media effects research provides some insights into how media affects 
policy preferences, little is known about the media’s impact on citizens’ preferences 
concerning political decision-making processes. Regarding the association between 
media and political preferences, there are studies which show that the media shape 
citizens’ policy preferences (Jordan, 1993; M. McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Pan & 
Kosicki, 1996). For instance, Pan & Kosicki (1996) found that the use of informa-
tion-oriented media affects the audience’s ideological orientations. These orienta-
tions, in turn, were found to have an impact on racial policy preferences. Policy 
preferences were measured, for instance, as support for the government’s efforts to 
assist blacks or support for increasing federal spending to assist blacks. Studies 
carried out in the framework of agenda setting research showed that the media may 
have an impact on which policy issues people consider to be important (M. 
McCombs & Shaw, 1972; M. E. McCombs & Shaw, 1993). For instance, the per-
ceived importance of policy issues was measured with the following question: 
“What are you most concerned about these days? That is, regardless of what politi-
cians say, what are the two or three main things which you think the government 
should concentrate on doing something about?” (M. McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p. 
178). The media were found to affect what citizens think the government should do, 
i.e. their policy preferences.  
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine from these studies that investigate 
the link between media information and citizens’ preferences regarding what should 
be done, whether media information also has an impact on citizens’ preferences as 
regards how political decisions should be made. Based on the current state of re-
search, it remains an empirically open question whether media information might 
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affect citizens’ process preferences above and beyond the impact of political culture, 
or whether process preferences are rather independent from media information. 
Thus, the present study takes into consideration that media information might not 
only shape the perceptions of political processes but also foster certain process pref-
erences. This might be the case, because mass media act as agent of socialization. 
Hence long-term effects of media use on preferences regarding decision-making 
processes might be plausible. This might also be the case if media information con-
tinuously contains claims that political processes should be more efficient or more 
efforts should be made to find a compromise between diverging interests, for exam-
ple. The media’s descriptions of the status quo might also shape attitudes towards 
how the situation should be instead. For instance, media effects on the audience’s 
preferences as regards the efficiency of political processes might occur if the media 
depict political processes simply as inefficient.  
3.2.3. The Media’s Presentations of Political Processes 
The assumption that media presentations of political processes may affect citizens’ 
perceptions of political processes and possibly preferences as regards political  
processes raises the question of how the media depict political decision-making 
processes. In order to inform propositions concerning the media’s impact on citi-
zens’ perceptions of such processes and their levels of political support, this section 
presents research that analyses how the mass media present political processes.  
A variety of research indicates that mass media not only mirror political realities 
but present a picture of political life that is shaped by the rules and norms of the 
news production process. This could result in media depictions of political processes 
that might challenge the way in which political institutions actually operate 
(Marcinkowski, 2005). Many recent studies have focused on the media’s presenta-
tion of election campaigns. The news coverage of election campaigns was found to 
be shaped by references to who is going to win and who is going to lose, attention to 
performances and perceptions of political actors, the language of wars and games, 
and a generally negative tone (Druckman, 2005; Rhee, 1997; Semetko & 
Schoenbach, 2003).  
Whereas the majority of media content research investigates mass media’s pre-
sentations of election campaigns, fewer studies examine the media’s depictions of 
routine political decision-making processes. Arnold (2004, p. 16) maintained that 
“most of the literature focuses on how the press covers wars, presidents, election 
campaigns, and policy issues. Scholars have largely ignored press coverage of Con-
gress and its members”. Little is known about the characteristics of media coverage 
of day-to-day political processes, either within Congress, the executive branch or the 
administrative branch. Likewise, Morris & Clawson (2007, p. 3) argued that “given 
the importance of understanding how the media portray Congress, the limited scope 
of this field of research relative to other political institutions, events, and issues is 
surprising.”  
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Studies which analyze the news coverage of the parliament might provide some 
answers to the question of how the media presents routine decision-making  
processes. Based on data from a national comparative content analysis of media 
coverage of parliament (Negrine, 1998, 1999), Marcinkowski (2000) reported find-
ings on media depictions of the parliament in Germany. The author concluded that 
the majority of media articles about the parliament provide information about politi-
cal decision-making procedures, but less information was found with respect to the 
substance of political decisions in the parliament. Based on an analysis of the par-
liamentary coverage in television networks36 between 1972 and 1992, Lichter & 
Amundson (1994) found that attention to scandals and the focus on unethical behav-
ior increased during the investigated period. News coverage of policy debates, in 
contrast, decreased. Moreover, the findings indicated that the media increasingly 
focused on political discord and that the news coverage was shaped by a rather nega-
tive tone. These changes are interpreted by the authors as trends towards more ad-
versarial news coverage. In general, then, the authors concluded that the news cov-
erage of the parliament “reflects the tendency of journalists to emphasize conflict 
over concord, politics over policies, and personal foibles over institutional func-
tions” (Lichter & Amundson, 1994, p. 139). The authors assumed that these charac-
teristics of the news coverage of parliament reflect the journalists’ “impatience to-
wards the messiness and inefficiency of representative institutions” (Lichter & 
Amundson, 1994, p. 139). Similarly, a study by Lawrence (2000) showed that at the 
level of the nation state, political discourses in the media are shaped by the game 
frame, i.e. the news contained stories about politicians winning or losing elections, 
legislative debates, or strategies for winning. Political debates on the state level were 
not shaped by the game frame, in contrast. 
A study by Morris & Clawson (2005, 2007) takes a more detailed look at con-
gressional news coverage and is interested in how the media portray this “complex 
and dynamic institution” (Morris & Clawson, 2007, p. 5). Based on a content analy-
sis of the New York Times and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) evening news 
coverage of the U.S. Congress from January 1990 through June 1998, Morris & 
Clawson (2005) investigated whether the stories discussed processes of legislative 
maneuvering, such as committee hearings, floor procedures and tactics, or vetoes. 
The role that conflicts, compromises, and scandals play in the news coverage was 
also probed. The authors found that procedural issues make up a substantial part of 
media coverage of Congress; in particular, democratic legislative processes which 
include conflict, debate and to a lesser extent compromise are covered in the news. 
Overall, congressional conflict was much more prominent in the news than com-
promise. “Conflict is highly present in congressional news” (Morris & Clawson, 
2005, p. 306). In general, the results suggest that legislative maneuvering is very 
visible in the news. “The legislative process is not only prevalent in the media dur-
 
36  National Broadcasting Company (NBC), American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System (CBS) 
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ing major policy debates, but also in day-to-day coverage” (Morris & Clawson, 
2005, p. 311).  
In general, then, there is empirical evidence that the day-to-day business of poli-
tics, i.e. routine decision-making processes, is visible in the mass media. Media 
coverage of processes within the parliament was found to focus on conflicts and to 
be shaped by a negative tone (Lichter & Amundson, 1994; Morris & Clawson, 2005, 
2007). On the whole, the empirical results lend support to the assumption that con-
gressional news coverage is rather adversarial, focusing on discord instead of 
consensus. The conclusion that the news media adopt an adversarial style when 
depicting political processes refers mainly to news coverage of political processes in 
the U.S., from which the majority of empirical evidence comes. Comparatively less 
is known about media presentations of political processes in Europe, Switzerland in 
particular. There is research that suggests that the general trend towards an increase 
in adversarial media content may either be hampered or strengthened by a nation’s 
political culture. For instance, Marcinkowski (2006) argued that news media cover-
age reflects a nation’s political culture. In a consensus democracy like Switzerland, 
media presentations of political processes are expected to be shaped by consensus-
orientation rather than focusing on competition and power struggles. In order to test 
whether the adversarial style of news coverage of political processes also holds for 
the case of Switzerland, this study includes a content analysis of the presentation of 
decision-making processes in the Swiss media (see Chapter 4). 
The finding that news media focus on political discord and negative aspects of 
political processes gives particular cause for concern in view of what is known about 
citizens’ process preferences. Apparently, the aspects that are unfavorable, rather 
than favorable, to citizens’ political support are those aspects that news media focus 
on. What consequences, then, might media-shaped perceptions of political decision-
making processes have for citizens’ political confidence? This question is at the core 
of the preferences-perceptions model of media effects.  
3.3. Outline of the Preferences-Perceptions Model of Media Effects 
The argument of discrepancy theory that the relationship between perceptions and 
according preferences predicts evaluative attitudes is widely considered in health 
research, marketing studies, and also in political science. With respect to media 
effects research, however, the argument has stimulated less research. The purpose of 
the present study is to build on discrepancy theory in order to explain the impact of 
media presentations of political decision-making processes on political support. 
Hence, this chapter presents a preferences-perceptions model of media effects.  
Drawing on self-discrepancy theory from social psychology, this study argues 
that the relationship between reality perceptions and according preferences predicts 
political evaluative attitudes. This argument was also advanced in previous studies. 
For example, Kimball & Patterson (1997) show that legislators’ inability to live up 
to the public’s overall expectations fosters disapproval of Congress. In a similar 
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vein, the institution’s role to engage in extensive debates shaped by partisanship and 
conflict was found to account for low levels of support for Congress, because the 
institution diverges from citizens’ expectations of how Congress should act (Durr, et 
al., 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). Building 
on the discrepancy argument, this study more precisely assumes that the relationship 
between perceptions of political processes and according preferences explains citi-
zens’ levels of political support.  
In order to explain how media information about political processes affects citi-
zens’ political support, this study assumes that the way political processes are pre-
sented in the media affects citizens’ perceptions of political processes. This argu-
ment is in line with cultivation theory (W. P. Eveland, Jr., 2002; Gerbner, 1998) and 
is backed up by previous studies showing that the mass media shape the perception 
of social realities (for instance Pfau, et al., 1995). Particularly in situations where 
direct experiences are missing, media effects are considered to be strong. Hence, it 
seems warranted to suggest that for routine political decision-making processes on 
the national level – a field where direct experiences are unlikely for the majority of 
citizens – mass media’s impact on the perception of such processes is rather strong. 
Both short-term and long-term effects of media information on the perception of 
political processes appear plausible. The assumption of long-term effects of the 
media on reality perceptions is in line with cultivation theory. In addition, findings 
from experimental research in the tradition of framing effects suggest that short-term 
effects of media information on reality perceptions may occur also. 
The perception of political processes, in turn, is assumed to influence citizens’ 
levels of political support. Thus, the model argues that media presentations of politi-
cal processes affect political support indirectly via the perception of these processes. 
In general, then, the model assumes that the audience’s perceptions of political  
processes act as mediator of the relationship between media presentation of political 
processes and political support.  
• Proposition 1: The media’s presentations of political processes shape the per-
ception of political processes. Process perceptions, in turn, influence political 
support.  
Little is known about the media’s impact on citizens’ preferences concerning po-
litical decision-making processes. Studies in political science have emphasized the 
role of the political culture in shaping citizens’ process preferences (Hibbing & 
Theiss-Morse, 2002; Kaase & Newton, 1995; Linder & Steffen, 2006). It remains an 
empirically open question whether process preferences are influenced by the mass 
media. Hence, the present study takes into consideration that media information may 
not only shape the perceptions of political processes but also influence citizens’ 
preferences as regards political processes. Especially long-term effects of media use 
might be considered in this respect as part of political socialization.  
In order to specify the conditions under which the impact of media’s presenta-
tions of political processes on political support is particularly likely, the model 
builds on research that shows that the relationship between perceptions of political  
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institutions and related preferences explains confidence levels (Hibbing & Theiss-
Morse, 2002; Kimball & Patterson, 1997). Hence, stronger effects on political sup-
port are assumed if there is a large magnitude of the relationship between what indi-
viduals prefer and what they perceive is actually the case. A large discrepancy ex-
ists, for example, when a person perceives political processes as conflict-oriented,  
 
but prefers compromise-seeking endeavors. In that case, the model assumes that the 
perception of political processes as conflict-oriented has a strong impact on that 
person’s level of political confidence. Thus, the model suggests that the impact of 
media-shaped perceptions of political processes is particularly strong when accor-
ding preferences are strong. In general, then, the model argues that media informa-
tion which challenges citizens’ preferences might account for lower levels of politi-
cal support. This study’s argument is that media impact on political support is mod-
erated by individual preferences as regards political decision-making processes. 
Media patterns, then, are not a challenge to democratic attitudes per se, but certain 
media patterns would have a negative impact on political support for those persons 
for whom media information contributes to a negative preference-perception dis-
crepancy. 
• Proposition 2: Process preferences moderate the impact of political perceptions 
on political support. 
The assumption that process preferences moderate the media’s impact on political 
attitudes is in line with studies in media effects research which consider the role of 
individual expectations. For instance, Maurer (2003b, p. 97) hypothesized that me-
dia effects are especially strong if the media give the impression that political actors 
do not provide the political solutions or outputs that are expected by the public. 
Likewise, Kleinnijenhuis and van Hoof (2009) suggested that ambiguous news 
about the government’s policy plans on a given issue decrease citizens’ satisfaction 
with the government information relating to that issue, precisely because the news 
coverage contradicts their preferences: “News consumers want distinctive policy 
ambitions” (Kleinnijenhuis & van Hoof, 2009, p. 6). This argumentation implicitly 
assumes that the impact of news coverage (ambiguity) on satisfaction results from 
its discrepancy with citizens’ expectations (decisiveness). The findings support the 
assumption that ambiguity in the news coverage decreases satisfaction with govern-
ment information. The proposed conditionality of the effect on citizens’ preferences 
is not probed, however, since there is no empirical investigation of the underlying 
assumption that people want distinctive policy. The argument that not only the audi-
ence’s perceptions but also its individual preferences matter is put forward in a study 
by Mutz & Reeves (2005) as well. The authors (Mutz & Reeves, 2005, p. 9) argued 
that  
“people expect political actors to act in a predictable manner, an expectation based on the 
world of face-to-face interaction, where civility is the norm. When politicians do not act ac-
cording to these expectations, they create negative reactions in viewers” (Mutz & Reeves, 
2005, p. 9).  
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Media presentations of political debates, then, were assumed to decrease political 
support by shaping the relationship between perceived incivility in political dis-
courses and citizens’ expectation that political actors obey the same social norms as 
ordinary citizens. In a similar vein, Morris & Clawson (2007) argued that media 
effects are based on the relationship between media presentations of bureaucratic 
elements and the political views of the audience that does not favor such bureau-
cratic procedures. The authors contended that Americans dislike legislative manoeu-
vring and expected a significant relationship between legislative manoeuvring cov-
erage and support for Congress. The combination of content analysis data and longi-
tudinal survey data provided evidence for this assumption: Support for Congress 
significantly drops when legislative procedure becomes more visible via the media.  
Moreover, the model’s assumption regarding the moderating impact of prefer-
ences is in line with priming research. Priming research assumes that issues that are 
considered to be important have a stronger impact on evaluative attitudes than issues 
that are considered to be unimportant (Iyengar, Peters, & Kinder, 1982; J. M. Miller 
& Krosnick, 1996, 2000). In line with the assumption of priming effects research, 
this study’s model assumes that the more weight citizens give certain aspects, the 
greater the influence of media information about these aspects on evaluative judg-
ments will be. Some similarity can also be found with respect to the expectancy 
value theory which assumes that “the subjective value of each attribute contributes 
to the attitude in direct proportion to the strength of the belief” (Doll & Ajzen, 
2008). Hence, this study’s general argument integrates into a larger tradition of re-
search interested in the moderating effects of value judgments or issue importance. 
The added value of the analytical model presented in this study is that it aims to 
differentiate the general statement that negative or critical media information gener-
ally decreases political support. Instead, the model assumes that media information 
has negative effects if it challenges an individual’s preferences. 
A precondition for the preferences-perceptions relationship to have an impact on 
political support is that this relationship is available and accessible. This assumption 
is based on arguments of self-discrepancy theory made by Higgins (1987). This 
theory stems from cognitive psychology and was developed in order to explain atti-
tudes concerning the self. Availabilty and accessibility of the preferences-
perceptions relationship can be understood in the following way: 
“Construct availability refers to the particular kinds of constructs that are actually present (i.e. 
available) in memory to be used to process new information, whereas construct accessibility 
refers to the readiness with which each stored construct is used in information processing” 
(Higgins, 1987, p. 320; emphasis in original).  
With respect to political processes, the relationship between process preferences 
and process perceptions is available, if an individual has beliefs about the relation-
ship between process perceptions and preferences stored in memory. Drawing on 
self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), the availability of beliefs referring to the 
discrepancy between preferences and perceptions is assumed to depend on the mag-
nitude of the preferences-perceptions discrepancy. The greater the incongruence 
between process perceptions and process preferences, the more the discrepancy 
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belief is available. In other words, the more a person believes that political processes 
are not in line with individual process preferences, the more this belief will be avail-
able in memory.  
An available discrepancy between process preferences and process perceptions 
will be without consequences for political support, however, if it is not activated to 
be used in the processing of information and the formation of attitudes. The likeli-
hood that an available self-discrepancy will be activated is contingent upon its ac-
cessibility. “Another important purpose of self-discrepancy theory, then, is to intro-
duce construct accessibility as a predictor of when available types of incompatible 
beliefs (and which of the available types) will induce discomfort” (Higgins, 1987, p. 
320). This assumption is in line with expectancy value theory, which assumes that 
attitude changes can occur either by changing already accessible beliefs or by mak-
ing new beliefs accessible (Doll & Ajzen, 2008). The accessibility of the prefer-
ences-perceptions relationship describes the readiness with which this relationship 
can be used in information processing. If beliefs about the preferences-perceptions 
relationship are easily accessible, they are at the top of an individual’s head. The 
accessibility of a discrepancy belief depends on the recency of activation, the fre-
quency of activation and the applicability for information-processing tasks (Higgins, 
1987). The more recently and the more frequently a discrepancy is activated, the 
more likely it is to be used for information processing. In addition, the more appli-
cable a construct, the greater is the likelihood of activation. The greater the accessi-
bility of the discrepancy between process preferences and perceptions for a citizen, 
the greater is the likelihood that this discrepancy will have an impact on that citi-
zen’s political support. Hence, increasing the temporary accessibility or the chronic 
accessibility of the discrepancy between process preferences and process perceptions 
results in attitude changes, but only for those subjects with a high magnitude of 
discrepancy. 
• Proposition 3: Accessibility of the preference-perception relationship enhances 
the effects of the preference-perception relationship on political support. 
External factors can produce temporary differences in the accessibility of gener-
ally available constructs, for example though exposure to construct-related stimuli, 
i.e. through priming. Hence, media information might not only affect the magnitude 
of the preference-perception relationship but also the accessibility of this relation-
ship in memory. If the magnitude of the discrepancy is already high, media might 
affect political support through priming without actually changing either process 
perceptions or process preferences. Besides temporary accessibility, Higgins (1987, 
p. 320) distinguishes chronic individual differences in construct accessibility. 
Chronic accessibility is given if certain aspects have high activation potentials at all 
times. Frequent activation might make constructs chronically accessible. Hence 
media information might alter the chronic accessibility of the preferences-
perceptions relationship over time, especially when the media regularly provide 
highly consistent messages. “It may well be that structural consistencies in the news 
– tendencies to emphasize conflict, dramatic themes, personalities, timeliness, and  
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proximity – do contribute over time to chronic accessibility of certain constructs” 
(Price & Tewksbury, 1997, p. 200). In line with assumptions by Zaller (1992, p. 
85f.), this study assumes that people with high levels of political awareness are more 
likely to hold chronically accessible preference-perception relationships than people 
with low levels of political awareness. A chronically accessible preferences-
perceptions relationship might increase the likelihood of media effects on political 
attitudes. Hence, the effects outlined above might be stronger for people with high 
levels of political awareness compared to people with low levels of political aware-
ness, because for the high politically aware, there is a chronic accessibility of the 
preference-perception relationship. Higgins (1987) argued that both the temporary 
and the chronic accessibility of the preferences-perceptions relationship can be 
stimulated by activating a single component of the discrepancy, i.e. either prefer-
ences or perceptions.  
Figure 3.1 presents a graphical depiction of the model. An example shall illustrate 
the model’s assumptions: A person A thinks that it is important that political  
processes are shaped by compromise. If the media present political decision-making 
processes within a certain political institution – the government, for instance – as 
being shaped by conflicts and power struggles instead of compromise-seeking en-
deavors, the media might affect this person’s perception of decision-making  
processes within the government as conflict-oriented. Thus, there is a high magni-
tude of the discrepancy between this person’s process preferences and perceptions. 
As compromise preferences are strong and compromises are not perceived to play a 
role in political decision-making within the government, a negative discrepancy 
between preferences and perceptions exists. Hence, this person will presumably 
have a low level of confidence in the government. Instead, if the media regularly 
present political decision-making processes within the government as compromise-
oriented, the same person A might perceive political decisions as being based on 
compromises. Thus, there is a small magnitude of the discrepancy between prefer-
ences and perceptions. In fact, the preference-perception discrepancy in this case 
might even be a positive one, indicating that compromise-seeking endeavors are 
perceived to play a greater role than is important for that person. Hence, this person 
will presumably have higher levels of confidence in the government.  
Imagine another person B who has also been exposed to conflict-oriented media 
content but does not consider compromise-seeking endeavors to be an important 
aspect of decision-making procedures. In that case, the magnitude of the prefer-
ences-perceptions relationship is small and media information is assumed to exert no 
negative impact on political confidence. In other words, the probability that the 
political support of person A is stronger than the political support of person B, given 
that both are exposed to the same media content, increases with the incongruence of 
preferences and perceptions of person A compared to that of person B. The greater 
the magnitude of this negative discrepancy, the less supportive citizens are con-
sidered to be, given that the discrepancy between process perceptions and process 
preferences is accessible in memory. 
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preferences and perceptions, the following may be considered: The more recent and 
frequent the activation of the discrepancy between preferences for compromises and 
perceptions of discord held by person A, the more accessible this discrepancy is 
hypothesized to be. As a consequence, the lower this person’s political support will 
be. Because the magnitude of the discrepancy between person B’s lack of compro-
mise preferences and conflict perceptions is low, increasing the accessible of this 
discrepancy will have no effects on this person’s level of political support. 
 
Figure 3.1. Flow Diagram of the Preferences-Perceptions Model of Media Effects. 
Circles Represent Mental Processes, Dashed Lines Represent Implicit Assumptions 
that Are 2ot Tested Empirically 
 
Although the model’s assumption that the relationship between perceptions of po-
litical processes and related preferences explains political support is backed by a 
multitude of empirical findings and appears to be intuitively plausible, three aspects 
merit special consideration. First, citizens might not have very specific preferences 
concerning how political decisions should be made. If individuals do not hold  
process preferences, their levels of political support might not be affected by the 
relationship between process preferences and process perceptions. This scenario is 
relatively unlikely, however. According to self-discrepancy theory, people need not 
to be aware of the relationship between preferences and perceptions for this relation-
ship to affect evaluative attitudes. People must only be able to retrieve attributes of 
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the relationship between process perceptions and process preferences when asked to 
do so (Higgins, 1987, p. 324):  
“I should note that self-discrepancy theory does not assume that people are aware of either the 
availability or the accessibility of their self-discrepancies. It is clear that the availability and 
accessibility of stored social constructs can influence social information processing automati-
cally and without awareness […] Thus, self-discrepancy theory assumes that the available and 
accessible negative psychological situations embodied in one’s self-discrepancies can be used 
to assign meaning to events without one’s being aware of either the discrepancies or their im-
pact on processing. The measure of self-discrepancies requires only that one be able to retrieve 
attributes of specific self-state representations when asked to do so. It does not require that one 
be aware of the relations among these attributes or of their significance.” (Higgins, 1987, p. 
324; emphasis in original).  
Hence, it seems plausible to assume that although they might be unable to say 
which aspects of political processes are particularly important to them, people might 
have the impression that they do not want the processes they perceive.  
Second, research suggests that predictors of political support differ with respect to 
different objects of evaluation (cf. Easton, 1975; Fuchs, 1993). Thus, the question 
arises whether the argument that the relationship between process preferences and 
process perceptions explains political support holds in a similar manner for attitudes 
towards the government, the parliament, political actors, and democracy.37 The rela-
tionship between process perceptions and process preferences might not predict 
support for a political object if people either had no perceptions of political  
processes related to this object or if people had no preferences with regard to deci-
sion-making processes related to this object. The assumption that citizens have no 
opportunity to develop perceptions of political processes related to different political 
objects appears somewhat implausible, because mass media offer information about 
political decision-making processes in a variety of different contexts. The assump-
tion that citizens do not hold any preferences with respect to political decision-
making processes related to different political objects also appears to be somewhat 
implausible. As I have already argued, process preferences might exist without indi-
viduals being aware of them. Thus, I posit that the model’s assumptions are of a 
rather general type and therefore hold for a variety of different objects of evaluation. 
The explanatory power of the model in this study will be investigated for different 
political objects of evaluation, i.e. the parliament, the government, political actors, 
and democracy in order to test this assumption. 
Third, the argument that the relationship between preferences and perceptions 
predicts political support implicitly assumes that citizens are able to differentiate 
between preferences and perceptions. This assumption is not tested in the majority 
of studies. However, previous research has shown that large individual discrepancies 
between preferences and perceptions exist (Kimball & Patterson, 1997, p. 706ff.; S. 
C. Patterson, et al., 1969). Such large individual differences between preferences 
 
37  Attitudes of political support towards the government, the parliament, political actors, and 
democracy are the focus of the present study. 
71 
and perceptions could be seen as an indicator for the assumption that people do 
recognize preferences and perceptions as different cognitive constructs. Neverthe-
less, the present study will test the discriminant validity of process preferences and 
process perceptions in order to provide empirical evidence for the assumption that 
citizens do distinguish between the perception of political processes and related 
preferences. 
3.4.  This Study’s Empirical Program to Test the Model 
The preferences-perceptions model of media effects takes central account of the 
relationship between media information, perceptions of political processes, prefer-
ences as regards political processes, and political support. Thereby, the model expli-
cates the mechanisms by which media information about political processes is as-
sumed to affect citizens’ levels of political support. The model proposes that media 
induced changes in the perception of political processes account for variances in 
political support. Hence, citizens’ perceptions of how political decisions are made 
and how political processes look like are presumed to act as mediator of mass me-
dia’s effects on political support. In addition, the model specifies the conditions 
under which the media’s impact on political support is particularly likely. The model 
assumes that the media’s impact on political support varies as a function of individ-
ual process preferences. Hence, process preferences are supposed to act as modera-
tor of the media’s impact on political support. The model aims to contribute to  
media effects research by differentiating the general statement that negative or criti-
cal media information enhances the political malaise. Instead, the model assumes 
that effects of media information on political support are stronger if media informa-
tion contradicts individuals’ preferences. 
In order to test the assumptions, the present study encompasses the following em-
pirical program (see Figure 3.2): First, media information of political decision-
making processes in Switzerland is analyzed in order to derive characteristic pat-
terns of media presentation of decision-making procedures (Chapter 4). Previous 
research indicates that decision-making processes are visible in the media (Morris & 
Clawson, 2005). The dominant focus on conflicts in parliamentary coverage that 
was found in several studies (Lichter & Amundson, 1994; Morris & Clawson, 2005, 
2007), led Lichter & Amundson (1994, p. 139) to conclude that the media coverage 
of the parliament is “adversarial”. However, the media might not generally present 
political processes as adversarial; rather, a nation’s political communication might 
be shaped by its political culture. As most studies investigate news coverage of par-
liament in the U.S., further research is needed in order to gain insights into the man-
ner in which political processes are presented in other nations. The purposes of the 
content analysis are to derive characteristic patterns of media presentations of politi-
cal processes in Switzerland, to inform the development of stimulus articles for the 
experimental study, and to provide background information for the findings as re-
gards the relationship between media use, process perceptions, and political support. 
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Second, standardized scales to measure process preferences and process percep-
tions (Chapter 5) was developed in pilot studies, because little attention has been 
paid to the conceptualization and measurement of political process preferences and 
according process perceptions as yet: 
“Scholars have paid less attention to measure public opinion of current processes and, espe-
cially, to identify people’s preferred procedures. Indeed, survey instruments rarely include 
questions about what government processes respondents would like to see.” (John R. Hibbing 
& Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 2001a, p. 147). 
This is also found to be the case with respect to the measurement of process per-
ceptions. According to Weatherford (1992, p. 149) the measurement of process 
attitudes is “scattered and unsystematic”. Not only in the U.S. context but also in 
other national contexts, the measurement of citizens’ perceptions of political deci-
sion-making processes and/or the measurement of according perceptions is ne-
glected in empirical research. Within the “Beliefs in Government” research program 
of the European Science Foundation, for example, political preferences were  
measured in terms of attitudes towards government responsibility for policy issues 
only (for instance Ardigó, 1995). The items used to measure process preferences and 
perceptions relate to characteristic patterns of media’s presentations of political 
processes that were found in the content analysis. 
Regarding the impact of mass media on process perceptions and political support, 
the model assumes both short-term and long-term effects. Hence, third, the short-
term effects of media information on process perceptions and political support are 
investigated in an experimental study (Chapter 6). This study conceptualizes expo-
sure to specific news articles as situational impact factor. Besides the effects of ex-
posure to selected media articles that contain negative depictions of political deci-
sion-making processes, this study looks at the impact of routine media use. Routine 
media use patterns are considered to be relatively stable and distinctive ways of 
interacting with the media (McLeod & McDonald, 1985). In the present study, these 
stable patterns of media use are conceptualized as a surrogate measure for media 
content. Thus, fourth, the long-term impact of media information on process percep-
tions and political support is investigated based on data from a survey with citizens 
from the German-speaking part of Switzerland (Chapter 7). Here, the relationship 
between routine media use and political attitudes is in focus. Thereby, the mecha-
nisms by which the use of political media information affects citizens’ political 
support are explored along with the conditions under which media information about 
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4. Media Presentations of Political Decision-Making Processes 
In order to test the assumptions of the preferences-perceptions model of media  
effects, the present study, first, analyzes the media presentation of political decision-
making processes in Switzerland. The aim of this study is to investigate whether the 
assumption of an adversarial style of presenting decision-making procedures also 
holds for news coverage in Switzerland. This study’s research question is presented 
in Section 4.1. The methodological details are considered in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 
describes the results, followed by a summary and discussion in Section 4.4. 
4.1. Research Question 
Following their own rules of news production, the media do not mirror political 
processes but might present a distinct picture of the way political decisions are 
reached. Although there is empirical research on the mass media’s presentation of 
political campaigns or certain policy issues (for instance De Vreese, 2005; De 
Vreese & Semetko, 2002; Kleinnijenhuis & van Hoof, 2009; Valentino, Beckmann, 
et al., 2001; Valentino, Buhr, et al., 2001), there is less research dealing with media 
presentations of political processes (Arnold, 2004). In general, research shows an 
increasing tendency on the part of the media to present information about Congress 
in terms of conflicts, winners and losers, strategies, and political discord. For in-
stance, media coverage of processes within the parliament was found to focus on 
conflicts and to be shaped by a negative tone (Lichter & Amundson, 1994; Morris & 
Clawson, 2005, 2007). This emphasis on adversarial aspects might also be character-
istic of media information about day-to-day political decision-making processes in 
general. Because the conclusion that the news media adopt an adversarial style when 
depicting political processes is based on empirical evidence that stems mainly from 
the U.S., comparatively less is known about media presentations of political  
processes in Europe, Switzerland in particular. In fact, the literature provides theo-
retical arguments that would, rather, speak for an emphasis on aspects of consensus 
and compromises in the case of Swiss media, since Switzerland is a consensus-
democracy (Marcinkowski, 2006). Hence, the following research question will guide 
the data analysis: 
• RQ1: Which aspects characterize the presentation of day-to-day political deci-
sion-making processes in the news coverage of Swiss media? 
This study is interested in differences in the presentation of political processes 
within the legislative and the executive branch. In order to derive patterns that are 
specific for contemporary news coverage in Swiss media, the analysis follows a 
comparative perspective over time. Moreover, a national comparison between Swit-
zerland and Germany is intended to shed light on the question whether political 
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decision-making procedures are presented differently in consensus-democracies 
compared with more competitive systems like Germany.  
4.2. Method 
Section 4.2.1 describes the sample that was used to investigate the media coverage 
of political decision-making processes in Switzerland and Germany. The opera-
tionalization of variables is presented in Section 4.2.2. Section 4.2.3 contains infor-
mation on how the content analysis was conducted. 
4.2.1. Content Analysis Sample 
In order to include media with different qualities, a broadsheet, a regional paper, and 
a tabloid from each nation were included in the sample. The selection criterion was 
circulation, so the sampling unit consists of papers with the highest circulation. For 
Switzerland, these are “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” (“NZZ”, WEMF38 2005: 150.945), 
“Tages-Anzeiger” (236.569), and “Blick” ( 262.262). For Germany, “Süddeutsche 
Zeitung” (“SZ”, IVW Q1/200839: 450.201), “Freie Presse” (IVW Q3/2006: 336.968) 
and “Bild” (paid circulation IVW Q2/2006: 3.599.652) were chosen. Television 
newscasts were also investigated. The main evening news on German public televi-
sion, “Tagesschau” (average of 9.73 million viewers per day), and the main evening 
news on Swiss public television, “Tagesschau” (average of 1 million viewers per 
day), were selected for the analysis. Since this study focuses on the media presenta-
tion of political decision-making processes, the analysis of media content is based 
on the newspapers’ front pages and the pages on national politics. Letters to the 
editor were not analyzed in the study. 
The newspapers were investigated in a longitudinal perspective, because this 
study is interested in possible differences in media coverage patterns at different 
points in time. In order to exclude “special times” in the context of elections, articles 
from the second years of the legislative term were chosen as a time of regular politi-
cal decision-making. Newspaper editions from 1964/65, 1984/85 and 2003/2004, 
2004/2005 were examined.40 The time comparison allows us to observe any poten-
tial specific patterns in contemporary news coverage. The patterns observed in con-
temporary media presentations will serve as a guideline for the development of the 
 
38  WEMF (“AG für Werbemedienforschung”) is an advertising media research institute in 
Switzerland.  
39  IVW (“Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e.V.”) 
is advertising media research institute in Germany. 
40  As a time of regular political decision-making, a one-year period beginning with the second 
year after the election of the German Chancellor and the election of the Swiss Federal Coun-
cil (after the elections for the National Council), was chosen. 
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experimental stimuli in Section 6.2.2. By random selection, ten percent of all news-
paper editions in the selected coding periods were chosen. After excluding all Sun-
days and national holidays, a sample of 10 percent of all editions makes 30 or 31 
editions per coding period and newspaper, so in total 428 issues were examined. 
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the content analysis sample. 
Based on the selected newspaper editions, all articles that were considered rele-
vant for the purpose of this content analysis were coded. More precisely, all articles 
that address political decision-making processes and problem-solving procedures on 
the national level within the legislative (parliament, commissions etc.), the executive 
branch (cabinet, minister etc.), or the administration were coded.41 In total, then, 633 
articles from newspapers (366 articles from German papers, and 267 articles from 
Swiss papers) from the basis of the analysis, as Table 4.1 shows. 
In order to probe whether the newspapers have a unique perspective on political 
decision-making in the government and parliament (cf. Mutz & Reeves, 2005, p. 2), 
the results are compared with findings from an analysis of political television news. 
For financial reasons, the analysis of television newscasts was restricted to the cur-
rent time period. More precisely, newscasts within the period from 12/10/2004 to 
12/09/2005 for Switzerland and within the period from 11/22/2006 to 11/21/2007 
for Germany were investigated. In total, 175 newscasts from German television’s 



















41  An article was coded if the headline or the lead of the article contains a reference to a political 
institution or political actor and the article refers to political decision-making and problem-
solving procedures. Thus the article might not only refer to decision-taking, but also the 
preparation of decisions and their implementation. If the article mentions more than one insti-
tution or actor, those article contents that refer to the institution or actor receiving the most at-
tention were coded. 
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Table 4.1. Content Analysis Sample  
4.2.2. Codebook and Reliability  
The codebook was used for the analysis of print and television news and encom-
passed four variable blocks. First, formal aspects were considered (name of publica-
tion or broadcasting channel, length, placing, journalistic genre, and use of quota-
tions). Second, thematic aspects were coded (political institution, type of decision-
making processes, policy cycle, and policy field). Third, references in media cover-
age to various aspects of political decision-making processes were coded. And 
fourth, the media’s attention to aspects of political legitimacy was coded. The code-
book for the analysis of television newscasts42 was largely the same as the press 
codebook but includes some additional variables on images and pictures and vari-
 
42  The introductory or concluding moderation and the actual news report were coded as two 
separate articles. 
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ables on specific aspects of the presentation of political negotiations. The following 
variables were included in the data analysis conducted in the framework of this 
study. The variables were measured with dichotomous variables in the form of a 
question. For more detailed information about the variables, the codebook (in Ger-
man language) can be requested from the author. 
• Power struggle: Does the article refer to power struggles or discord between 
political institutions or actors? 
• Accusation: Do political actors blame each other or accuse somebody of some-
thing?  
• Compromise: Does the article focus on consensus-seeking endeavors or the 
search for political compromises? 
• Understanding: Does the article refer to political actors talking to each other, 
listening to each other, or mutual understanding? 
• Winning and losing: Does the article refer to winners or losers among political 
actors?  
• Collective attribution: Does the article present political decisions as the result of 
joint interests and motives?  
• Collective action: Does the article refer to collective actions and the role of joint 
behavior?  
• Inability: Does the article refer to the inability of political actors, institutions or 
processes to solve political problems?  
• Failure: Does the article refer to the failure of political actors, processes or 
institutions?  
To test intercoder reliability, each coder observed the same subset of the sample 
that consists of 50 newspaper articles.43 Reliability was calculated using the Soft-
ware program PRAM (Program for Reliability Assessment with Multiple Coders). 
To evaluate inter-coder reliability, Holsti’s R is used. In Table 4.2, the average  
values over all coder pairs are given. The variables collective attribution and collec-
tive action appeared to be somewhat problematical. Accordingly, the findings should 











43  There was another reliability test for the television analysis. The results do not differ signifi-
cantly from the reliability results reported here. 
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Table 4.2. Intercoder Reliability 
4.2.3. Procedure 
The relevant material was collected by researching online data-bases and online 
archives as well as in libraries. The title and the first paragraph of all articles within 
the relevant sections of the selected newspaper issues were read. Based on this in-
formation, a decision was made as to whether an article was relevant or not. The 
newscasts were taken from online archives. Four students of mass communication at 
the University of Zurich coded the material. Three sessions of coder training took 
place in April 2007. An additional training session for the content analysis of televi-
sion newscasts was conducted in September 2007. Coding was done at computer 
workstations at the University of Zurich from May 2007 until October 2007. The 
data material was randomly distributed across time and coders in order to reduce 
systematic biases. An online platform was set up to facilitate the communication 
among the coders and the author. Potential difficulties in the coding process were 
therefore transparent and traceable. Moreover, the online platform was used to sup-





Based on the content analysis data, this study investigated how the mass media in 
the German-speaking part of Switzerland present political decision-making  
processes. More precisely, the role of discord and references to procedural ineffi-
ciency were investigated. The analysis takes a comparative perspective over institu-
tions, newspaper types, time, television vs. press, and nations. Based on the com-
parative approach, it was probed whether characteristics of the presentation of po-
litical processes are rather stable or invariant as regards time, media types, or 
nations. Section 4.3.1 describes findings on how the media present political deci-
sion-making processes. In Section 4.3.2, the relationship between the variables is 
investigated in order to derive characteristic patterns of media presentations of po-
litical processes.  
4.3.1. Characteristics of the Media’s Presentations of Political Processes 
Because media information on political processes might differ with respect to the 
institutional affiliation of procedures, this study compares the media’s presentation 
of political decision-making processes within the executive and the legislative 
branch. Overall, 62 percent of articles in the Swiss newspapers provide information 
about political decision-making procedures within the executive branch, whereas 38 
percent of articles present processes taking place within the legislative branch. A 
comparison between the different newspaper types showed that the focus on gov-
ernmental procedures is particularly strong in the Swiss tabloid: 82 percent of arti-
cles in the tabloid refer to decision-making procedures in the government. In con-
trast, 56 percent of articles in the broadsheet and 59 percent of articles in the re-
gional newspaper refer to the executive. In television, 54 percent of all newscasts 
focus on the government compared to 55 percent of newscasts that present parlia-
mentary processes. In line with this study’s definition of political processes as day-
to-day discussions of possible solutions to political problems and decision-making 
within the government, the parliament, or the political administration, the most 
dominant actor type in the media are elected officials. More precisely, 99 percent of 
articles about government and 93 percent of articles of articles about parliament 
included references to political actors, followed by non-elected political actors (20 
and 25 percent respectively). 
In order to investigate how the Swiss newspapers and television newscasts pre-
sent political decision-making processes, media attention to several process aspects 
was analyzed. The findings showed that the presentation of political processes is 
partly contingent upon whether the articles refer to the executive or the legislative 
branch. Hence, Table 4.3 presents the percentage of articles referring to different 
aspects of political decision-making processes and compares press articles about the 
parliament with press articles about the government. The significance of the differ-
ences between the institutions was tested with the Chi-Square difference test. The 
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findings showed that, on the one hand, news articles about the parliament, more 
often than articles about the government, refer to political opponents’ endeavors to 
reach an understanding and to find a political compromise, and to the role of collec-
tive actions. That does not imply, however, that political processes in the parliament 
are presented as especially consensus-oriented, because these articles contain more 
frequent references to power struggles than is the case for articles about the govern-
ment. Interestingly, there is no difference in the presented inefficiency of decision-
making processes: 15 percent of articles about the government and 10 percent of 
articles about the parliament depict political institutions or actors as incapable of 
finding solutions to political problems. In general, the data suggests that the news 
coverage of political processes within the legislative branch is more evaluative than 
the news coverage of political processes within the executive. 
 
Table 4.3. Presentation of Political Processes in Articles about Government and 
Parliament 
 
The comparison between the three newspaper types (broadsheet, regional paper 
and tabloid) showed that references to the role of consensus-seeking endeavors 
(compromises, mutual understanding) and the collective aspect of decision-making 
procedures (collective attribution, collective action) are most frequent in the broad-
sheet and least frequent in the tabloid (see Table 4.4). The presentation of political 
processes with respect to consensus-seeking endeavors and collectivity in the re-
gional newspaper lies somewhere between the other two newspaper types. The focus  
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on political discord (power struggles, accusations) is found to be characteristic of all 
three newspaper types, although in the broadsheet this aspect is less emphasized 
than in the regional paper and in the tabloid. References to the inefficiency of politi-
cal decision-making (inability) are found in the regional paper in particular.  
 
Table 4.4. Presentation of Political Processes in Different 2ewspaper Types 
 
The comparison in a time perspective showed that references to certain aspects of 
political processes are characteristic of contemporary media coverage, whereas  
media references to other aspects appeared to be time-invariant (see Table 4.5). One 
characteristic of the news coverage during the period 2004/05 is that news articles 
refer to power struggles and present political actors as blaming each other more 
frequently than is the case for the previous time periods. Articles that refer to com-
promise-seeking endeavors, the role of collective actions and collective attributions 
are, in contrast, significantly less frequent in the press coverage in 2004/05 com-
pared to 1964/56 and 1984/85. In general, this tendency is found for both articles 







Table 4.5. Presentation of Political Processes at Different Points in Time 
 
The presentation of political decision-making processes in Swiss newspapers was 
also compared to the presentation on Swiss television (see Table 4.6). Because the 
content analysis of television newscasts was restricted to the period 2004/2005, this 
analysis is based on articles from the current news coverage in both print and televi-
sion for reasons of comparability. The results indicate that television newscasts 
focus more frequently than the press articles about the role of compromises, under-
standing, and collective actions. More precisely, 59 percent of all newscasts in tele-
vision contain references to consensus-seeking endeavors, 34 percent refer to the 
role of understanding the other political side, and 63 percent refer to collective ac-
tions, compared to 23 percent, 12 percent, and 26 percent of press articles respec-
tively. However, television news also contains more references to accusations 
voiced by political actors than the newspapers. Whereas 46 percent of all television 
newscasts on parliamentary processes referred to political accusations, this was the 
case in only 6 percent of press articles. Comparing the presentation of decision-
making processes in the government, the results also indicate that television news 
contain more references to compromises (43 percent), understanding (25 percent), 
and collective actions (41 percent), than the press coverage of the government (26 
percent, 9 percent, and 20 percent, respectively). More press articles about processes 
within the executive branch (16 percent) than television newscasts (4 percent) pre-
sent political actors or institutions as incapable of solving political problems. Televi-
sion newscasts presenting decision-making processes within the parliament, how-
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ever, refer to the inefficiency of political processes: 10 percent of newscasts about 
parliamentary processes refer to the inability of political actors or institutions to 
solve political problems.  
 
Table 4.6. Presentation of Political Processes in Television and Press 
 
The comparison of press coverage in Germany and Switzerland shows that the 
characteristics of the presentation of political decision-making processes already 
described for the Swiss newspapers appear to be representative for the German press 
as well. In fact, the tendency to emphasize power struggles is even stronger in Ger-
many. More precisely, 45 percent of all articles about the government in Germany 
(35 percent of articles in Switzerland) refer to power struggles and conflicts. In 21 
percent of all articles about the government in Germany (15 percent of articles in 
Switzerland), political actors blame each other. Looking at the news coverage of the 
parliament, the differences are even more obvious: 60 percent of all articles about 
the parliament in Germany (48 percent of articles in Switzerland) refer to power 
struggles and conflicts. In 27 percent of all articles about the parliament in Germany 
(12 percent of articles in Switzerland), political actors blame each other.  
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4.3.2. Identifying Presentation Patterns 
A correlation analysis was conducted in order to gain more information about typi-
cal patterns of media presentations of political decision-making processes. The re-
sults for the correlation analysis are presented in Table 4.7. Based on the correlation 
analysis, two distinct patterns of presenting political processes could be identified. 
The first pattern can be described as presenting political processes as consensus- 
oriented endeavors. This pattern encompasses the following variables: collective 
attribution, collective actions, compromises, and the role of understanding-seeking 
endeavors. These variables are positively correlated. The pattern, hence, is charac-
terized by a focus on consensus-seeking endeavors and the role of collective actions 
and interests. The second pattern can be described as presenting political processes 
as shaped by power struggles. This pattern encompasses the following variables: 
power struggles, accusation, and winning and losing. The pattern, hence, is charac-
terized by a focus on power struggles and the competitiveness of political processes 
(references to winners and losers of political decision-making processes). These 
variables are positively correlated. The two patterns are negatively linked: The items 
representing the power struggle focus are negatively associated with collective ac-
tions, collective attribution and compromise-seeking behavior and vice versa.  
 
Table 4.7. Correlation between Variables Measuring the Media’s Presentation of 
Processes 
 
Items of both patterns consensus-orientation and power struggles are linked to 
references regarding the inefficiency of political processes. The power struggle 
pattern goes along with references to the inability of finding a solution to political 
problems (failure). In contrast, aspects of the consensus pattern are negatively re-
lated with the aspect of inability. This indicates that when political processes are 
presented by focusing on the role of consensus, articles are less likely to refer to the 
inability to solve political problems. In contrast, when political processes are pre-
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sented by focusing on power struggles, articles are more likely to refer to the in-
ability to solve political problems. The presentations patterns identified in the corre-
lation analysis can contribute to the development of realistic stimulus material. Ac-
cording implications for the conceptualization of the stimulus material (see Section 
6.2.3) are discussed in the following summarizing section. 
4.4. Summary and Discussion 
The results from the content analysis indicate that media information on political 
decision-making processes encompasses aspects of collective action and attribution, 
compromise-seeking endeavors and the role of mutual understanding as well as 
references to power struggles, accusations, and the inability to solve political prob-
lems. Altogether, the characteristics of press coverage of political decision-making 
processes in the Swiss press appeared to be rather stable when compared across 
newspaper types and media information about political processes in different politi-
cal institutions. However, the focus on political discord has increased during the last 
decades, whereas consensus-orientation and the attribution of decisions to collective 
actions have become less frequent in the media coverage. This finding is in line with 
previous research which shows that parliamentary coverage in the U.S. increasingly 
focuses on political discord (Lichter & Amundson, 1994) and conflicts (Morris & 
Clawson, 2005). From a methodological point of view, however, it should be borne 
in mind that this study’s content analysis is based on a restricted sample. Three 
Swiss newspapers and television news from one broadcast channel were investi-
gated, all of which were from the German-speaking part in Switzerland. Thus, the 
results might not apply to the news coverage in Switzerland in general. In addition, 
the finding that news coverage contains references to political discord and inability 
cannot be taken as evidence of a lack of media attention to the efficiency of political 
processes, for instance, because the content analysis included only a selection of 
variables measuring aspects of political processes which were considered to be rele-
vant in the framework of the present study. Whereas references to the inefficiency of 
decision-making procedures were measured, references to the efficiency of such 
processes were not. 
One purpose of this overview was to inform the conceptualization of stimulus 
material for the experimental study (Chapter 6). The results presented here hold 
several implications in this respect. First, findings suggest that the external validity 
of the stimulus material is greater, if the articles refer to political processes in the 
legislative branch, because articles about the parliament were found to contain more 
evaluative aspects than articles about the government. Second, based on the results it 
appears reasonable to use articles from regional papers as the base material for the 
development of the stimulus material, because the regional paper contained more 
evaluative aspects than the tabloid. In addition, the regional paper’s position in terms 
of how political decision-making processes are presented lies somewhere between 
the tabloid and the broadsheet. Third, stimulus articles should relate to aspects that 
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are characteristic for contemporary media coverage, because the comparison of news 
coverage from different points in time showed that there are specific patterns that are 
characteristic for this period. This is the focus on power struggles in particular. 
Fourth, the comparison of presentations between German and Swiss press articles 
showed that the evaluative aspects that were found to be characteristic of the Swiss 
news coverage are also typical for media information in Germany. In fact, the Ger-
man media’s tendency to emphasize conflicts is even stronger. This finding suggests 
a greater external validity of the stimulus material.  
A second purpose of this overview of results from the content analysis was to 
serve as interpretational background for the investigation of the relationship between 
the use of political information in television and political attitudes (Chapter 7). This 
study is based on the assumption that routine media use reflects the impact of char-
acteristic patterns of media content that subjects were exposed to. What, then, are 
these characteristic patterns of information in television newscasts? The findings 
indicate that television news about political decision-making is shaped by a strong 
focus on political accusations, particularly when informing about parliamentary 
processes, although television news focuses on aspects of consensus-orientation at 
the same time. In addition, television news referred to the inability of political actors 
to solve political processes, particularly when informing about political processes in 
the parliament. Overall, the results indicated that television newscasts, in general, 
are more evaluative than press articles. The findings warrant the assumption that 
television might decrease the perception of political processes as consensus-oriented 
and the perception of political processes as efficient. 
This chapter described the identification of characteristic media patterns in the 
presentation of political decision-making processes. The following chapter presents 
the development of a standardized scale to measure citizens’ preferences concerning 
political processes and related perceptions in surveys. 
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5. Measuring Citizens’ Process Preferences and Perceptions 
Recent research suggests that both process preferences and process perceptions are 
relevant predictors of citizens’ confidence in political institutions. So far, however, 
no standardized scale that systematically measures process preferences and percep-
tions has existed (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 2001a, p. 147). This 
chapter describes the development and validation of multi-dimensional scales which 
measures citizens’ preferences concerning political decision-making processes and 
according perceptions. In Section 5.1 the hypotheses that guide the development of 
the scales are presented. The operationalizations of variables as well as the proce-
dures of data collection are described in the method section in Section 5.2. The re-
sults indicate that citizens distinguish different dimensions of political process: con-
sensus-orientation, competition and the efficiency of political decision-making  
processes (Section 5.3). Section 5.4 provides the reader with a summary and conclu-
sion. 
5.1. Hypotheses 
Survey research to date has focused on the measurement of policy preferences (for 
instance Krosnick, 1988; Page & Shapiro, 1992). There is no standardized scale to 
measure process preferences or the perception of political processes, however (John 
R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 2001a, p. 147; Weatherford, 1992, p. 149). 
Hence, an important aim of this study is the development of standardized scales to 
measure citizens’ process preferences and process perceptions. Both process prefer-
ences and process perceptions may refer to different aspects of political processes. 
For instance, inclusiveness, transparency, equality, and responsiveness are consid-
ered to be relevant aspects of political processes (cf. Kaina, 2008). The focus of 
empirical research, however, is on the fairness of decision-making procedures (e.g. 
Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 2000; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). Procedural 
justice research investigates the perception of the trustworthiness of political  
processes, their neutrality, and the equal consideration of different opinions (Tyler, 
et al., 1996). Drawing on the work of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), efficiency 
can be considered as another aspect of political processes. Efficiency and fair behav-
ior are also identified as dimensions of political processes in a study by Weatherford 
(1992). Using data from the National Election Studies, Weatherford showed that the 
differentiation between these process aspects is not only conceptually relevant, but 
also that citizens do distinguish between them. In the study by Weatherford (1992), 
efficiency refers to policy making without an undue waste of time or resources. 
Fairness refers to regular and predictable decision-making processes as well as an 
open and equal access to decisional arenas.  
89 
Literature on preference formation suggests that “what people want might be so-
cially constructed” (De Mesquita & McDermott, 2004, p. 276). Hence it seems plau-
sible to argue that preferences regarding political process develop within a distinct 
cultural setting and are therefore shaped by the political culture of a nation. In line 
with that, research in political science suggests that citizens’ political preferences 
mainly develop on the basis of their political socialization within a distinct political 
culture (De Mesquita & McDermott, 2004, p. 276; Fuchs, 1999b; Widlavsky, 1987). 
Accordingly, citizens in different political cultures were found to hold distinct pref-
erences as regards political decision-making processes. The political culture of con-
sensus democracies, such as Switzerland, can be traced back to the dominant role of 
negotiations and bargaining processes and the consensus-orientation of political 
institutions. This fosters the citizens’ expectation that social problems are best 
solved based on compromises (Linder & Steffen, 2006). Competitive democracies, 
in contrast, are shaped by the government-opposition code (Kaase & Newton, 1995). 
Majoritarian-based or hierarchical processes dominate and are characterized by 
elements of competition and the attribution of political achievements to certain po-
litical actors. The related expectations of the citizens are clearly defined programmes 
and parties that are capable of forming governments on their own (Kaase & Newton, 
1995, p. 134). Similarly, Hibbing & Theiss-Morse (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995; 
Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002) argue that U.S. citizens expect a stealth democracy, 
i.e. quick and decisive action: “[Americans] dislike compromise and bargaining […] 
and they dislike debate and publicly hashing things out, referring to such activities 
as haggling or bickering” (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995, p. 18). Likewise, Walz 
(1996) argues that citizens in Germany expect political institutions to decide in the 
interest of the public good and in an effective and competent manner.  
Building on the reviewed literature, this study will focus on three different dimen-
sions of political processes. First, the study is interested in preferences concerning 
the consensus-orientation of political processes as well as according perceptions as 
an important aspect of political decision-making in consensus democracies. Second, 
this study refers to preferences and perceptions with regard to political competition 
as an aspect that was found to be of great value for citizens in competitive democra-
cies (Kaase & Newton, 1995). And third, because research has shown that citizens in 
the U.S. want quick and decisive action (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002), this study 
focuses on preferences and perceptions regarding the efficiency of political proce-
dures. Consensus-orientation is associated with respectfulness and fairness of politi-
cal behavior, the role of compromise-seeking endeavors and the fact that there are 
no losers in political processes. The competition dimension concerns the role of 
clear orders and the decisiveness of political actors and refers to political debates 
that are shaped by quarrels or power struggles as a way of competitive majoritarian-
based decision-making processes. The efficiency dimension refers to easy structures 
of political processes, fast and efficient procedures and the avoidance of delays. 
Although other process aspects may be distinguished, these three aspects appear to 
be the most central ones in the literature and constitute a first step in the investiga-
tion of process preferences and perceptions. 
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• H1a: The scale to measure process preferences consists of three correlated di-
mensions: compromise-orientation, competition, and efficiency. 
• H1b: The scale to measure process perceptions consists of three correlated di-
mensions: compromise-orientation, competition, and efficiency. 
• H1c: The process preferences scale and the process perceptions scale are inde-
pendent constructs. 
Moreover, I assume that the measurement of process preferences is culturally in-
variant.44 Cultural invariance refers to the aspect that a construct has the same mean-
ing in different cultures. Measurement invariance is a precondition for interpreting 
differences in scores in different cultures (cf. Bensaou, Coyne, & Venkatraman, 
1999; Little, 1997). The metric invariance of the process preference scales was 
tested with samples from two different cultures: Switzerland as a consensus demo-
cracy and Germany as a rather competitive democracy. Cultural invariance of the 
scale is given if it has the same measurement structure for citizens from Germany as 
it has for Swiss citizens. 
• H2: The process preference scale is culturally invariant. 
In addition, the invariance of the process preferences scale as regards the objects 
of assessment is assumed. This study distinguishes between process preferences 
concerning the executive political branch (i.e. the Swiss government) and the legis-
lative branch (i.e. the Swiss parliament, which consists of National Council and 
Council of States). Invariance is given if the scale measures citizens’ preferences as 
regards decision-making processes within the executive branch in the same manner 
as it measures citizens’ preferences as regards decision-making processes within the 
legislative branch. This study is interested in the measurement invariance as a pre-
condition for being able to meaningfully interpret differences in score. 
• H3: The process preference scale shows invariance as regards the objects of 
assessment. 
5.2. Method 
Section 5.2.1 describes the variables and operationalization. The data collection 
procedure is outlined in Section 5.2.2. Section 5.2.3 discusses the methods of data 
analysis. 
 
44  Whereas the measurement of policy preferences has received some scholarly attention, the 
measurement of process preferences has not (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 
2001a, p. 147). This study aims to make a methodological contribution to the development of 
a standardized scale to measure process preferences. Hence, the cultural invariance as well as 
the invariance regarding different objects of assessment were tested for the process prefer-
ences scale. 
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5.2.1. Variables and Operationalization 
In this section, the operationalization of the variables is described (see Appendix 
10.2 for precise item wordings; the survey questionnaires (in German language) can 
be requested from the author). The scales were designed as a multidimensional re-
search instrument to understand the specific preferences that citizens hold concern-
ing how political decisions should be made and the perceptions of how political 
decisions are actually made. Based on the literature, indicators of political effi-
ciency, consensus-orientation and competition discussed are derived. In addition, 
special care was taken to ensure that the items developed to measure citizens’  
process preferences and perceptions are linked to patterns in media information on 
political decision-making procedures (see Chapter 4). Weatherford (1992) used 
indicators from the National Election Studies to measure the fairness of political 
processes. The items refer to the role of major interests, blame for corruption, fair 
courts, good politicians, trust in the government to do what is right, and the feeling 
of being well represented in the political system. Fairness in that sense is a rather 
broad concept that encompasses the role of lobbyists as well as issues of representa-
tiveness. The items used in this study, in contrast, were adapted from relational jus-
tice scale items that are used, for instance, by Tyler, Degoey, & Smith (1996) and 
Tyler & Rasinski (1991). The according items refer to the role of politeness and 
fairness and the equal consideration of different issue positions. The dimension 
consensus-orientation in this study, hence, encompasses six indicators that relate to 
the respectfulness and fairness of political behavior, whether political parties con-
cede a point to the other side, the consideration of diverging interest, the avoidance 
of losers in a political process, and the role of political compromises. 
To our knowledge, no survey items refer to the importance of competitive ele-
ments in decision-making processes. The items used in this study build on state-
ments in an article by Kaase & Newton (1995). The dimension competition of po-
litical processes contains six items that relate to the decisiveness of political actors, 
the role of political quarrels and power struggles, the insistence on political opin-
ions, the ability of political parties to put their plans through, and the possibility of 
hierarchical orders.  
Using survey data from the American National Election Surveys, Weatherford 
(1992) found that efficiency can be measured by three indicators: Citizens’ percep-
tion of the way political actors make use of financial resources (e.g. wasting taxes), 
the extent to which they perceive politicians as incompetent or crooked, and the 
extent to which respondent perceive that the people running the government are 
smart and know what they are doing. Efficiency in that sense encompasses both 
aspects of how resources are handled as well as aspects of political competence. The 
items used in this study focus on the measurement of efficiency in terms of time. 
The efficiency dimension of political processes is measured with five variables that 
refer to fast and efficient decision-making processes, simple and short processes, the 
avoidance of delays in decision-making, and the role of clear instructions. 
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Altogether, a set of 17 preference statements was developed. Because the litera-
ture provides evidence for the usefulness of rating scales as an alternative to ranking 
scales for the measurement of values (Alwin & Krosnick, 1985), a 7-point scale 
response format assessed how relevant the different aspects of political decision- 
making are for the individual respondent. When responding to the scale, individuals 
were asked the following questions: ‘Citizens hold different preferences regarding 
how political decisions should be made. Please answer according to the following 
scale how important you consider the various preferences. The scale ranges from 1 
(not important at all) to 7 (very important)’. Preferences regarding the consensus-
orientation of political processes were for instance measured with the question ‘How 
important is it for you, that political parties sometimes concede a point to the other 
side?’ Preferences regarding the efficiency of political processes were for example 
measured with the question ‘How important is it for you that political decision-
making processes are simple and short?’ The items used to measure process prefer-
ences are presented in Table 5.2. 
The measurement of process perceptions was developed by adapting the process 
preferences items. All items were measured on a 7-point scale and had the following 
stem: ‘Now we would like to know how, in your opinion, political decisions are 
actually made in Switzerland. Please answer according to the following scale and 
indicate to what extent the following statements on political decision-making  
processes in Switzerland, in your opinion, apply or not apply. The scale ranges from 
1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (fully applies).’ Perceived consensus-orientation of 
political processes was for instance measured with the statement ‘Political parties 
sometimes concede a point to the other side.’ Perceived efficiency-orientation was 
for example measured with the statement ‘Political decision-making processes are 
time-consuming.’ The items used to measure process perceptions are presented in 
Table 5.3. 
In order to test the cultural invariance of the process preferences scale (see Sec-
tion 5.3.2), surveys with Swiss and German students were conducted. In these pilot 
studies, a Likert response format was used to measure process preferences.45 The 
following question was asked: ‘Please answer according to the following scale, to 
what extent you agree with the following statements. The scale ranges from 1 (fully 
agree) to 7 (do not agree at all).’ Process perceptions were measured by asking: 
‘How are political decisions actually made in Switzerland/Germany? Please answer 
according to the following scale and indicate to what extent the following statements 
on political decision-making processes in Switzerland, in your opinion, apply or not 
apply. The scale ranges from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (fully applies).’ The data 
from this comparative survey do not encompass all nine scales items. Therefore I am 
able to test the cultural invariance on a restricted data set only. Missing variables are 
the ones that refer to the question whether political parties should concede a point to 
 
45  The Likert response format appeared to be somewhat problematical, because the items would 
not have been accepted as “own” statements. Therefore, process preferences in the final study 
were measured by asking how important a variety of process aspects are for the respondents. 
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the other side, one political party is able to put their plans through, and delays in 
political processes are avoided. Thus, for each of the three dimensions the data set 
contains two variables (shown in Table 5.5). The wording of items in this study is 
slightly different from the variables in the first study. The core messages are the 
same, however. 
In order to test the discriminant validity of the process preferences scale as re-
gards different objects of assessment, data from the another pilot survey with 530 
Swiss citizens was used. Process preferences concerning decision-making processes 
in the Swiss government (“Bundesrat”) and the Swiss parliament – which consists of 
National Council (“Nationalrat”) and Council of States (“Ständerat”) – were distin-
guished. A 7-point scale response format assessed how relevant the different aspects 
of political decision-making are for the individual respondent. When responding to 
the scale, individuals were asked the following questions: ‘Citizens hold different 
preferences regarding how political decisions in the parliament should be made. 
Please answer according to the following scale how important you consider the 
various preferences. The scale ranges from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very impor-
tant)’, ‘Citizens hold different preferences regarding how political decisions in the 
government should be made. Please answer according to the following scale how 
important you consider the various preferences. The scale ranges from 1 (not impor-
tant at all) to 7 (very important)’. Preferences regarding the consensus-orientation of 
political processes were for instance measured with the question ‘How important is 
it for you, that politicians in the parliament sometimes concede a point to the other 
side?’ / ‘How important is it for you that politicians in government sometimes con-
cede a point to the other side?’ Preferences regarding the efficiency of political 
processes were for example measured with the question ‘How important is it for you 
that political decision-making processes in the parliament are simple and short?’ / 
‘How important is it for you that political decision-making processes in the govern-
ment are simple and short?’ The items used to measure process preferences are pre-
sented in footnote 56. 
5.2.2. Participants and Procedures 
A first pretest of the process preferences and perceptions items was done with five 
persons.46 The persons were informed about the purpose of pretesting the question-
naire. The test included a post-interview probing with a focus on comprehension. 
Pretests are a relevant step in developing the final questionnaires (Probst, 1998). 
They encompass the careful analysis of unclear formulations, redundancies, and 
questions that result in many “don’t know” answers. Moreover, the variances of 
items might give hints on whether the scales are appropriate. In addition, pretests 
 
46  The persons were doctoral students at the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. 
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give information on the question order. The insights from the pretest informed the 
further development of the survey items. Special attention was given to the items 
measuring process preferences and perceptions. Wordings were edited, single items 
were deleted, and complex items were simplified. 
In a pilot study with samples from two different cultures, Switzerland as a con-
sensus democracy and Germany as a rather competitive democracy, the cultural 
invariance of the process preferences scales was tested. In November and December 
2007, standardized written surveys were conducted with college students in Ger-
many (n = 163) and Switzerland (n = 150). Students in Münster, Lucerne, and Zu-
rich participated in the study.47 The survey was conducted within the framework of 
university lectures and seminars. The surveys were conducted in the German-
speaking part of Switzerland only, which has the advantage that potential differences 
in the measurement in the two samples might not be attributed to language differ-
ences. The college samples seemed appropriate for the purpose of scale develop-
ment, where representative samples are not necessarily required (Noar, 2003, p. 
626). The survey dealt with attitudes toward the government and politicians. The 
samples had an above-average number of participants with higher levels of formal 
education. In the German survey, 42 percent were males, and the age ranged from 18 
to 31 (M=22; SD=2.7). In the Swiss survey, 51 percent were males, and the age 
ranged from 18 to 33 (M= 22; SD=2.8). The duration of the surveys was approxi-
mately 15 minutes. 
The second pilot study was conducted in March/April 2008 for the purpose of 
testing the invariance of the scale as regards different objects of assessment. The 
subjects were recruited in collaboration with “smartvote”, an online voting decision-
making tool in Switzerland.48 In the “smartvote” post election survey in November 
and December 2007 a question was included that asked whether the respondent 
would be interested in participating in a social science research project. Those re-
spondents who indicated ‘yes’ were included in a pool of potential participants. The 
sample therefore includes a high number of subjects with strong interests in politics. 
In addition, the sample has an above-average number of participants with a high 
level of formal education. The study was conducted as an online survey. Out of 800 
invited subjects, 530 people completed the questionnaire. The response rate was 
0.66. In the sample from the second pilot survey, 61 percent were males, and the age 
ranged from 16 to 76 (M=38; SD=13.9). The survey dealt with attitudes towards the 
government and parliament. The duration of the survey was approximately 15  
minutes. 
The development of the process perceptions and process preferences scales is 
based on data from a standardized online survey that was conducted in May 2008 in 
the German-speaking part of Switzerland. Respondents were recruited through the 
 
47  Thanks to Margit Bussmann, Frank Esser, Tina Freyburg, Frank Marcinkowski, Urs Scheuss, 
and Doreen Spörer for their help with the implementation of this pilot study. 
48  The author thanks Jan Fivaz from the online voting platform “smartvote” for his help with the 
recruitment of participants (www.smartvote.ch). 
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newsletter of ‘smartvote’, an electronic voting decision-making tool in Switzerland. 
The newsletter is regularly sent to all registered users of the ‘smartvote’ online-
platform (www.smartvote.ch). The participants, hence, were more interested in poli-
tics than the average Swiss citizen. Moreover, participants had an above-average 
level of higher educational degrees. For the purpose of scale development and vali-
dation, this survey sample was separated into two groups, a smaller sample with 157 
participants who participated in the control group of the experimental study, and a 
second sample with 366 participants who participated in the two experimental 
groups. In the first group (n = 157), 64 percent were males, and the age ranged from 
19 to 84 (M=42; SD=14.5). In the second group (n = 366), 69 percent were males, 
and the age ranged from 18 to 80 (M= 44; SD=15.5). 
5.2.3. Data Analysis 
The items measuring process preferences and process perceptions were tested by 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with maximum-likelihood parameter estimation. 
The analysis used EQS version 6.1 software (Bentler, 2006). CFA is a technique that 
can greatly enhance confidence in the structure and psychometric properties of a 
new measure (Noar, 2003) and several studies have provided evidence for the use-
fulness of CFA in further developing conventional measures of political attitudes 
(e.g. Funke, 2005; Weatherford, 1992). Data were tested for univariate and multi-
variate normal distribution. Extreme violations (moderate ones are given in paren-
theses) on the assumption of the univariate distribution are associated with skew 
values of at least 3 (2) and kurtosis of at least 20 (7) (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). 
These values were not reached in all of the samples. Yuan, Lambert, & Fouladi 
(2004) developed an extension of the Mardia (1970; 1974) test of multivariate kurto-
sis that can be applied to data with missing values. The normalized estimate is inter-
pretable as a standard normal variate; the hypothesis of multivariate normality must 
be rejected if it is outside the range of -3 to +3 (Bentler, 2006, p. 282f.). Strong out-
liers were excluded from data analysis. Missing values were estimated with the 
maximum likelihood method, also known as full information maximum likelihood 
(cf. Bentler, 2006, 275ff.). To evaluate the model fit, the following criteria were 
evaluated: the Chi-Square value divided by the number of degrees of freedom (< 3), 
the comparative fit index (CFI > .90), the Root Mean-Square Error of Approxima-
tion (RMSEA < .06) with its 90% confidence interval (CI, lower bound < .05, upper 
bound < .10) ( Kline, 2005, p. 133ff.). 
5.3. Results 
Section 5.3.1 presents the model development and validation of a scale to measure 
process preferences. Section 5.3.2 describes the development and validation of 
scales to measure citizens’ perception of political processes. In Section 5.3.3, it was 
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tested whether respondents differentiate between process preferences and process 
perceptions. In addition, the cultural invariance of the process preferences scale was 
tested; the results are presented in Section 5.3.4. Moreover, the process preference 
scale was tested in terms of its invariance as regards different objects of assessment; 
Section 5.3.5 describes the findings. Finally, the construct validity of the scales is 
investigated (Section 5.3.6). 
5.3.1. Process Preferences: Model Development and Validation 
The scale to measure process preferences was designed as a multidimensional re-
search instrument to understand the specific preferences that citizens hold concern-
ing how political decisions should be made. Building on aspects of political effi-
ciency, consensus-orientation, and competition that are discussed in the literature 
(Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Kaase & Newton, 1995; Linder & Steffen, 2006), a 
set of 17 preference statements was developed. In confirmatory factor analysis, the 
dimensions of process preferences (consensus-orientation, competition, and effi-
ciency) can be modeled as latent variables that are each reflected by several indica-
tors. Hence, an initial model was developed that specifies how the 17 indicators are 
related to the three latent factors (preferences towards the efficiency of political 
processes, preferences as regards the consensus-orientation, and preferences regar-
ding political competition). In the initial model the factor consensus-orientation 
encompasses six indicators: the respectfulness of political behavior, the fairness of 
political actors, whether political parties concede a point to the other side, the con-
sideration of diverging interest, the avoidance to distinguish between winners and 
losers of a political process, and the role of political compromises. The factor com-
petition contains the following six items: whether political actors force their points, 
the role of political quarrels, the role of power struggles, the persistency of political 
actors, the ability of political parties to put their plans through, and the possibility of 
hierarchical orders. The dimension efficiency includes five variables: fast decision-
making processes, efficient decision-making processes, simple and short processes, 
the avoidance of delays in decision-making, and the firm stand of political actors.  
The initial model with 17 items was tested with the survey data from the final 
survey with Swiss citizens. For the purpose of scale development and validation this 
survey sample was separated into two groups, a smaller sample with 157 partici-
pants who participated in the control group of the experimental study, and a second 
sample with 366 participants who participated in the two experimental groups. The 
development of the scale is based on the sample with 157 participants. The unstan-
dardized loading of the first indicator was fixed to 1.0 to scale the factor. The initial 
correlated factors model that was developed did not fit the data. Some indicators 
were not satisfactory and eight out of the initial 17 indicators were eliminated from 
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the analysis.49 The resulting modified model encompasses nine indicators and is 
presented in Figure 5.1, Cronbach’s Alpha was .69. The modified correlated factors 
model fits the data quite well (see Table 5.1). Standardized factor loading are struc-
ture coefficients that estimate indicator-factor loadings. The factor loadings for each 
set of indicators are relatively high, indicating that the factors are well represented 
by the according items (see Table 5.2). This also suggests convergent validity. 
Drawing on Boyle (1991) who argues that establishing reliability at the cost of va-
lidity is problematical, items with lower factor loadings (< .6) were not eliminated 
from the model in order to satisfy the complexity of the constructs.  
The data-driven model modification process resulted in a correlated factor model 
that encompasses three factors with three indicators each. The factor efficiency de-
scribes preferences regarding the efficiency of political decision-making and in-
cludes indicators that refer to fast and efficient decision-making processes, simple 
structures of decision-making processes, and the avoidance of delays in political 
processes. The factor consensus-orientation describes preferences regarding the role 
of compromises in decision-making processes and encompasses variables that relate 
to the question of whether one party from time to time concedes a point to the other 
side, the consideration of divergent interests and compromise-seeking behavior. The 
factor competition describes preferences regarding the role of competition and clear 
alternative standpoints in political processes. It includes items that refer to the deci-
siveness of political actors who force their point, the ability of political parties to put 
their plans through, and the role of hierarchical orders. The correlations between the 
factors indicate that the three factors are distinct. For the correlation between the 
factor consensus-orientation and the factor competition r = 0.01; for the correlation 
between the factors consensus-orientation and efficiency r = 0.21; and for the corre-
lation between the factors competition and efficiency r = 0.64. All correlations are 




49  I did take out the variables referring to the role of political quarrels and role of power strug-
gles related to the competition factor, because those two variables refer too much to conflicts 
whereas the competition factor generally refers to competitive elements of political decision-
making processes which not need be shaped by quarrels and power struggles. After removing 
these two variables, the item measuring the importance of insisting on an opinion showed a 
low loading on the competition factor and was also excluded. For the efficiency factor, I took 
out the two variables referring to efficient decision-making processes and clear instructions, 
because the Lagrange Multiplier test indicated problems with those variables. Moreover, the 
loading of the firm stand item was low and, hence, this item was excluded. For the consensus-
orientation factor, I excluded the two variables measuring the importance of respectfulness of 
political behavior and fairness of political actors because both relate to general characteristics 
of political actors rather than a specific dimension of process preferences. Then I excluded the 












Simple and short processes
Avoid delays
efficiency
Put their plans through
 
Figure 5.1. Modified Measurement Model of Process Preferences. See Table 5.2 for 
variables, factor loadings, and indicator reliabilities (i.e. squared multiple correla-
tions 
 
Further tests of alternative models were conducted to evaluate the discriminant 
and convergent validity of the scale.The modified model was compared with alterna-
tive models in a set of multisample analyses. If the models are nested, that is one 
model is a restricted version of the other, the relative fit of these models can be 
compared with the Chi-Square difference test. The specification of a model in which 
each of the nine indicators loads on only one factor provides a precise test of con-
vergent and discriminant validity (Kline, 2005, p. 181). A one-factor model tests 
whether the items are measuring one overall factor rather than three individual fac-
tors. Support for this model would suggest that individuals do not differentiate 
among different dimensions of process preferences and they would best be repre-
sented by a unidimensional construct (Noar, 2003, p. 633f.). The results of selected 
fit indices clearly indicate poor fit for the one factor model (see Table 5.1). The fit is 
significantly worse than the fit for the correlated factors model, as the Chi-Square 
difference test shows.50 Hence, the observed variables show discriminant validity 
and measure more than one domain. The three scales allow measuring preferences 
 
50  Given a difference in Degrees of Freedom (df) of 3, the difference in Chi-Square is signifi-
cant at the level of 5 % if it is 7.815 or larger. The Chi-Square difference here is larger than 
that value. 
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concerning efficiency, consensus-orientation and competition separately. In addi-
tion, an uncorrelated factors model tests the idea that the three factors are independ-
ent. Support for this model would suggest that the three dimensions of process pref-
erences are independent constructs and thus are not related to one another (Noar, 
2003, p. 634). Retention of this model suggests that what is being measured here are 
really three different constructs. As the uncorrelated factors model and the initial 
correlated factors model are nested, the former one being a restricted version of the 
latter, the relative fit of these models can be compared with the Chi-Square differ-
ence test. The uncorrelated factor model fitted the data not well (see Table 5.1), and 
the Chi-Square difference test indicates that the correlated factor model fitted the 
data significantly better.51  
In general, then, the correlated factor model is superior to a one-factor model and 
superior to an uncorrelated factor model. The support for the correlated factor model 
suggests the possibility of a hierarchical model. A hierarchical model tests the idea 
that a second-order factor can account for relations between the three factors. Hence, 
the unanalyzed association between the correlated factors model is replaced by a 
second-order factor, which has no indicators and is presumed to have direct effects 
on the first-order factors (Kline, 2005, p. 193). This hierarchical model indicates that 
each of the three preference dimensions are first-order factors that are related to a 
second-order factor termed the general “process preference” factor. Retention of this 
model supports the idea that these three scales are subscale of one larger scale. 
Therefore, the three scales could be examined individually or summed together into 
one scale. The hierarchical model fits the data equally as well as the correlated factor 
model. This is the case because the second-order parameterization did not gain any 
degrees of freedom as it would with more indicators (Bentler, 2006, p. 45). Looking 
at the parameter estimates, the results indicate that the general factor “process pref-
erences” is well represented by the factors competition and efficiency. However, it is 
not well represented by the factor consensus-orientation, the factor loading is low (β 
= .19). Hence, the correlated factors model was chosen as the superior model.  
 
Table 5.1. Comparison of Alternative Measurement Models of Process Preferences  
 
51  Given a difference in Degrees of Freedom (df) of 3, the difference in Chi-Square is signifi-
cant at the level of 5 % if it is 7.815 or larger. The Chi-Square difference here is larger than 
that value. 
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Models that are modified based on empirical data require the validation on an in-
dependent sample (Kline, 2005). Hence another sample of Swiss citizens from the 
same study was used (n = 366) for validation of the correlated factors model. The 
invariance in measurement models represents a continuum (Bollen, 1989, p. 356). 
Bollen (1989) suggests a hierarchy of invariance that can be assessed along the two 
overlapping dimensions: Invariance of model form and similarity in the parameter 
values. The first level refers to the number of factors. The hypothesis to be tested is 
that there are the same numbers of correlated common factors in both groups. Only 
if equality in model form is given, the similarity in parameter values can be tested. 
With respect to similarity in parameter values, I tested (1) whether the factor  
loadings linking the latent variable to the observed variable are the same in the two 
samples, (2) whether the factor variances and covariances are invariant, and (3) I 
tested the equality of measurement error variances as a higher form of invariance. 
Data analysis supported the hypothesis of invariance in model form. A set of multi-
ple group analyses, then, tested the invariance of factor loadings, factor variances 
and covariances, and error variances. All parameters are found to be invariant across 
both samples. The fully constrained comparison results in two equivalent models. 
Table 5.2 shows the items, factor loadings, and reliabilities of the process preference 
scale. These results clearly support the validity of the scale. The model fit was satis-
factory, with CFI = .98, RMSEA =.03 (90% CI = .00, .05), Chi-Square = 82.61, df = 
69. Cronbach’s Alpha in the first sample was .69, in the second sample .65. Thus, 
H1a, which assumes that citizens’ process preferences encompass the three dimen-
sions efficiency, consensus-orientation and competition and that these preferences 























Table 5.2. Items, Factor Loadings, and Indicator Reliabilities of Process Prefer-
ences Scale 
5.3.2. Measuring Process Perceptions 
A model measuring process perceptions was tested by adapting the process prefer-
ences model. The scale to measure process perceptions encompasses three dimen-
sions: consensus perceptions, efficiency perceptions and competition perceptions. 
The initial model with 17 items was tested with the survey data from the final survey 
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with the Swiss citizens. For the purpose of scale development and validation this 
survey sample was separated into two groups, a smaller sample with 157 partici-
pants who participated in the control group of the experimental study, and a second 
sample with 366 participants who participated in the two experimental groups. The 
development of the scale is based on the sample with 157 participants. The consen-
sus dimension of process perceptions is measured with items referring to the role of 
compromises, the consideration of diverging interests, and whether or not politicians 
concede a point to the other side. The efficiency dimension of process perceptions is 
measured with items referring to delays in political decision-making procedures, 
simple and short processes and whether or not political problems are solved fast. 
The competition dimension of process perceptions is measured with items referring 
to the role of hierarchical orders, the decisiveness of political actors and whether or 
not political actors put their plans through. The model fit was satisfactory, with CFI 
= .91, RMSEA =.07 (90% CI = .03, .10), Chi-Square = 43.50, df = 24. Cronbach’s 
Alpha was .48. Whereas the factors efficiency perception and consensus perception 
are well represented by its indicators, the factor competition perception causes some 
trouble. The item “Politicians are decisive and force their points” shows a particu-
larly low and non-significant loading on the competition perception factor. After 
excluding this item, the model fit improved significantly as indicated by the Chi-
Square-Difference Test. The model fit was satisfactory, with CFI = .97, RMSEA 
=.04 (90% CI = .00, .09), Chi-Square = 23.14, df = 17. Cronbach’s Alpha was .47. 
See Table 5.3 for factor loadings and indicator reliabilities. Generally, the measures 
of process perceptions regarding the competition dimension are not ideal. Ap-






















Table 5.3. Items, Factor Loadings, Indicator Reliabilities of Process Perceptions 
Scale 
 
Another sample of Swiss citizens from the same study was used (n = 366) for vali-
dation of the correlated factors model. For the scale measuring process perceptions, 
data analysis supported the hypothesis of invariance in model form. In a set of mul-
tiple group analyses I then tested the invariance of factor loadings, factor variances 
and covariances, and error variances. All parameters are found to be invariant across 
both samples. The fully constrained comparison results in two equivalent models.  
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Table 5.3 shows the items, factor loadings and reliabilities of the process perceptions 
scale. These results clearly support the validity of the scale. The calculated fit indi-
ces for the group comparison are: with CFI = .96, RMSEA =.04 (90% CI = .01, .06), 
Chi-Square = 78.24; df = 52. Cronbach’s Alpha in the first sample was .45, in the 
second sample .44. In general, then, the findings support H1b. 
5.3.3. Discriminant Validity of Preferences and Perceptions Scales 
In order to compare citizens’ process preferences and related process perceptions, 
the two scales to measure preferences and perceptions need to be discriminant, that 
is they need to measure different concepts. The discriminant validity of the process 
preferences and process perceptions scales was tested using the joint sample includ-
ing participants group 1 and group 2 (n = 523).The discriminant validity of the  
process preferences and process perceptions scales was tested for the three dimen-
sions, consensus, efficiency and competition, separately. The specification of a 
model in which each of the indicators loads on only one factor provides a precise 
test of convergent and discriminant validity (Kline, 2005, p. 181). A one-factor 
model tests whether the items are measuring one overall factor rather than two indi-
vidual factors. Support for this model would suggest that individuals do not differen-
tiate among different process preferences and process perceptions and both concepts 
would best be represented by a unidimensional construct (cf. Noar, 2003, p. 633f.). 
The results of selected fit indices clearly indicate poor fit for the one factor model 
for all three dimensions, consensus, efficiency and competition (see Table 5.4). The 
fit is significantly worse than the fit for the uncorrelated factors model, as the Chi-
Square difference test shows.52 An uncorrelated factors model tests the idea that the 
two factors are independent. Support for this model suggests that the process prefer-
ences and process perceptions scales are independent constructs and thus not related 
to one another (Noar, 2003, p. 634). Comparing the uncorrelated factor model with a 
correlated factor model, the correlated factors model did result in a significant reduc-
tion of Chi-Square for the efficiency and competition dimensions, but not for the 
consensus dimensions.53 The correlation between efficiency preferences and effi-
ciency perceptions was -.398 (p < .005); the correlation between competition prefer-
ences and competition perceptions was .515 (p < .005). In general, the findings sup-
port H1c and indicate that the process preferences and process perception factors 
show discriminant validity and the scales allow measuring process preferences and 
related perceptions separately, although preferences and perceptions that concern the 
 
52  Given a difference in Degrees of Freedom (df) of 1, the difference in Chi-Square is signifi-
cant at the level of 5 % if it is 3.841 or larger. The Chi-Square difference here is larger than 
that value. 
53  Given a difference in Degrees of Freedom (df) of 1, the difference in Chi-Square is signifi-
cant at the level of 5 % if it is 3.841 or larger. The Chi-Square differences for the efficiency 
dimension and the competition dimension are larger than that value. 
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efficiency of political processes and preferences and perceptions that concern the 
competition of political processes were found to be correlated. 
 
Table 5.4. Process Preferences and Process Perceptions as Distinct Concepts 
5.3.4. Test of Cultural Invariance of Process Preferences Scale 
Cultural invariance indicates that a construct has the same meaning in different cul-
tures. The measurement invariance is a precondition for interpreting differences in 
scores in different cultures (cf. Bensaou, et al., 1999; Little, 1997). “Inadequate 
testing for the invariance of data across national groups weakens the interpretations 
that may be derived from cross-national empirical research” (Bensaou, et al., 1999, 
p. 672). In order to test the cultural invariance of the scale which is assumed in H2, 
data from the first pilot study was used. This study was conducted with college stu-
dents in Germany (n = 163) and Switzerland (n = 150). Switzerland constitutes a 
typical consensus democracy, whereas Germany is a rather competitive democracy. 
The test of the cultural invariance is based on a restricted data set; for each of the 
106 
three dimensions the data set contains two variables;54 the variables are shown in 
Table 5.5.  
The test of measurement invariance between cultures is also evaluated as a con-
tinuum (Bensaou, et al., 1999; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). The invariance in 
model form and the similarity in parameter values, i.e. the invariance of factor  
loadings, the invariance of factor variances and covariances, and the invariance of 
error variances, were tested. The data supported the hypothesis of invariance in 
model form. In a set of multiple group analyses, the invariance of factor loadings, 
factor variances and covariances was tested by setting equality constraints. All pa-
rameters are found to be invariant across both samples. The model that in addition 
constrained the error variances to be equal across the two groups did not fit the data, 
however. Table 5.3 shows the items, factor loadings, and reliabilities of the process 
preference scale for the model with equality constraints on the invariance of factor 
loadings, factor variances and covariances. The model fit was satisfactory, with CFI 
= 1.00, RMSEA =.00 (90% CI = .00, .05), Chi-Square = 17.02, df = 20. Cronbach’s 
Alpha is .53 for the Swiss sample and .67 for the German sample. Results clearly 
indicate that the process preference scale shows cultural invariance and support H2. 
Therefore, differences in scores on the items can be meaningful compared across 
countries. However, although the factor variances are equivalent, the error variances 
are not, indicating that the indicators might not be equally reliable across constructs 
(cf. Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998, p. 81). 
 
54  The wording of items in this study is slightly different from the variables in the other two 
studies. The core messages are the same, however. 
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Table 5.5. Cultural Invariance of Process Preferences  
5.3.5. Process Preferences: Test of Invariance Regarding Objects of Assessment 
H3 postulates that the scale is invariance as regards the objects of assessment, mean-
ing that the scale measures process preferences equally well for different political 
institutions, such as the government and the parliament. In order to test this assump-
tion, data from the second pilot survey with 530 Swiss citizens were used. Process 
preferences concerning decision-making processes in the Swiss government 
(“Bundesrat”) and the Swiss parliament – which consists of National Council  
(“Nationalrat”) and Council of States (“Ständerat”) – were distinguished. To test the 
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invariance as regards the object of assessment, the data are perceived as multitreat-
multimethod (MTMM) data, with treats being the nine process preference variables 
(concede a point, consider diverging interests, compromises, force their points, put 
their plans through, hierarchical orders, fast decision-making, simple and short  
processes, avoid delays) and methods being the two different objects of assessment 
(parliament and government). The conceptualization of the data as MTMM data 
with process preferences being the treats and methods being the object of assessment 
is considered to be appropriate, because the logic that underlies the analyses of 
MTMM data seems applicable for a test of invariance of measurement regarding 
different objects of assessment. In both cases, the research interest refers to conver-
gent validity, and it is investigated whether different methods (or in this case objects 
of assessment) or traits (in this case process preferences) explain the variance of 
observed variables. Convergent validity is given when the variance is explained by 
traits rather than methods. Hence, if the variance of observed process preference 
variables is explained by process aspects rather than the objects of assessment, this 
supports the hypothesis that the scale is invariant as regards the two different object 
of assessment (government and parliament). 
The literature suggests several models to analyze MTMM data (cf. Byrne & 
Goffin, 1993; Lance, Noble, & Scullen, 2007; H.W. Marsh & Bailey, 1991). I will 
present results that are based on a Correlated-Uniqueness Model (CU), an approach 
recently discussed in the literature (Byrne & Goffin, 1993; Lance, Noble, & Scullen, 
2007; Marsh, Byrne, & Craven, 1992). Other approaches to test the invariance as 
regards objects of assessment for the process preferences scale are discussed by the 
author elsewhere (Floß, 2008). The CU Model was proposed by Marsh (1988) as an 
approach to MTMM analyses that allows method effects to be represented by corre-
lated error/uniqueness terms (i.e. error covariances). 
Figure 5.2 presents the CU Model used to test the hypothesis. Error covariances 
representing the same method were freely estimated. The measures which are  
loading on the same trait factor were constrained to have equal factor loadings for 

















Note. Chi-Square (df=36, N 521)  =62.71, Comparative fit index is .99, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is .04 
with a 90% confidence interval .02 - .05.
The numbers 11-19 and 21-29 are the number of the variables that measure preferences regarding political processes in the 
parliament and the government (see Table 5.6. for information on how the numbers relate to variables, see footnote 56 for 
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Note. Chi-Square (df=36, N 521)  =62.71, Comparative fit index is .99, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is .04 with 
a 90% confidence interval .02 - .05.
The numbers 11-19 and 21-29 are the number of the variables that measure preferences regarding political processes in the 
parliament and the government (see Table 5.6. for information on how the numbers relate to variables, see footnote 56 for 
information on the item wordings).
Figure 5.2. Correlated Uniqueness Model of Preferences Regarding Different Ob-
jects 
 
The model fit was satisfactory, with CFI = .99, RMSEA =.04 (90% CI = .02, .05), 
Chi-Square = 62.72, df = 36. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 
5.6. The findings are based on the analysis of 511 cases.55 The trait-factor loadings 
for the CU model were strong (mean correlation =. 77) and all loadings were statis-
tically significant. Each of the correlated uniqueness represents the correlation be-
tween two variables sharing the same method after removing trait effects (Marsh & 
Bailey, 1991, p. 66). The results suggest good convergent validity and lend support 
to H3 which assumes that the proposed process preferences scale is invariant as 











55  Cases missing to 530 were excluded from the data analysis because they are statistical out-
liers. 
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Table 5.6. Results for the Correlated Uniqueness Model 
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Based on the confirmation of the scale’s invariance as regards objects of assess-
ment, a comparison of citizens’ preferences regarding political processes in the gov-
ernment and citizens preferences regarding political processes in the parliament was 
conducted. Table 5.7 shows a comparison of the mean values for citizens’ prefer-
ences regarding the government and the parliament.56 The findings suggest that there 
are no major differences. Likewise, the correlations between the items measuring 
process preferences regarding the government and corresponding items measuring 
process preferences regarding the parliament are high (mean correlation = .59). The 
empirical evidence for the scale’s invariance as regards the objects of assessment 
along with the finding that citizens’ process preferences do not differ significantly 
when comparing preferences concerning political processes in the government and 
the parliament warrant the assumption that citizens do hold rather general process 
preferences. Based on this assumption, the media effects study that is presented in 









56  The following items were used to measure preferences concerning decision-making processes 
in the government and preferences concerning decision-making processes in the parliament: 
Concede: How important is it for you that politicians in the parliament sometimes concede a 
point to the other side? / How important is it for you that politicians in the government some-
times concede a point to the other side? Div interests: How important is it for you that politi-
cians in the parliament give consideration to diverging interests when searching for solutions? 
/ How important is it for you that politicians in the government give consideration to diverg-
ing interests when searching for solutions? Compromises: How important is it for you that 
political decisions in the parliament are based on compromises? / How important is it for you 
that political decisions in the government are based on compromises? Fast: How important is 
it for you that the parliament solves political problems as fast as possible? / How important is 
it for you that the government solves political problems as fast as possible? Short processes: 
How important is it for you that political decision-making processes in the parliament are 
simple and short? / How important is it for you that political decision-making processes in the 
government are simple and short? Avoid delays: How important is it for you that parliamen-
tary actors avoid delays when making political decisions? / How important is it for you that 
governmental actors avoid delays when making political decisions? Force points: How im-
portant is it for you that politicians in the parliament are decisive and force their points? / 
How important is it for you that politicians in the government are decisive and force their 
points? Plans through: How important is it for you that in the parliament one political side is 
able to put their plans through? / How important is it for you that in the parliament one politi-
cal side is able to put their plans through? Orders: How important is it for you that parlia-
mentary actors could give hierarchical orders, if a decision has to be taken? 7 How important 




Table 5.7. Comparison between Preferences Regarding Parliament and Government 
5.3.6. Construct Validity of the Scales 
Further analyses were conducted in order to test the construct validity of the scales. 
The analyses are based on the final survey and include participants from group 1 and 
group 2 (n = 523). The relationship between both process preferences and process 
perceptions and a set of variables can be analyzed in order to investigate the con-
struct validity of the scales. Before the results will be presented, the reader will be 
provided with some descriptive information. Respondents’ process preferences are 
listed in Table 5.8 along with the mean values and standard deviations. As regards 
process preferences, a higher mean score in Table 5.8 indicates greater importance 
attached to that attribute. As regards process perception questions, the higher the 
mean scores in the Table 5.8, the more the particular attribute applies to decision-
making processes in Switzerland. The mean differentials indicate the mean distance 
between preferences and perceptions. Positive values indicate that preferences ex-
ceed perceptions and an attribute is considered to be important but not perceived to 
be accurate. Negative values indicate that perceptions exceed preferences and an 
attribute is considered less important but perceived to be accurate. 
The most important attributes of political decision-making processes are the re-
spectfulness and the fairness of political behavior. Other typical aspects of consen-
sus democracy such as the consideration of diverging interests, the evading of power 
struggles and the conceding of points to the other side, are also important to the 
participants. Attributes of efficiency are also considered to be very important, 
namely the avoidance of delays and the efficiency of political processes. Factors 
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considered to be less important by the respondents are that there are no losers to a 
political process and that political actors are decisive and force their points. As for 
the process perceptions, the most accurate attribute of decision-making processes in 
Switzerland is that political decisions are based on compromises. The consideration 
of diverging interests, another characteristic element of decision-making processes 
in consensus democracies, is also perceived to be rather accurate. Moreover, politi-
cians are perceived to put plans through and to be decisive and force their points. 
The subjects consider it least accurate to say that political processes are simple and 
fast and that political actors make efforts to avoid political quarrels and power 
struggles.  
The comparison of preferences and perceptions shown in Table 5.8 indicates that 
there are substantial differences between what citizens expect from political  
processes and what they perceive is actually the case in reality. In the aggregate, 
respondents think that political processes are deficient in their avoidance of political 
power struggles. The mean differential is also large for the discrepancy with respect 
to the avoidance of quarrels and the discrepancy referring to the efficiency of politi-
cal processes. There is only one differential with a negative sign, which indicates 
that, in the aggregate, respondents think that the way that political actors force their 
points surpasses their preferences. The value for this mean differences is, although 
significant, relatively small. 
 
Table 5.8. Mean Process Preferences – Perceptions Differentials  
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Table 5.9 shows calculations of the general magnitude of the discrepancies across 
the 17 items. The table indicates the proportion of respondents whose perception of 
political processes matches, falls short of, or surpasses their preferences. For in-
stance, a respondent is coded as having congruent preferences and perceptions if the 
respondent considers it to be extremely important that political decisions are based 
on compromises and also thinks that political decisions are based on compromises. 
If an attribute is coded as extremely important, and the respondent perceives that it 
is does not apply at all, the respondent is coded as having preferences that exceed 
perceptions. If an attribute is coded rather less important, and the respondent per-
ceives that it does fully apply, the respondent is coded as having perceptions that 
exceed preferences. It is notable that for just a few aspects perceptions exceed pref-
erences for a considerable proportion of respondents. This is the case for the follow-
ing aspects: Political actors put heir plans through, political decisions are based on 
compromises, political actors force their points, and political actors make use of 
hierarchical orders. In contrast, about nine out of ten respondents perceive that po-
litical processes are less efficient, less fair and less shaped by clear orders than they 
should be. For a large majority of respondents, too, preferences exceed perceptions 
as regards the avoidance of political delays, the respectfulness of political actors, the 
political actors’ evading of power struggles and political quarrels, and the rapidness 
of political decision-making. In general, the findings indicate that political processes 
do not match individual expectations on most of the measured attributes. 
 
Table 5.9. Relationship between Process Preferences and Perceptions 
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The questionnaire contains ten items that measure citizens’ political support. The 
items either refer to the government, the parliament, democracy, or political actors. 
The items were measured on a 10-point scale, with 1 indicating low support and 10 
indicating high support.57 Table 5.10 shows the aggregate levels of political support 
for the government, the parliament, political actors, and democracy that the respon-
dents in the sample have. On average, support is lowest with respect to politicians, 
followed by support for the parliament. Support for the Swiss government is even 
higher, and the highest levels of political support were indicated with respect to 
democracy. In general, the political support of the study’s participants appears to be 
stronger than the national average. In a national representative survey conducted in 
June 2008, only 41 percent of the respondents indicated that they trust the govern-












57  The following items were used to measure political support. trust government: Please tell 
me on a score of 1-10 how much you personally trust each of the following institutions. 1 
means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete 
trust…government. trust parliament: Please tell me on a score of 1-10 how much you per-
sonally trust each of the following institutions. 1 means you do not trust an institution at all, 
and 10 means you have complete trust … parliament (National Council and Council of 
States). performance government: How good or bad do you consider the present general 
performance of the government? Please answer according to the following scale, 1 indicates 
very bad, 10 indicates very good. performance parliament: How good or bad do you con-
sider the present general performance of the parliament? Please answer according to the fol-
lowing scale, 1 indicates very bad, 10 indicates very good. performance politicians: How 
good or bad do you consider the present general performance of politicians in Switzerland al-
together? Please answer according to the following scale, 1 indicates very bad, 10 indicates 
very good. satisfaction politicians: How satisfied are you with the way politicians in Swit-
zerland altogether solve the nation’s problems? Please answer according to the following 
scale, 1 indicates not satisfied at all, 10 indicates very satisfied. trust politicians: How much 
do you trust politicians in Switzerland altogether to act as they really should? Please answer 
according to the following scale, 1 indicates no trust at all, 10 indicates very much trust. sat-
isfaction democracy: On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
Switzerland? Please answer according to the following scale, 1 indicates not at all satisfied, 
10 indicates very satisfied. ideal democracy: To what extent does democracy as it exists in 
Switzerland correspond to your personal version of an ideal democracy? Please answer ac-
cording to the following scale, 1 indicates no correspondence to personal vision at all, 10 in-
dicates full correspondence to personal vision. 
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Table 5.10. Respondents’ Level of Political Support 
 
In order to investigate variables that are related to respondents’ process prefer-
ences, perceptions and the discrepancy between both, factor scores for process pref-
erences, process perceptions and the discrepancy between both were built. The 
measurement model for citizens’ process preferences as described in Section 5.3.1 
indicates that there are three dimensions of process preferences, each being reflected 
by three items. Likewise, there are three dimensions of process perceptions, each 
being reflected by three items (see Section 5.3.2). The according nine attributes out 
of the initial 17 attributes were selected; the items are shown in Table 5.11. For each 
of the three process dimensions (efficiency, competition and consensus-orientation) 
a factor score was built. More precisely, the nine process preferences, process per-
ceptions and preferences-perceptions differential items were each subjected to a 
separate factor analysis using principal components extraction with oblique rotation 
which does not presume orthogonal factors. The factor loadings were put to work to 
derive factor scores for each survey respondent. Regression method was selected to 
construct the factor scales. Table 5.11 shows the results for the factor analyses. 
Respondents’ process preferences are contingent upon their political ideology. A 
political right position is positively associated with the importance of efficiency (r = 
.150, p < .001) and competition (r = .293, p < .001), whereas consensus-orientation 
is less important (r = -.204, p < .001). There also is a correlation between age and 
preferences, indicating that all three preference dimensions – consensus (r = .203, p 
< .001), efficiency (r = .203, p < .001), and competition ( r = .208, p < .001) – are 
more important, the older the subjects are. The competitiveness of political proc-
esses is also more important for respondents with high levels of income (r = .119, p 
< .001). High income levels are also associated with lower preferences regarding the  
 
117 
consensus-orientation of political processes (r = -.136, p < .001). Moreover, women 
(M = -.207) consider efficiency significantly less important than men (M = .073, F = 
7.886, df = 1, p < .001). No association was found between political interest and 
process preferences. 
The perception of political processes is correlated with age, indicating that an 
older age is associated with the perception of political processes as less efficient (r = 
-.212, p = .005). A high level of formal education is correlated with the perception 
that political processes are consensus oriented ( r= .227, p < .001). Women are more 
likely to indicate that consensus-orientation is a characteristic of political processes 
than men (MWomen = -.173, MMen = .081, F= 5.985, df = 1, p = .015); whereas men 
are more likely to say political processes are competitive than women (MWomen = 
.199, MMen = -.085, F= 7.455, df = 1, p = .007). Respondents with high levels of 
political interest are more likely to perceive processes as consensus oriented (r = 
.154, p < .001). 
 
Table 5.11. Factor Analysis of Perceptions, Preferences, and Discrepancies Items 
 
There also is a positive correlation between age and the discrepancy dimensions; 
older people are more likely to possess larger preferences-perceptions discrepancies 
on all three dimensions – consensus-orientation (r = .127, p < .001), efficiency (r = 
.152, p < .001), and competition (r = .164, p < .001) – than younger people. High 
levels of formal education (r = -.182, p < .001) and income (r = -.179, p < .001) go 
together with a less intense discrepancy as regards the consensus-orientation of 
political processes. And the more a respondents leans towards the political right, the 
less intense is the consensus discrepancy (r = -.161, p < .001), but the more intense 
is the competition discrepancy (r = .214, p < .001). With respect to gender, the find-
ings suggest that for women the consensus-discrepancy is larger than for men 
(MWomen = .166, MMen = -.065, F = 4.821, df = 1, p = .029). Men, in contrast, per-
ceive a larger competition discrepancy than women (MWomen = -.281, MMen = .117, 
F= 14.409, df = 1, p = .000).  
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In order to investigate the relationship between the discrepancy factors and politi-
cal support, the items measuring political support were subjected to a factor analysis 
using principal components extraction with oblique rotation which does not presume 
orthogonal factors.58 The factor loadings were put to work to derive factor scores for 
each survey respondent. Regression method was selected to construct the factor 
scales. Two factors are distinguished. The first factor describes support for the Swiss 
government. The second factor describes a general attitude of political support that 
encompasses support for the parliament, politicians, and democracy. High levels of 
the efficiency discrepancy factor (r = -.201, p < .001) and the competition discrep-
ancy factor (r = -.150, p < .001) are significantly associated with lower levels of 
political support for the government. High levels of the efficiency discrepancy fac-
tors ( r= -.354, p < .001) and the consensus discrepancy factor ( r= -.251, p < .001) 
are significantly associated with lower levels of political support for the parliament, 
politicians, and democracy. 
5.4. Summary and Discussion 
Because no standardized scales to measure citizens’ preferences regarding political 
decision-making processes and according perceptions currently exist, one important 
aim of this study was the development and validation of a standardized scale for the 
measurement of citizens’ process preferences and process perceptions. This chapter, 
then, proposed the first systematic scales to measure process preferences and related 
perceptions of political processes. For the measurement of process preferences, a 
measurement model was developed, tested and validated on another independent 
sample. Three dimensions of process preferences were distinguished: consensus-
orientation, competition and efficiency. A theory-driven correlated factors model 
was tested on two independent samples using CFA. Whereas the first sample did 
indicate modification on the model, the second sample was used to validate the 
modified model. Further comparisons with alternative models did indicate that the 
model is superior to a one-factorial model, which underlines discriminant validity. 
The process preference scale encompasses three dimensions with three indicators 
each: consensus-orientation (concede a point, consider diverging interests, compro-
mises), competition (force their points, put their plans through, hierarchical orders), 
and efficiency (fast decision-making, simple and short processes, avoid delays). 
Adapting the measurement model of the process preferences scale, a scale measur-
ing citizens’ perception of political processes was developed. In addition, evidence 
was provided for the discriminant validity between process preferences and process 
 
58  Results from the factor analysis are, based on the pattern matrix, for factor 1: satisfaction 
government .870, performance government .904, for factor 2: trust parliament .616, perform-
ance parliament .594, performance politicians .609, satisfaction politicians .711, trust politi-
cians .643, satisfaction democracy .899, ideal democracy .882. Item wordings are presented 
in footnote 89. 
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perceptions. The findings suggest that the process preferences and process percep-
tion scales allow measuring process preferences and related perceptions separately. 
Further studies confirmed the cultural equivalence of the process preferences 
scale and its invariance as regards two different objects of assessment (parliament, 
government). The cultural invariance of a scale is an essential precondition to be 
able to meaningfully interpret differences in scores across different cultures. The 
scale’s invariance as regards the object of assessment is a precondition to be able to 
meaningfully analyze possible differences in scores. Based on the confirmed invari-
ance of the scale as regards different objects of assessment, findings indicated that 
subjects’ preferences as regards political processes in the government and the par-
liament do not differ substantially.  
In further analysis, the construct validity of the scales was tested. A left political 
ideology was found to be associated with preferences for the consensus-orientation 
of political processes, whereas a right political orientation was found to be related to 
a preference for efficient procedures. Both the discrepancy between the efficiency 
perceptions and related preferences as well as the discrepancy between consensus 
perceptions and related preferences were found to be associated with support for the 
government. More precisely, strong discrepancies – in the sense that preferences 
exceed perceptions – were found to be associated with lower levels of political sup-
port. This finding is in line with other research indicating that large discrepancies 
between political preferences and perceptions are linked to low levels of political 
support (Kimball & Patterson, 1997; S. C. Patterson, et al., 1969). 
This study provides first empirical evidence of the concept of process preferences 
and process perceptions, but it also has several limitations. While the successful 
validation of the process preferences and process perceptions scales is the main 
focus of this article, it can only be a first step in future research. Hence, future re-
search could investigate the role of other process aspects, such as inclusiveness, 
transparency, equality, and responsiveness (cf. Kaina, 2008).  
The invariance of the process preferences scale was tested for preferences regard-
ing parliament and government, but findings from this study might not hold for other 
objects of assessment, such as the political administrative sector, or individual po-
litical actors. Furthermore, testing the cultural invariance of the scale with data that 
encompass all nine variables and data from other countries would enhance the em-
pirical validation of the scale’s measurement invariance across different cultures. 
Moreover, the results might not generalize to other samples, because the samples 
used in this study are not representative for the Swiss or German citizens. Although 
this is not considered to be problematical for the purpose of scale development and 
validation, this study’s samples hold implications for the generalizability of findings. 
The data presented here stem from samples that are characterized by a high level of 
political interest and high levels of formal education. Because preferences are based 
on knowledge and information (Druckman & Lupia, 2000), it seems plausible to 
assume that for individuals with low knowledge about politics or no interest in poli-
tics, process preferences might not be as diverse or be characterized by a different 
conceptual structure. Thus, tests of the proposed scale on data that stems from sam-
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ples with participants that are only moderately or not interested in politics, as well as 
tests with data from individuals with low formal education, are needed.  
Notwithstanding their limitations, the developed scales are a first attempt towards 
a standardized measurement of process preferences and perceptions. This study 
makes the assumption that considering process preference might contribute to re-
search on media effects on political support. But before this assumption is investi-
gated in Chapter 7, the following chapter presents insights on the short-term impact 
of media information on the perception of political processes based on an experi-
mental study.  
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6. Short-Term Effects of Media on Process Perceptions and Political 
Support  
An experiment was conducted in order to investigate the way in which specific as-
pects of media information may have short-term effects on the perception of politi-
cal processes. In addition, the impact of media information on political support via 
its influence on the accessibility of the preferences-perceptions relationship was 
probed. The study’s hypotheses and research questions are presented in Section 6.1. 
The methodological details are described in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents the 
study’s results, followed by a summary and conclusion section (Section 6.4). 
6.1. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
The study presented in this chapter focuses on the short-term impact of media in-
formation on the perception of political processes and political support. The investi-
gation of the media’s impact on the perception of political processes takes only two 
dimensions of political processes into consideration, namely consensus and effi-
ciency. The two dimensions are selected, because the findings from the content 
analysis suggested that these aspects constitute characteristic patterns of media pres-
entations of political processes. Moreover, competition as a third dimension of po-
litical processes is not considered in the analyses of media effects on political sup-
port, because competition was found to be less important in the context of Switzer-
land as a consensus democracy (see Section 5.3.6). Therefore, two versions of 
stimulus articles – one referring to the conflict-orientation of political processes, the 
other referring to the inefficiency of political procedures – were included in the 
experimental study. Whereas exposure to news articles which focus on conflicts in 
political decision-making processes are hypothesized to decrease the perception that 
political processes are consensus-oriented, exposure to news articles that focus on 
the inefficiency of political decision-making processes are hypothesized to decrease 
the perception that political processes are efficient. 
• H1: Individuals exposed to conflict-oriented news articles are less likely to per-
ceive political processes as consensus-oriented than individuals who are not ex-
posed to conflict-oriented news articles. 
• H2: Individuals exposed to inefficiency-focused news articles are less likely to 
perceive political processes as efficient than individuals who are not exposed to 
inefficiency-focused news articles.  
In order to test whether the stimulus articles have an impact on preferences re-
garding political processes, the following research question was formulated:  
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• RQ1: Does exposure to the stimulus articles alter participants’ preferences re-
garding political processes? 
Following suggestions by Maurer (2003b, p. 101ff.) who argued that subjects 
who actually perceive the negativity of media articles are more likely to show nega-
tive effects on political support than subjects who do not perceive the mass media’s 
negativity, I assume that there is not only a direct impact of exposure to the stimulus 
articles on the perception of political processes (H1 & H2) but also an indirect effect 
of news articles on the perception of political processes via the impressions that the 
articles raise in the view of the individual respondents.  
• H3: Exposure to conflict-oriented news articles affects the perception of politi-
cal processes as consensus-oriented via the impression that individuals gain 
from these articles.  
• H4: Exposure to inefficiency-focused news articles affects the perception of 
political processes as efficient via the impression that individuals gain from 
these articles.  
However, the relationship between the impression that the subjects gained from 
the articles and the perception of political processes might not be unidirectional in 
the sense that the article impression shapes the perception of political processes. The 
other direction of causality appears plausible also, i.e. the perception of political 
processes may shape the impression that the participants gain from the articles. This 
assumption is supported by the hypothesis theory of social perception. According to 
this theory, subjects’ available considerations determine what aspects of reality they 
perceive, the conclusions that are drawn from these perceptions, and the likelihood 
of their retrieval at a later point in time (Bruner, 1957; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 
1977; Lilli & Frey, 1993). Likewise, confirmation bias theory assumes that there is a 
tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one’s precon-
ceptions (Klayman & H, 1987; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Hence, this study tests 
the assumption that there is a relationship between process perceptions and article 
impressions in the sense that the general perceptions of political processes influence 
the impression that participants gain from the news articles.  
• H5: An individual’s perceptions of political processes influence the impressions 
that the study’s participant gains from the news articles. 
The preferences-perceptions model of media effects assumes that media might 
not only affect the magnitude of the preference-perception relationship, but also the 
accessibility of this relationship in memory. Higgins (1987) found that an increase in 
the accessibility of the discrepancy between preferences and perceptions is related to 
an increase in discomfort, but only for subjects whose magnitude of the discrepancy 
is high. Temporary accessibility varies as a function of contextual priming (Higgins, 
1987). Hence, media information might shape the temporary construct accessibility 
of incompatible beliefs through priming. For subjects with a high magnitude of the 
preference-perception discrepancy, I assume that the priming manipulation makes 
the discrepancy temporarily accessible. Thus, for subjects high in magnitude of the 
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preference-perception discrepancies, political support is assumed to decrease as a 
result of priming effects in the context of exposure to the news media articles.  
• H6: For subjects high in the magnitude of the preference-perception discrepan-
cies, exposure to the news articles decreases political support.  
6.2. Method 
In media effects research, experimental designs are an established method to inves-
tigate casual mechanisms (Trepte & Wirth, 2004). Likewise, Iyengar (2002) empha-
sized the precise causal inference that experimental designs facilitate. Moreover, 
experiments make it possible to investigate not only effects, but also underlying 
mechanisms. Experiments are “useful in helping to develop and test theories to ex-
plore whether hypothesized relationships hold and under what conditions they are 
operative” (McDermott, 2002a, p. 126). Hence, experiments might contribute to an 
increased clarity of details (McDermott, 2002b). Although political support is con-
sidered to be a rather stable attitude, empirical studies investigating the effects of 
media information on confidence or trust in political institutions show that ex-
perimental designs are able to identify such effects (cf. for instance De Vreese, 
2004; De Vreese, Boomgarden, & Semetko, 2005; Bertram Scheufele, 2008; Schuck 
& De Vreese, 2006; Valentino, Beckmann, et al., 2001). An experimental study was 
embedded in a series of surveys (see also Section 7.2). In Section 6.2.1 the experi-
mental design and the study’s participants are described. The procedures of data 
collection are depicted in Section 6.2.2. Section 6.2.3 describes the development of 
the stimulus material. Section 6.2.4 gives information on the operationalization of 
variables and Section 6.2.5 describes the methods of data analysis. 
6.2.1. Experimental Design and Participants 
The experimental design applied in this study is a posttest only control group de-
sign59 with two different treatments (Alternative-Treatments Design) and a control 
group. One treatment (Tx1) consists of newspaper articles
60 with negative informa-
tion about the consensus-orientation of political decision-making. Articles, for in-
 
59  Initially, an experimental design that encompasses both a pre- and a posttest was planned. 
However, in order to avoid sensitization effects, subject fatigue, and attrition, this design was 
rejected in favour of a posttest only design with control group. More information on those as-
pects is provided in the following paragraphs. 
60  Ideally, the experimental stimuli should consist of television newscasts, in line with the 
assumption of this study that television news in particular has an impact on citizens’ political 
support. Because the production of experimental television newscasts would have been too 
expensive, newspaper articles were used instead.  
124 
stance, refer to the aggressive and competitive behaviour of political actors, con-
flicts, and power struggles, or the lack of considering different interests. The alterna-
tive treatment (Tx2) consists of newspaper articles with negative information about 
the efficiency of political decision-making. Articles, for instance, refer to delays, 
protracted decisions, time-consuming procedures, a lack of efficiency of decision-
making processes, and the indecisiveness of political actors (see Section 6.2.2). The 
control group does not get any treatment. The experimental design is a between 
subjects-design (cf. Grabe & Westley, 2003, p. 285) . 
The target population of this study consists of citizens from the German-speaking 
part of Switzerland who are at least 18 years old and hold voting rights. The study’s 
participants were recruited in collaboration with the Swiss online election informa-
tion tool smartvote (www.smartvote.ch). The registered users of this platform regu-
larly receive newsletters. One of those newsletters for users of the German-speaking 
population contained information on the planned study as well as contact informa-
tion for readers interested in participating. The sample, hence, is based on self-
selection and is not representative of the Swiss population. Subjects are randomly 
assigned61 to the different groups in order to create a pre-treatment similarity of the 
groups with respect to relevant variables, such as gender, age, income, education, 
and political interest. Thus, possible threats to the effects due to confounding vari-
ables are randomly distributed over conditions. Subjects in the different groups tend 
to have the same average characteristics; the only systematic difference is the treat-
ment (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 248ff.). Consequently, changes in the 
outcome variable are not caused by differences of personal characteristics between 
the groups (McDermott, 2002a). Thus, random assignment facilitates casual infer-
ence.  
In the control group (n = 157), 71 percent were males, the age ranged from 19 to 
84 (M = 42; SD = 14.5), and 69 percent had a higher education entrance qualifica-
tion or a higher level of formal education. In the conflict group (n = 189), 67 percent 
were males, the age ranged from 19 to 76 (M = 44; SD = 15.3), and 68 percent had a 
higher education entrance qualification or a higher level of formal education. In the 
inefficiency group (n = 177), 71 percent were males, the age ranged from 18 to 80 
(M = 44; SD = 16.1), and 77 percent had a higher education entrance qualification or 
a higher level of formal education. 
6.2.2. Procedures 
The study was conceptualized as an internet experiment. Internet experiments are 
considered to be an efficient way of doing experimental research that makes it more 
easy to reach diverse populations (Iyengar, 2001). Citizens who sent an e-mail to the 
 
61  Random assignment refers to the fact that units are assigned to conditions based only on 
chance. Each unit has a nonzero probability of being assigned to a condition. 
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author and expressed their interest in participating in the study were invited to par-
ticipate in the research project on May 5, 2008. The initial survey took about 10 
minutes to complete. The response rates are 0.82 for the experimental groups and 
0.84 for the control group.62 Rather surprisingly, the higher work load for partici-
pants in the experimental groups did not keep subjects from participating in the 
study. On May 19, 2008 an e-mail invitation to fill out an online questionnaire refer-
ring to a news article was sent to the participants in the two treatment groups. From 
then until May 23, 2008, the subjects in the two treatment groups received, each day, 
an invitation to an online questionnaire that referred to a news article. Each of the 
five surveys on news article took about five to eight minutes to complete. Response 
rates were between 0.89 and 0.92 for the conflict group and 0.86 and 0.90 for the 
efficiency group.63 These rates are satisfactory; the treatment articles were received 
by the study’s participants. In order to have a more detailed understanding of how 
the articles were received, I investigated how many articles were read by the partici-
pants in average. The majority of subjects (95 percent) answered the questions to all 
five articles. There is no significant difference between the two groups as regards 
how many articles were read. In addition, I looked at when the participants in aver-
age read the articles. An average of 66 percent of all participants read an article on 
the same day on which the article was sent, 18 percent read an article one or two 
days later, and 11 percent read an article within three to five days later. There is no 
significant difference between the two groups as regards when the articles were read.  
On May 26, 2008 an invitation to participate in the final survey was sent out both 
to participants in the treatment groups and participants in the control group. The 
final survey took about 15 minutes to complete. Response rates are .89 for the treat-
ment groups, .92 for the control group. Directly after the participants had completed 
the final survey, they were transferred to a website that contained the debriefing 
information.64  
The quality of causal inferences and generalizations drawn from any research 
study depends on its measures to enhance validity and rule out alternative explana-
tions. In this study, efforts were made to control for various threats to validity. How-
 
62  The response rates are calculated based on the complete data set because it is a general char-
acteristic of the survey and not of the data set that is finally used for the analysis. The com-
plete data set does include participants who are younger than 18 years old and participants 
who do not hold Swiss citizenship. In the complete data set, the number of participants in the 
conflict group is 209, in the inefficiency group 207, and in the control group 172. The re-
sponse rate is given for the two experimental groups together, because the random assignment 
to either the group with conflict articles or the group with inefficiency articles took place after 
the initial survey was completed. 
63  The values for the response rates do not match the attrition rates, because the former is based 
on the complete data set, whereas the latter is based on the adjusted data set that does not in-
clude subjects who are younger than 18 years or do not hold Swiss citizenship. 
64  Subjects were informed about the study’s interest in media effects on political support. They 
were also told that two different versions of newspaper articles were presented in the study in 
order to investigate possible effects. The debriefing also contained information on how to 
contact the researcher for information on research results. 
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ever, as there are tradeoffs between the several aspects, there are threats to validity 
that cannot be controlled with the design. Although most concerns regarding ex-
perimental studies refer to a lack in mundane realism (Graber, 2004; McDermott, 
2002a), i.e. the similarity between an experimental setting and the real world, they 
fail the idea of experiments, since  
“the idea of experimentation is not primarily that a specific set of experimental results apply 
directly to broader conclusions about human behavior in other settings, but rather that these re-
sults develop and test theories that then, in turn, and in aggregation, help explain and predict 
underlying causal mechanisms in more universal issues” (McDermott, 2002a, p. 335f.).  
Hence, in experimental designs, internal validity is vital to external validity. Even 
so, experiments can possess high levels on both dimensions. In this study care is 
taken to enhance both internal and external validity.  
The internal validity of the study refers to the question of whether the relationship 
between two variables or concepts reflects a causal relationship (Shadish, et al., 
2002, p. 53f.). Since the participants are randomly assigned to the two treatment 
groups and the control group, a selection bias – i.e. systematic differences in sub-
jects’ characteristics that could cause the effect – is unlikely. Randomization should 
ensure that the three groups are equal on relevant variables, i.e. the initial levels of 
political support, process-preferences and process perceptions as well as political 
interest and socio-demographic variables. A comparison between the two treatment 
groups and the control groups in terms of the allocation of characteristic variables 
shows that the randomization was successful.65 Table 6.1 gives an overview of the 
results from the mean comparisons with regard to age, income, education, political 
placement, radio use, regional newspaper use, national newspaper use, tabloid paper 
use, free newspaper use, television use, and internet use. There is only one signifi-
cant difference between the groups: The subjects in the inefficiency treatment group 
read national newspapers less intensely than the participants in the control group and 
participants in the conflict treatment groups. Additional Chi-Square tests were con-
ducted to test for differences as regards gender, the frequency of direct experiences 
with politics, and the frequency of indirect experiences with politics. These tests 
revealed no significant differences between the different conditions on gender66, the 
 
65  The randomization analysis is based on the final data set in order to test whether the randomi-
zation works for those participants who are actually included in the data analysis of media ef-
fects. The final data set does not include participants who are younger than 18 years old and 
participants that do not hold Swiss citizenship. Moreover, all subjects who participated in the 
initial survey only were excluded from the final data set (for more information on data prepa-
ration, see Section 5.3.3). In the final data set the number of participants in the conflict group 
is 189, in the inefficiency group 177, and in the control group 157. 
66  69 percent men in the conflict group, 71 percent men in the inefficiency group, 71 percent 
men in the control group, Chi-Square = .931, df = 2, p =.628 
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frequency of direct experiences with politics67, and the frequency with indirect ex-
periences with politics.68 
History is a threat to internal validity in the sense that events occurring concur-
rently with the treatment could also cause the effect. However, the design controls  
for history, as participants in the control group and the treatment groups are exposed 
to the same external events. Hence, any possible effects on political support of such 
external events (i.e. political scandals or economic crisis) have an equal effect on the 
levels of support of participants in all groups. Moreover, in order to minimize the 
possibility of impacts of external effects associated with election campaigns, a pe-
riod of regular political decision-making was chosen as the timeframe for the ex-
perimental study. The study was conducted during summer 2008 as a non-election 
period.  
In order to avoid unwanted sensitization effects, no pretest measurements on the 
dependent variables were included in the initial survey. Nosanchuck & Marchak 
(1969) reported that sensitization is the main unwanted effect of pretests. Pretests 
may draw the attention to the purpose of the study, which results in increased atten-
tion to relevant aspects of the study. This has consequences for the outcome vari-
ables. For instance, Nosanchuck & Marchak (1969) found consistency effects69 
when a pretest was used. As a consequence, subsequent attitude changes might be 
suppressed. Based on a review of experimental studies that include pretests, Bracht 
& Glass (1968) concluded that sensitization to subsequent treatment is most likely to 
occur when the dependent variable is a self-report measure. As in the present study 
the dependent variable is a self-reported measure, measurements of political support, 
process preferences, and process perceptions were not included in the initial survey 
that takes place before the treatment is implemented. Thus, the questionnaire in the 
initial survey focuses on socio-demographic variables and is kept rather short. This 
also contributes to the prevention of subject fatigue due to long item batteries. Be-
sides the advantages associated with the lack of a pretest, there are also drawbacks. 
The lack of a pretest is particularly risky, if there is a likelihood of attrition from the 
study. Without pretest measures, it is more difficult to determine whether those 
subjects who had dropped out of the study differ from the participants who contin-
ued with respect to their characteristics on the dependent variables. Hence, in order 
to compensate for the abdication of a pretest, several measures to minimize the risk 
of attrition were taken. 
 
67  38 percent no direct experiences in the conflict group, 34 percent no direct experiences in the 
inefficiency group, 37 percent no direct experiences in the control group, Chi-Square = 1.464, 
df = 4, p = .833 
68  34 percent no indirect experiences in the conflict group, 34 percent no indirect experiences in 
the inefficiency group, 38 percent no indirect experiences in the control group, Chi-Square = 
1.675, df = 4, p =. 795 
69  Consistency effects refer to the desire of the respondents to appear consistent in answering 
what they perceive to be related questions. As a consequence, the answer to one question is 
moved in the direction to the other question (Weisberg, 2005, p. 119f.; Weisberg, Krosnick, 
& Bowen, 1996, p. 97). 
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Table 6.1. Results of Randomization Check 
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Whereas several threats to internal validity are controlled for with the proposed 
design, attrition70 remains an uncontrolled threat to internal validity. Attrition refers 
to the loss of responses from participants who drop out of the study after the subjects 
were randomly assigned to conditions (Shadish, et al., 2002, p. 323). Attrition can 
happen before the treatment is implemented or after the treatment is implemented. 
Post-treatment attrition is a subset of selection bias that occurs after the treatment 
took place (Shadish, et al., 2002, p. 59). Attrition is a problem if the participants 
who drop out of the study differ from those who continue to participate. Differences 
in the outcome measure could then be caused by that loss rather than by the treat-
ment. In the present study, it will not be possible to prevent any attrition given the 
rather long duration of the experimental study. Although attrition cannot be con-
trolled for, several measures were used to prevent attrition (cf. Shadish, et al., 2002, 
pp. 323-340). Questionnaires were kept as short as possible. In addition, the initial 
invitation to participate in the study contained detailed information about the struc-
ture of the study (number of questionnaires, approximate time it takes to complete 
the questionnaires, information about when the questionnaires will be sent) as well 
as the nature of the media stimuli, in order to avoid surprises for the participants 
later on. Subjects who did not participate in a survey were reminded to please do so 
in order to increase response rates and prevent attrition. Because research indicates 
that attrition is lower, when the time between random assignment and treatment 
implementation is minimized (Shadish, et al., 2002, p. 331), the time span between 
the initial survey and the treatment phase was kept as short as possible. In that way, 
the time span should still allow enough time for the participants to complete the 
initial survey. Thus, the treatment was implemented two weeks after the invitation to 
participate in the initial survey had been sent. Most importantly, incentives were 
offered as compensation for the study participants’ time and in order to motivate 
participants to stay in the study. There is empirical evidence that incentives are use-
ful and have a positive effect on response rate (Harkness, Mohler, Schneid, & 
Christoph, 1998). All participants in the two treatment groups who completed the 
experimental study (initial and final survey plus at least one questionnaire on news 
article) could choose between a voucher for books to a value of 20 CHF and a 
voucher for the cinema (value of 18 CHF). Subjects in the control group who com-
pleted the initial and the final survey received a book voucher to the value of 10 
CHF. 
To be able to analyze whether people who drop out of the study differed from the 
ones who do not, relevant variables were measured in the initial survey conducted 
before the treatment takes place. This information enables attrition to be analyzed, in 
order to understand how much it threatens the validity of a conclusion about the 
treatment effectiveness (Shadish, et al., 2002, p. 334ff.).71 The rates of attrition from 
 
70  Sometimes attrition is also called mortality. 
71  The attrition analysis is based on the adjusted data set that does not include participants who 
are younger than 18 years old and participants who do not hold Swiss citizenship. However, 
subjects who participated in the initial survey only are part of this adjusted data set because 
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the initial survey to the final survey are 9.1 percent for the conflict group, 11.5 per-
cent for the inefficiency group, and 8.2 percent for the control group. Comparing the 
initial survey with the response rate for the five surveys on the news articles, attri-
tion ranges between 4.7 percent and 10.5 percent for the conflict group, and between 
7.7 percent and 11 percent for the inefficiency group. There is almost no attrition 
from the article surveys to the final survey, indicating that those subjects who had 
the treatment also participated in the posttests. Hence, most attrition occurred before 
the treatment was implemented. Generally, if attrition is low (less than 10 percent) it 
can be neglected (Shadish, et al., 2002, p. 229f.). Considering the sample of partici-
pants in the conflict group, the inefficiency group and the control group together, 
there are no significant differences between subjects who continued to participate 
and those who dropped out on relevant variables, e.g. variables that might be corre-
lated with the outcome (age, income, education, political placement, political inter-
est, media use; for all variables: df = 5, F < 2.2). There are also no differences be-
tween dropouts and individuals who continued participation as regards gender (Chi-
Square = 1.304, df = 5, p = .935), direct experiences with politics (Chi-Square = 
15.886, df = 10, p=.103), and indirect experiences with politics (Chi-Square = 9.856, 
df = 10, p = .453). In general, then, attrition appears to be no threat to internal valid-
ity in this study. 
Regarding uncontrolled threats to construct validity of cause, hypotheses guessing 
by the participants as well as reactivity to the experimental situation and consequen-
tial influences on their responses are considered to be a serious threat. Literature 
suggests several ways to reduce this problem (cf. Shadish, et al., 2002, p. 77f.). One 
possible way is using ethically justifiable deceptions to ensure that subjects cannot 
guess the hypotheses (McDermott, 2002a, p. 41). In order to distract participants 
from the purpose of this study, they were told that the study is interested in the per-
ception of political news coverage. Hence, questions on how the participants per-
ceive and evaluate the news articles were included in the surveys. In addition, ensur-
ing anonymity and confidentiality can reduce the risk of probands’ evaluation ap-
prehensions.  
Participants received the survey questionnaires and media stimuli at home or in 
their office, depending on where they have internet access. Given the field setting, 
special care must be given to treatment implementation, treatment adherence in 
particular (cf. Shadish, et al., 2002, pp. 316-320; Yeaton & Sechrest, 1981). Treat-
ment adherence in the study’s context refers to the question of whether people read 
the newspaper articles as intended to. In order to improve adherence, the surveys 
include questions that refer to the stimulus articles. Manipulation checks were also 
looked at for information on whether treatment was received or not (Shadish, et al., 
2002, p. 317). What this study cannot control, however, is whether those subjects to 
 
the analysis of their loss is precisely what attrition measures (for more information on data 
preparation see Section 7.2.2). In the adjusted data set, the number of participants in the con-
flict group is 205, in the inefficiency group 200, and in the control group 171.  
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which the articles and questionnaires were sent to are actually the ones who partici-
pated in the study. 
6.2.3. Stimulus Material 
The strength, integrity, and effectiveness of a treatment are central aspects of any 
experimental study (Yeaton & Sechrest, 1981, p. 156). Treatment strength is defined 
as the “a priori likelihood that the treatment could have its intended outcome” 
(Yeaton & Sechrest, 1981, p. 156). Treatment dose, frequency and length of the 
treatment define its strength. A strong treatment is aimed, because the effect size is 
considered to be relatively low, given that political support is a rather stable attitude. 
Regarding the strength of the treatment, different treatment strengths are used in 
experimental research that explores the effects of media information on political 
support. Strength ranges from one or two single articles at one point in time (cf. for 
instance De Vreese, 2004; Bertram Scheufele, 2008; Valentino, Beckmann, et al., 
2001) to five days of treatment (cf. Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). In order to ensure 
treatment strength in the present study, the treatment could be measured over the 
period of two weeks, which would allow two posttests, one after each week. How-
ever, such a strong treatment involves the risk that the participants in the study get 
tired (subject fatigue) and drop out (attrition). In order to use a treatment that is both 
intense enough to evoke possible effects on the one hand, but is not too much of a 
burden for the study’s participants on the other hand, the treatment consists of one 
media article per weekday and lasts over five days. Hence, five articles per partici-
pant constitute the treatment. The articles were sent to the respondents as part of 
online surveys. More precisely, respondents received one survey each day over the 
period of five consecutive days. 
 As there is a trade-off between treatment strength and generalizability of cause to 
real world conditions, efforts will be made to ensure that treatments are both strong 
and realistic. The authenticity of media stimuli is a very important aspect that shapes 
the external validity of experimental research (Matthes, 2007b, p. 306f.; Trepte & 
Wirth, 2004). Thus, this study makes efforts to ensure that the media stimuli are as 
authentic as possible. A precondition of external validity is that the stimulus material 
occurs in a similar form in real world situations. One way to ensure the external 
validity of media stimuli is to investigate regular and characteristic patterns of mass 
media content and to develop the media stimuli according to these patterns (for 
instance Cappella & Jamieson, 1996; Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000; Iyengar, 1987). 
Therefore, results from the content analysis (Chapter 4) are used to inform the de-
velopment of the media articles that serve as treatment in the experimental study.72 
 
72  An alternative procedure could have been to conduct a qualitative content analysis. However, 
this would not allow us to derive characteristic patterns of media presentations of political 
processes. Such typical patterns, however, are reflected in media stimuli, which is why the 
development is based on findings from this quantitative analysis. 
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Based on the results from the media content analysis, two distinct media patterns of 
presenting political decision-making processes can be distinguished, namely the 
media’s focus on the inefficiency of political processes and the media’s emphasis of 
political discords and conflicts.  
For the treatment articles, the general findings from the content analysis had to be 
specified and filled with precise phrases and expressions from the newspapers. 
Therefore, I more closely looked at selected articles that in the content analysis were 
found to contain aspects relating to the conflict-orientation and/or the inefficiency of 
political processes. These articles were scanned in search for applicable phrases and 
expressions. The experimental intervention consists of news articles that either con-
tain critical media information about the lack of consensus-seeking behavior or 
critical media information about the lack of efficiency in political decision-making 
processes. Media information criticizing the lack of consensus refers to 1) power 
struggles or political conflicts, 2) the lack of consensus, 3) the role of collective 
actions, and 4) political competitions with winners and losers. Media information 
criticizing the efficiency refers to 1) the use of resources such as time and money, 2) 
the competence of political actors, 3) the role of hierarchical orders, and 4) the deci-
siveness of political actors. For more detailed information, the stimulus material (in 
German language) can be requested from the author. 
The articles deal with decision-making processes in the parliament and the gov-
ernment. In order to ensure that the study’s participants are motivated to read the 
articles, the issues addressed in the articles need to have certain relevance for the 
average citizen. In addition, the issues need to be subject of current discussion and 
they need to refer to problems that are of national relevance instead of international 
or regional importance. Based on these criteria, five issues were identified: 1) the 
reform of the federal old-age insurance, 2) the financing of the social long-term care 
insurance, 3) national climate policy, 4) non-smoker protection, and 5) disability 
insurance. Moreover, the articles were kept rather brief, ensuring that the two ver-
sions were equal in length.  
The stimulus articles were conceptualized as news with interpretative elements. In 
order to have possible effects of stimulus articles on subjects’ attitudes of political 
support, the stimuli have to be direct and obvious. Therefore, precise expressions, 
phrases and single indicator words are relevant. The two versions have similar leads 
or first sentences that concentrate on the most important facts, but are different at the 
core. Also, the titles are different and display the general tone of each version. In 
one version the focus is on conflicts. Regarding the conflict aspects, a decision had 
to be made on whether intra-institutional conflicts, inter-institutional conflicts or 
both conflict types should be included in the material. The decision was made in 
favor of including both conflict types in the material.73 In the other version the focus 
 
73  Durr et.al. (1997) found that intra-institutional conflicts have a negative impact on support, 
whereas inter-institutional conflicts might have positive effects on political support. However, 
as both aspects occur in media coverage, both versions were included in the stimulus mate-
rial. 
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is on the inefficiency of decision-making procedures. The according paragraphs 
contain valuations, mostly in the form of direct or indirect quotes from political 
experts or participants.74  
However, participants also must believe that the material is authentic and credible 
in order to have possible effects. Swiss journalists from different news organizations 
edited the articles in order to ensure the authenticity of the stimulus articles.75 All 
articles contained the name or initials of a fictitious author or the identification code 
of a press agency.76 In addition, with regard to the layout of the stimulus articles, 
they were suited to the design of regional Swiss newspapers.77  
Experimental stimuli are evaluated with respect to their external and internal va-
lidity (Trepte & Wirth, 2004). Although stimuli can possess high levels of validity 
on both dimensions, there are trade-offs between the two. An important aspect of 
internal validity is that there are no differences between two versions of an article on 
other aspects than the treatment, for instance the perceived relevance of information 
or their comprehensiveness. The internal validity of the stimuli refers to the fact that 
changes in the outcome variable can be attributed to the manipulated aspects in the 
stimulus material. Hence, context variables must be the same across the different 
versions in order to eliminate the possibility of confounding effects (Trepte & Wirth, 
2004, p. 78). Obviously, the more complex and diverse (and hence in most cases 
more realistic) the stimulus material is, the more difficult it is to eliminate the effects 
of the manipulated aspects from other aspects of the material. Nevertheless, efforts 
were made to keep the context factors constant across the two versions (conflict 
focus vs. inefficiency focus) of a stimulus article. 
Stimuli pretests were conducted with Swiss students in March 2008 (n = 21). One 
group of participants received an article that focused on the conflict-orientation and 
discords of political processes, while the other group received an article that focused 
on the inefficiency of decision-making procedures. I expected that subjects in the 
conflict group would indicate more often that conflict-related statements were con-
tained in the article than subjects in the inefficiency group, and vice versa. Signifi-
cant differences were found in this respect. In addition, the pretests showed that the 
perceived trust in the articles did not differ as a function of the manipulation (t < 1).  
 
74  The author thanks political scientists Andreas Ladner (IDHEAP Lausanne), and Urs Scheuss 
(University of Zurich) who agreed to be quoted in the articles. 
75  The author thanks Bettina Epper from the “Bieler Tagblatt”, Michel Wenzler from “Tages-
Anzeiger”, Kaspar Meuli, a freelance journalist and communication officer, and Guido Keel, 
online editor at Luzerner Medien for dedicating part of their valuable time to the editing of 
the stimulus articles. 
76  Fictitious authors were used so that participants were not able to look the articles up in their 
newspapers or the internet. For the same reason, it was not mentioned which newspaper the 
articles (presumably) were taken from. 
77  The layout of the stimulus articles was suited to the layout of the following regional papers: 
“Der Bund”, “St. Galler Tagblatt”, “Solothurner Zeitung”, “Neue Luzerner Zeitung” 
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6.2.4. Variables and Operationalization 
In this section, the operationalization of the variables is described (see Appendix 
10.2 for precise item wordings; the survey questionnaires (in German language) can 
be requested from the author). Process preferences were measured after the treat-
ment with six items that that relate to two dimensions of political processes, namely 
consensus-orientation and efficiency (for more information see Floß, 2008). Three 
items refer to preferences regarding the consensus-orientation of political processes 
(Cronbach’s α = .70), three items refer to preferences regarding the efficiency of 
political processes (Cronbach’s α = .79). All items were measured on a 7-point scale 
and had the stem ‘In the following question we would like to know more about your 
political preferences. Citizens hold different preferences regarding how political 
decisions should be made in democratic systems. Please answer according to the 
following scale how important you personally consider the following preferences to 
be. The scale ranges from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important).’ Preferences 
regarding the consensus-orientation of political processes were, for instance, meas-
ured with the question ‘How important is it for you that political parties sometimes 
concede a point to the other side?’ Preferences regarding the efficiency of political 
processes were for example measured with the question ‘How important is it for you 
that political decision-making processes are simple and short?’ 
Process perceptions were measured after the treatment with six items that relate 
to two dimensions of political processes, namely consensus-orientation and effi-
ciency. Three items refer to the perceived consensus-orientation of political  
processes (Cronbach’s α = .74), and three items refer to the perceived efficiency of 
political processes (Cronbach’s α = .67). All items were measured on a 7-point scale 
and had the stem ‘Now we would like to know how, in your opinion, political deci-
sions are actually made in Switzerland. Please answer according to the following 
scale and indicate to what extent the following statements on political decision-
making processes in Switzerland, in your opinion, apply or not apply. The scale 
ranges from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (fully applies).’ Perceived consensus-
orientation of political processes was for instance measured with the statement ‘Po-
litical parties sometimes concede a point to the other side.’ Perceived efficiency-
orientation was for example measured with the statement ‘Political decision-making 
processes are time-consuming.’ 
Political support was modeled as a hierarchical factor that refers to four objects 
of evaluation: government, parliament, politicians, and democracy (Cronbach’s α = 
.91). This conceptualization is in line with other research that conceptualizes politi-
cal support as hierarchical factors, i.e. as a general attitude of political support that 
explains the relationship between more specific attitudes towards different objects of 
political support (Fuchs, 1989, p. 62ff.).78 Political support was measured after the 
 
78  Hierarchical factor models encompass a second order factor which explains the relationship 
between first order factors (Kline, 2005, p. 198ff.) 
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treatment. The measures build on established survey items ((e.g. European Social 
Survey 2008; Eurobarometer 1997; cf. Muller & Jukam, 1977; cf. Westle, 1989) and 
were adapted to the study’s context. The items were measured on a 10-point scale, 
because a sensitive measurement of the independent variables controls for ceiling or 
floor effects. More precisely, the sensitive measurement ensures that scores on the 
variables are less likely to approach the maximum possible scores or the minimum 
possible scores, respectively.79 Support for the government was assessed by two 
items, for example, ‘How good or bad do you consider the present general perform-
ance of the Swiss government?’ Support for the parliament was measured with two 
items, for example, ‘How good or bad do you consider the present general perform-
ance of the Swiss parliament?’ Support for politicians was assessed by three items, 
for instance ‘How much do you trust politicians in Switzerland altogether to act as 
they really should?’ Support for democracy was measured with two items, for ex-
ample ‘To what extent does democracy as it exists in Switzerland correspond to 
your personal version of an ideal democracy?’ 
Article impressions variables measure the subjects’ perception of the stimulus ar-
ticles. The items relate to two dimensions, the conflict-orientation and the ineffi-
ciency focus of news articles. Article impressions were assessed after the treatment 
with two items for each dimension. On a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(does not apply) to 4 (applies), subjects were asked to indicate what impression the 
articles raised with respect to the way political decisions are made. The items meas-
uring participants’ article impressions had the stem ‘To begin with, we would like to 
ask you some questions on the news articles that we have sent to you last week. 
What impression did these articles raise with respect to the way political decisions 
are made?’ The impression of articles as conflict-focused (Cronbach’s α = .62), for 
example, was measured with the question ‘Have the articles, all in all, raised the 
impression that political decision-making processes are shaped by conflicts and 
power struggles?’ The impression of articles as inefficiency-focused (Cronbach’s α 
= .59), for example, was measured with the question ‘And have the articles, all in 
all, raised the impression that political decision-making processes are time-
consuming?’  
The following socio-demographic control variables are included in data analysis 
as control variables: Age, gender, education, political ideology and political experi-
ence. Political experience is an index variable that was based on four items (Cron-
bach’s α = .64). Two items measure political activity (party work, political man-
date), and two items measure political experience in general (direct experiences 
through own political activity, indirect experiences through the political activity of 
friends or relatives). An index variable was built by counting the values indicating 
 
79  Ceiling effects refer to the difficulty of obtaining further increases if responses already ap-
proach the maximum possible scores. Floor effects refer to the difficulty of obtaining further 
decreases if responses already approach the minimum possible scores (Shadish, et al., 2002, 
p. 50). 
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experiences and activity; this variable range from 0 (no experience) to 4 (much ex-
perience).  
6.2.5. Data Analysis 
The SEM analyses used EQS version 6.1 software (Bentler, 2006). Missing values 
were treated using the maximum likelihood-method (ML-imputation algorithm), 
also known as full information maximum likelihood (cf. Bentler, 2006, p. 285ff.; 
Wothke, 2000). The data were tested for univariate and multivariate normal distribu-
tion and strong outliers were excluded from data analysis. Extreme violations  
(moderate ones are given in parentheses) on the assumption of the univariate distri-
bution are associated with skew values of at least 3 (2) and kurtosis of at least 20 (7) 
(West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). These values were not reached. Strong outlier as 
regards multivariate normality distribution (cf. Yuan, Lambert, & Fouladi, 2004) 
were excluded from data analysis. Because the analysis is based on imputed data, I 
generally applied the distribution-free Satorra-Bentler estimation as an alternative to 
Maximum-Likelihood estimation. Robust methods might correct for deviations from 
the missing-at-random assumption. To evaluate the model fit, the following criteria 
were evaluated: the Chi-Square value divided by the number of degrees of freedom 
(< 3), the comparative fit index (CFI > .90), the Root Mean-Square Error of Ap-
proximation (RMSEA < .06) with its 90% confidence interval (CI, lower bound < 
.05, upper bound < .10) ( Kline, 2005, p. 133ff.). 
6.3. Results 
One objective of this study is to examine the effects that media presentations of 
political processes have on citizens’ perceptions of political processes and their 
levels of political support. In this section, the short-term impact of experimental 
stimulus articles on respondents’ perceptions of political processes and their political 
support is investigated. Section 6.3.1 presents the results from the treatment and 
manipulation checks. Then, Section 6.3.2 describes the findings on the articles’ 
impact on the perception of political processes. One assumption of this study is that 
exposure to the stimulus articles may affect political support by increasing the tem-
porary accessibility of the process preferences-perceptions discrepancies. This as-
sumption is tested in Section 6.3.3.  
6.3.1. Treatment and Manipulation Checks 
The questions for the treatment and manipulation checks were included in each of 
the five surveys that included the stimulus articles (conflict group: n = 189, ineffi- 
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ciency group: n = 177). First, it was tested whether the participants perceived the 
aspects in the articles that are supposed to cause the effect. Therefore, the five ques-
tionnaires on the articles altogether included ten questions that asked whether as-
pects related to conflict occurred in the articles and ten questions that asked whether 
aspects related to inefficiency occurred in the articles. I expected that subjects in the 
conflict group more often than subjects in the inefficiency group indicate that the 
conflict-related statements occurred in the article, and vice versa. Subjects reading 
the conflict-oriented articles noticed more conflict-related aspects (M = 8.41, SD = 
1.77) than subjects who read the inefficiency articles (M = 3.33, SD = 2.02). The 
difference between the two conditions was highly significant [t(364) = 25.01, p < 
0.001]. Similarly, subjects reading the inefficiency-oriented articles noticed more 
inefficiency-related aspects (M = 7.49, SD = 2.05) than subjects who read the con-
flict articles (M = 2.02, SD = 1.75). This difference was also highly significant 
[t(364) = -27.50, p < 0.001]. 
Second, it was tested whether the manipulation worked as expected. The assump-
tion is that subjects who read the articles with negative information about the con-
sensus-orientation of political processes agreed more with the statement that the 
articles raise the impression that political processes are conflict-oriented than sub-
jects who read the articles with focus on procedural inefficiency. Likewise, subjects 
who read the articles with negative information about the efficiency of political 
processes agree more with the statement that the articles raise the impression that 
political processes are inefficient than subjects who read the articles which focus on 
conflicts. The general impression which the articles raised with respect to political 
processes was assessed on a 4-point Likert scale. Two questions are linked to the 
role of conflicts; two are linked to inefficiency.80 High scores on the article impres-
sion variables indicate that the respondents did agree that the articles raised a spe-
cific impression. The manipulation worked quite well: Respondents in the conflict 
article group reported a significant higher article conflict impression (M = 2.94, SD 
= 0.62) than respondents in the inefficiency article group (M = 2.50, SD = 0.77, t 
(358) = 6.03, p < 0.01). Similarly, respondents in the conflict article group reported 
a significant higher article impression regarding uncompromising decisions (M = 
2.48, SD = 0.76) than respondents in the inefficiency article group (M = 1.79, SD = 
0.71, t (353) = 8.82, p < 0.01). Likewise, respondents in the inefficiency article 
 
80  The questions were the following: “What impression did these articles raise with respect to 
the way political decisions are made? Have the articles, all in all, raised the impression that 
political decision-making processes are shaped by conflicts and power struggles?” Would you 
say this applies, rather applies, does rather not apply, or does not apply?”, “And have the arti-
cles, all in all, raised the impression that political decisions are made uncompromisingly? 
Would you say this applies, rather applies, does rather not apply, or does not apply?”, “And 
have the articles, all in all, raised the impression that political decision-making processes are 
time-consuming? Would you say this applies, rather applies, does rather not apply, or does 
not apply?”, “And have the articles, all in all, raised the impression that political decisions are 
postponed over and over again? Would you say this applies, rather applies, does rather not 
apply, or does not apply?” 
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group reported a significant higher article impression regarding time-consuming 
decision-making procedures (M = 3.55, SD = 0.72) than respondents in the conflict 
article group (M = 3.25, SD = 0.69, t (355) = - 3.97, p < 0.01). In a similar manner, 
respondents in the inefficiency article group reported a significant higher article 
impression regarding the postponement of decisions (M = 3.13, SD = 0.63) than 
respondents in the conflict article group (M = 2.83, SD = 0.71, t (348) = - 4.21, p < 
0.01). 
In order to ensure that the context variables were indifferent across the two article 
versions, subjects’ trust in the stimulus articles was measured. Respondents were 
asked to indicate how much, on a 7-point Likert scale, they agree to statements 
which refer to the different dimension of trust in media, namely selectivity of facts, 
accuracy of depictions, and journalistic assessment (Kohring & Matthes, 2007). 
Perceived trust in the articles (as a mean index) did not differ as a function of the 
manipulation (t < 1). Following the suggestion of Cappella & Jamieson (1997, p. 
93ff.), this study also tested whether the manipulation had an impact on perceived 
comprehensibility and interestingness of the information as well as its relevance. 
Again, subjects were asked to indicate how much, on a 7-point Likert scale, they 
agree to statements referring to these aspects. The results showed that the perception 
of these aspects (based on a mean index) did not differ as a function of the manipu-
lation (t < 1). 
In sum, then, the findings suggest that the stimulus did work. The treatment was 
successful on the treatment level and also worked well on the manipulation level. 
The groups differ as regards the impression that the participants thought the articles 
raised with respect to political decision-making processes. The context variables, in 
contrast, were successfully held constant across the two groups. 
6.3.2. Impact of Stimulus Articles on Process Perceptions 
ANOVAs were used to probe the assumption that exposure to the stimulus articles 
affects the participants’ perception of political processes (H1 & H2). The perception 
of consensus-orientation and the perception of efficiency-orientation were measured 
with three items each. Hence six one-factor analyses of variance were investigated in 
order to investigate possible differences between the treatment groups (conflict 
treatment group, efficiency treatment group, control group). To check for possible 
confounds, socio-demographic variables (gender, age, education, income, political 
ideology, and political experience) were included as covariates. No significant main 
effects of the experimental variable are found.81 However, the group differences are 
 
81  “Political parties sometimes concede a point to the other side”: F = 0.60, p = .942, η2 = .002, 
“Politicians give consideration to diverging interests when searching for solutions.”: F = 2.08,   
p = .126, η2 = .02,   
“In Switzerland political decisions are based on compromises.”: F = 1.05, p = .352, η2 = .01 




generally in the predicted direction, as shown in Table 6.2. Regarding the items 
tapping the perception of the consensus-orientation of political processes, the mean 
values for participants in the conflict group are smaller than the mean values in the 
inefficiency group. The comparison with the control group shows no difference as 
regards the perception of political processes as compromise-based. Notably, this 
may indicate that exposure to those articles which focused on the inefficiency of 
political processes increased the perception that political processes are consensus-
oriented. Regarding the items tapping the perception of the efficiency of political 
processes, the mean values of participants in the inefficiency group are smaller than 
the mean values in the control group, but the mean values for participants in the 
control group are rather similar to the ones in the inefficiency group. Notably, this 
may indicate that the conflict stimulus articles not only shaped the perception that 
political processes are conflict-oriented, but also that these processes are inefficient. 
 
Table 6.2. Adjusted Means for Process Perceptions in Experimental Groups 
 
“Political decision-making processes in Switzerland are time-consuming.”: F = 1.68, p = 
.187, η2 = .01  
“Swiss politicians postpone decisions over and over again.”: F = 0.94, p = .390, η2 = .004 
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Another model was run with factor scores for consensus perception and efficiency 
perception as dependent variables. The construction of factor scales is described in 
Section 5.3.6. Table 5.9 presents the results for the factor analysis.82 Socio-
demographic control variables (gender, age, education, income, political ideology, 
and political experience) were included as covariates. Findings showed that there are 
no significant differences between subjects in the conflict articles group, subjects in 
the inefficiency articles groups and subjects in the control group as regards consen-
sus perception (F = 1.32 p = .27 η2 = .01) and efficiency perception (F = 1.76, p = 
.17, η2 = .01). In general, then, the data do not support H1 and H2. The experimental 
manipulation did not change subjects’ process perceptions. Political attitudes appear 
to be rather stable and resistant to such a relatively small dosage of five news arti-
cles. The results showed a significant impact of gender (F = 4.22, p = .04) and edu-
cation (F = 20.08, p = .000) on the perception of political processes as regards the 
consensus-orientation and a significant impact of age (F = 13.53, p = .000) on the 
perception of political processes as regards efficiency.  
Further ANOVAs were conducted to test whether exposure to the stimulus arti-
cles affects the participants’ preferences regarding political processes (RQ1). The 
models include factor scores for consensus preferences and efficiency preferences as 
dependent variables. The construction of factor scales is described in Section 5.3.6. 
Socio-demographic control variables (gender, age, education, income, political ide-
ology, and political experience) were included as covariates. Findings showed that 
there are no significant differences between subjects in the conflict articles group, 
subjects in the inefficiency articles groups and subjects in the control group as re-
gards consensus preferences (F = 0.48, p = .62, η2 = .003) and efficiency preferences 
(F = 2.15, p = .12, η2 = .01). These findings indicate that the experimental manipula-
tion did not change subjects’ process preferences. Political attitudes appear to be 
rather stable and resistant to such a relatively small dosage of five news articles. The 
results showed a significant impact of age (F = 17.79, p = .000) and political ideol-
ogy (F = 14.23, p = .000) on the consensus preferences and significant effects of age 
(F = 11.10, p = .001), gender (F = 5.8,5 p = .02), education (F = 4.54, p = .03), and 
political ideology (F = 10.60, p = .001) on efficiency preferences. 
Maurer (2003b, p. 101ff.) argued that subjects who are not only exposed to nega-
tive media information but also perceive the media coverage to be negative are more 
likely to be affected by negative media information than subjects who do not per-
ceive the mass media’s negativity. Following this reasoning, a further analysis in-
cluded the impressions that subjects gained from the article as variables that mediate 
the effects of stimulus articles on the perception of political processes (H3 & H4). 
This model was investigated using structural equation modeling. It is based on the 
sample of participants in the two treatment groups (n = 366), because there is no 
 
82  The process perception items were subjected to factor analysis using principal components 
extraction with oblique rotation which does not presume orthogonal factors. The factor  
loadings were used to derive factor scores for each survey respondent. Regression method 
was selected to construct the factor scales.  
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measurement of article impressions for the subjects in the control group. The inde-
pendent variable stimulus is coded in one manifest variable by dummy coding the 
two treatment groups83 (cf. Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Pedhazur & 
Pedhazur Schmelkin, 1991). Exposure to the stimulus articles (0 = exposure to inef-
ficiency-focused articles, 1 = exposure to conflict-focused articles) was specified as 
predictor of the articles’ conflict impression and the articles’ inefficiency impres-
sion. A higher score on the article impression scale indicates that respondents agree 
that the articles raised the according impression. For more information on the meas-
urement models for the article impression factors see Appendix 10.3. The article 
impression variables, in turn, were specified as predictors of the perception of politi-
cal processes. More precisely, the model includes the effect from the conflict im-
pression of the articles on the perception of political processes as consensus-oriented 
and the effect from the inefficiency impression of the articles on the perception of 
political processes as inefficient (see Appendix 10.3 for information on measure-
ment models of consensus and efficiency perceptions). Socio-demographic variables 
(gender, age, education, political experience, and political ideology) were included 
in order to control for their influence. In favour of clarity they are not displayed in 
the figures, however. Figure 6.1 shows the model and the results. 
The model showed a significant effect of the stimulus articles on conflict impres-
sion (β = 0.51, p < .05) and a significant effect of the stimulus articles on ineffi-
ciency impression (β = -0.22, p < .05). The conflict impression variable, in turn, 
significantly predicted the consensus perception of political processes (β = -0.25, p < 
.05). The stronger the respondents thought that the articles did raise the impression 
that political processes are conflict-oriented, the less consensus-oriented political are 
processes perceived to be. Likewise, the inefficiency impression variable, in turn, 
significantly predicted the efficiency perception of political processes (β = -0.61, p < 
.05). The stronger the respondents thought that the articles did raise the impression 
that political processes are inefficient, the less efficient are political processes per-
ceived to be. The indirect effect of the stimulus articles on the consensus perception 
of political processes via conflict impression was β = -0.13 and was statistically 
significant as indicated by the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982), ZSobel: 3.00, p < .05. The 
indirect effect of the stimulus articles on the efficiency perception of political proc-
esses via inefficiency impression was β = 0.14 and was also statistically significant 
as indicated by the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982), ZSobel: 3.41, p < .05. Hence findings 
indicate that the stimulus articles decreased both the perception of political proc-
esses as consensus-oriented and the perception of political processes as inefficient 
indirectly via their influence on article impressions. Thus, the data supports H3 and 
H4. In addition, the model shows significant effects of gender (coded as 1 = woman, 
2 = man; β = 0.21, p < .05), education (β = 0.16, p < .05) and age (β = -0.12, p < .05) 
on the consensus perception of political processes and significant effects of gender 
 
83  Dummy coding consists of 1’s and 0’s, with 1 signifying membership in a category under 
consideration and 0 signifying no membership in that category. For two treatment groups, one 















(1=conflict treatment,   
0=inefficiency treatment)
* Perception: 
7 = fully applies
1 = does not apply at all
# Impression: 
4 = fully applies 





Note. Shown are standardized path coefficients. All the solid line paths are statistically significant at .05 or above. 
Chi-Square (df=76, N  361)  =161.41, Comparative fit index is .91, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is 
.05 with a 90% confidence interval .04 - .07.
(β = 0.20, p < .05) and age (β = -0.24, p < .05) on the efficiency perception of politi-
cal processes. There is also a significant effect of age (β = 0.14, p < .05) on the arti-
cle conflict impression and a significant effect of gender (β = 0.16, p < .05) on the 
article inefficiency impression. This indicates that men, highly educated persons and 
persons of a younger age are more likely to perceive political processes as consen-
sus-oriented than women, persons with lower levels of formal education and persons 
of older age. Persons of a younger age and men are also more likely to perceive 
political processes as efficient than persons of an older age and women. People of an 
older age are also more likely to have the impression that the stimulus articles pre-
sent political processes as conflict-oriented than people of a younger age, and men 
are more likely to have the impression that the stimulus articles present political 
processes as inefficient than women. The model fit was satisfactory, with CFI = .91, 
RMSEA =.05 (90% CI = .04, .07), Chi-Square = 161.41, df = 76. 
 
Figure 6.1. The Impact of Stimulus Articles on Process Perceptions 
 
The results suggest that there is a relationship between the article impression 
variables and process perceptions. As regards the causal direction of this relation-
ship, however, a plausible assumption might be that respondents’ general perception 
of political processes may affect their attitude towards the impressions that the arti-
cles raise. In fact, H5 assumes that there is such an impact of individual process 
perceptions on the impressions that the study’s participants gain from the news arti-
cles. In order to test this assumption, the model described in Figure 6.1 was esti-
mated with reversed effects, i.e. process perceptions were modeled as predictors of 
article impressions. Thus, both process perceptions and stimulus articles were speci-
fied as predictors of article impressions. The model showed a significant effect of  
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the stimulus articles (1 = conflict-focused articles, 0 = inefficiency-focused articles) 
on conflict impression (β = 0.52, p < .05) and a significant effect of the stimulus 
articles on inefficiency impression (β = -0.29, p < .05). The conflict impression  
variable was also significantly predicted by the consensus perception of political 
processes (β = -0.24, p < .05). The less consensus-oriented political processes are 
perceived to be, the more likely are the articles considered to present political deci-
sion-making processes as conflict-oriented. Similarly, the inefficiency impression 
variable was significantly predicted by the efficiency perception of political proc-
esses (β = -0.68, p < .05). The less efficient political processes are perceived to be, 
the more likely are the articles considered to present political decision-making proc-
esses as inefficient. The model fit was quite satisfactory, with CFI = .89, RMSEA 
=.06 (90% CI = .05, .07), Chi-Square = 190.40, df = 85. Thus, the data does provide 
support for the assumption that the impression which the articles raised is deter-
mined by respondents’ perception of political processes. 
6.3.3. Effect of Stimulus Articles on Political Support via Effects on Accessibility 
Priming effects are assumed, i.e. exposure to the articles is proposed to make the 
discrepancy temporarily accessible for participants who are high in the magnitude of 
the discrepancy (H6). As a result, for subjects who are high in the magnitude of the 
preference-perception discrepancy, it is predicted that the political support decreases 
as a result of exposure to the stimulus articles. To test this prediction, a series of 
magnitude of discrepancy (high, low) x experimental treatment (exposure to conflict 
articles, no exposure to conflict articles / exposure to inefficiency articles, no expo-
sure to inefficiency articles respectively) ANOVAs was performed on political sup-
port; one series for the effect of the consensus discrepancy on political support, the 
other series for the effect of the efficiency discrepancy on political support. The 
discrepancy items are factor scores for consensus discrepancy and efficiency dis-
crepancy. The construction of factor scales is described in Section 5.3.6, and Table 
5.9 presents the results for the factor analysis.84 The high vs. low discrepancy mag-
nitude groups were built based on a median split. Respondents with consensus dis-
crepancies above the median (MD = 1.33) were put in the high consensus discrep-
ancy group (n = 128), respondents with consensus discrepancies below the median 
were put in the low consensus discrepancy group (n = 129). Respondents with effi-
ciency discrepancies above the median (MD = 2.66) were put in the high efficiency 
discrepancy group (n = 131), and respondents with efficiency discrepancies below 
the median were put in the low efficiency discrepancy group (n = 127). The support 
items are also factor scores; the construction of the factor scores is described in 
 
84  The discrepancy items were subjected to factor analysis using principal components extrac-
tion with oblique rotation which does not presume orthogonal factors. The factor loadings 
were used to derive factor scores for each survey respondent. Regression method was selected 
to construct the factor scales.  
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Section 5.3.6.85 Two factors are distinguished. The first factor refers to support for 
the government. The second factor encompasses support for the parliament, support 
for political actors, and support for democracy. Socio-demographic variables (age, 
gender, education, income, political ideology, and political experience) were in-
cluded as covariates. The results show a significant main effect of the consensus 
discrepancy on support for the parliament, political actors and democracy (F = 
10.075, p = .002, η2=0.06), a significant main effect of the efficiency discrepancy on 
support for the government (F = 8.023, p = .005, η2=0.04) and a significant main 
effect of the efficiency discrepancy on support for the parliament, political actors 
and democracy (F = 16.166, p = .000, η2=0.09). The main effect of the consensus 
discrepancy on support for the government was not significant (F = 1.571, p = .219, 
η2=0.004). These results indicate that a large discrepancy between process prefer-
ences and process perceptions (in the sense that preferences exceed perceptions) is 
associated with lower levels of political support. The main effects of the treatment 
and the two-way interaction effects on support for the government and support for 
the parliament, political actors and democracy were all non-significant.86 The lack of 
significant interaction effects indicates that political support does not decrease as a 
result of exposure to the stimulus articles for subjects who are high in the magnitude 
of the preference-perception discrepancy. Thus, the data do not support H6. 
6.4. Summary and Discussion 
This chapter reported findings on the impact of the experimental stimulus articles on 
respondents’ perceptions of political processes. The results indicate that the stimulus 
 
85  The political support items were subjected to factor analysis using principal components 
extraction with oblique rotation which does not presume orthogonal factors. The factor  
loadings were used to derive factor scores for each survey respondent. Regression method 
was selected to construct the factor scales. 
86  Main effect of the conflict treatment on support for the government: (F = 1.792, p = .182, η2 
= 0.006).  
Main effect of the conflict treatment on support for the parliament, political actors and de-
mocracy: (F = .336, p = .563, η2 = 0.004).  
Main effect of the inefficiency treatment on support for the government: (F = 2.084, p = 150, 
η2 = 0.006).  
Main effect of the inefficiency treatment on support for the parliament, political actors and 
democracy: (F = .006, p = .000, η2 = 0.000).  
Interaction effect conflict treatment & discrepancy magnitude on support for the government: 
(F = 1.490, p = .223).  
Interaction effect conflict treatment & discrepancy magnitude on support for the parliament, 
political actors and democracy: (F = .177, p = 674).  
Interaction effect inefficiency treatment & discrepancy magnitude on support for the govern-
ment: (F = .087, p = .768).  
Interaction effect inefficiency treatment & discrepancy magnitude on support for the parlia-
ment, political actors and democracy: (F = .600, p = .439). 
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articles did not affect the participants’ perception of political processes. More pre-
cisely, exposure to conflict-oriented articles did not decrease participants’ perception 
of political processes as being consensus-oriented, nor did the exposure to ineffi-
ciency-oriented articles decrease the participants’ perception of political processes as 
being efficient. A variety of factors might explain the null findings. From a  
methodological point of view, more precise measures of the independent variable 
political support which are more closely linked to the news articles’ content could be 
applied in order to enhance the likelihood of effects. Such measurements could refer 
to respondents’ confidence in political actors with regard to the way they handle the 
protection of non-smokers or the reform of the federal old-age insurance, for exam-
ple. Both issues were addressed in the stimulus articles. Another methodological 
aspect seems worthy of consideration. Ideally, because the impact of television was 
assumed to be stronger than the impact of the newspapers, I would have liked to use 
television newscast instead of newspaper articles as stimuli in the present study. 
Because of the costs involved with television stimuli, this was not possible, how-
ever. Moreover, the study’s sample consists of individuals with particularly high 
levels of political interest and political support. Thus, the sample provides a hard test 
for the effect assumptions. Therefore one might be able to find significant effects of 
stimulus articles in future studies with samples of political novices whose political 
attitudes are found to be less strong and stable (Fiske, Kinder & Larter, 1982; lyen-
gar et al. 1984). However, not only methodological aspects might be relevant, the 
theoretical assumptions should be reconsidered also. It seems warranted to suggest 
that the absence of empirical evidence for the assumed effects of stimulus articles on 
political support in this study may indicate that the perceptions of political processes 
are shaped already before the participants were exposed to the stimuli. In line with 
the assumptions of cultivation theory, the mass media’s impact on reality percep-
tions, then, might be subject to long-term changes rather than short-term changes. 
According hypotheses are tested in Chapter 7. 
Looking at the indirect effects of exposure to the stimulus articles on political 
support via the impressions that the articles raised in the view of the participants, the 
findings indicate that such indirect effects took place. More precisely, the results 
suggest that the stimulus articles decreased both the perception of political processes 
as consensus-oriented and the perception of political processes as inefficient, indi-
rectly via article impressions. However, the test of this assumption is based on a 
quasi-experimental design. Because quasi-experiments lack random assignment, 
they are more likely to suffer from threats to validity than randomized experiments. 
In particular, quasi-experiments provide less support for causal inferences due to 
inherent threats to internal validity. Most importantly, the self-selection of partici-
pants to the treatment conditions raises concern (cf. Shadish, et al., 2002, p. 13f.). In 
this study self-selection takes place because the participants decide for themselves 
which impressions the articles raise. Hence, not only the treatment, but also alterna-
tive explanations might account for the observed effect. Thus, researchers have to 
worry about ruling out alternative explanations in order to get a more valid estimate 
of the treatment effect. 
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In this study, it seems plausible to assume that not only stimulus articles, but also 
general political attitudes might shape the impressions that the articles raise. More 
precisely, it seems warranted to suggest that if an individual perceives a political  
process as being conflict-oriented, this person is also more likely to get the impres-
sion that news articles present political processes as conflict-oriented, for example.87 
The results presented here support the assumption that general process perceptions 
affect the impression that subjects gain from the stimulus articles. The relationship 
between process perceptions and article impressions, hence, might be reciprocal. 
Nevertheless, the significant treatment effects on the article impression variables 
that were found in the manipulation check suggest that the impression which the 
articles raise in the view of the respondents is not only affected by individual  
process perceptions but also by stimulus articles. 
Besides the impact of news articles on the perception of political processes, this 
chapter also addressed the impact of exposure to the news articles on political sup-
port. The assumption here is that exposure to the articles increases the temporary 
accessibility of already available discrepancies between process preferences and 
perceptions through priming. As a result, the levels of political support of those 
subjects who are high in magnitude of the discrepancy are hypothesized to decrease. 
The results did not support this assumption, however. The conceptualization of the 
post-test questionnaire might account for this null finding. The items included in this 
questionnaire may have blurred the priming condition, because participants in the 
conflict group as well as participants in the inefficiency group were asked questions 
referring to both the consensus-orientation of political processes and the efficiency 
of political processes. In this exploratory study, this was done in order to be able to 
compare the impact of respondents’ routine media use on perceptions and prefer-
ences concerning both aspects of political processes (consensus and efficiency, see 
Chapter 7). However, future studies that are interested in priming effects on the 
temporary accessibility of preferences-perceptions relationships should apply ex-
perimental designs with posttest measures which refer to the manipulated aspects 
only. An according study could, for instance, follow this procedure: Subjects are 
asked to fill out a questionnaire a few weeks before the experimental session in 
order to determine the magnitude of their relationship between process preferences 
and perceptions. Respondents are then divided into high and low consensus prefer-
ences-perceptions discrepancy groups and into high and low efficiency preferences-
perceptions discrepancy groups. These divisions then can be used to create two 
distinct groups of subjects varying on which type of discrepancy was predominant: 
 
87  This assumption is in line with the hypothesis theory of social perception, for instance. Ac-
cording to this theory, available considerations of people determine which aspects of reality 
they perceive, the conclusions that they drawn from those perceptions, and the likelihood of 
their retrieval at a later point in time (Bruner, 1957; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Lilli & 
Frey, 1993). Similarly, confirmation bias theory assumes that individuals have a tendency to 
search for or interpret information in a way that confirms their preconceptions (Klayman & 
H, 1987; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). 
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A high consensus preferences-perceptions discrepancy/low efficiency preferences-
perceptions discrepancy group and a high efficiency preferences-perceptions dis-
crepancy/low consensus preferences-perceptions discrepancy group (cf. Higgins, 
1987). At the experimental session, a pre-test on prior levels of political support 
could be conducted. Subjects then are exposed to either news articles with references 
to the conflict-orientation of political processes or news articles with references to 
the inefficiency of political processes. Following the exposure to these articles, a 
post-test would measure the levels of political support. 
Despite its limitations, the experimental study does provide first insights into the 
relationship between exposure to media information about political decision-making 
processes and citizens’ perceptions of such processes. The following chapter pre-
sents further analyses as regards the long-term impact of routine media use on  
process perceptions and attitudes of political support. 
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7. Long-Term Effects of Media on Process Perceptions and Political 
Support 
This chapter presents the investigation of long-term effects of media information on 
citizens’ process perceptions and political support. In this study, routine use of mass 
media is assumed to reflect the influence of characteristic patterns of the media 
coverage. Media use patterns are considered to be relatively stable and distinctive 
ways of interacting with the media (McLeod & McDonald, 1985). These stable 
patterns are recently referred to as logic of an institutional news media (Marcin-
kowski, 2005). In addition, the role of citizens’ individual process preferences as 
moderator of the media’s impact is examined. The research questions and hypothe-
ses are presented in Section 7.1. Section 7.2 describes the methodological design. 
The findings are presented in Section 7.3., followed by a summary and discussion 
(Section 7.4). 
7.1.  Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Routine media use in this study is measured with respect to the use of political in-
formation. The routine use of newspapers and the routine use of television are dis-
tinguished. Not only is television generally assumed to contain more negative politi-
cal information than newspapers, it also includes visual information, which results in 
dual information-processing strategies. Thus the likelihood of a possible impact of 
television on social reality perceptions might increase. Moreover, the results from 
the media content analysis that are presented in Chapter 4 indicate that television 
newscasts, in general, are more evaluative than press articles. Televisions news 
about political decision-making processes was found to be shaped by a strong focus 
on political accusations, particularly when informing about parliamentary processes, 
although television news at the same time focuses on aspects of consensus. In addi-
tion, television news referred to the inability of political actors to solve political 
processes, particularly when informing about political processes in the parliament.  
Following the tradition of videomalaise and cultivation research, possible effects 
of routine television use are assumed to capture long-term changes of political atti-
tudes. As regards the impact on process perceptions, I assume that routine television 
use shapes the perception of certain qualities of political processes. Based on the 
finding that the television presents political processes with references to political 
discord and procedural inefficiency (Chapter 4), I hypothesize that television use 
decreases both the perception of political processes as consensus-oriented and the 
perception of political processes as efficient.  
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• H1: The more intensive a person’s television use is, the less are political  
processes perceived as consensus-oriented by that person. 
• H2: The more intensive a person’s television use is, the less are political  
processes perceived as efficient by that person. 
Based on the preferences-perceptions model of media effects, the perception of 
political processes is hypothesized to explain levels of political support. Both a de-
crease in the perception of political processes as consensus-oriented and a decrease 
in the perception of political processes as efficient are assumed to be associated with 
lower levels of political support. 
• H3: The less consensus-oriented political processes are perceived by a person, 
the lower is this person’s level of political support. 
• H4: The less efficient political processes are perceived by a person, the lower is 
this person’s level of political support. 
The concept of political support in this study encompasses attitudes towards dif-
ferent objects of evaluation, namely government, parliament, political actors, and 
democracy. In order to test whether the assumed effect mechanisms vary with re-
spect to these different objects of evaluation, I formulate the following research 
question.  
• RQ1: Does the model explain citizens’ support for the government, support for 
the parliament, support for political actors, and support for democracy equally 
well? 
Little is known about the media’s link to individual process preferences of the 
citizens. Whether routine television use affects citizens’ process preferences will be 
a question open to empiricism. Similarly, it is an open question whether the media 
might affect political support by shaping citizens’ process preferences. Hence, I 
formulate a research question in order to test whether process preferences mediate 
the relationship between television use. 
• RQ2: Do citizens’ process preferences mediate the effect of routine television 
use and/or exposure to news articles on political support? 
Whereas the mediating variable is influenced by the independent variable and 
then, in turn, influences the dependent variable, a moderating variable specifies the 
conditions under which a given effect occurs, as well as conditions under which the 
strength or direction of an effect vary (cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986; Holmbeck, 1997). 
The core assumption here is that process preferences moderate the impact of process 
perceptions on political support. Drawing on discrepancy theory, I expect that the 
effects of process perceptions on political support are smaller if the perceived qual-
ity of political processes is in line with individual process preferences. In contrast, I 
expect that the effects of process perceptions on political support are stronger if the 
perceived quality of political processes is contrary to what a person does prefer. 
More precisely, I assume that if a subject holds strong preferences regarding the  
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consensus-orientation of political processes, the consensus perception has a stronger 
influence on political support than it would be the case for subjects with low consen-
sus preferences. Likewise, if a subject holds strong preferences regarding the effi-
ciency of political processes, the efficiency perception has a stronger influence on 
political support than it would be the case for subjects with low efficiency prefer-
ences.  
• H3a: The impact of consensus perceptions on political support is stronger for 
subjects with high levels of consensus preferences than it is for subjects with 
low levels of consensus preferences. 
• H4a: The impact of efficiency perceptions on political support is stronger for 
subjects with high levels of efficiency preferences than it is for subjects with 
low levels of efficiency preferences. 
The media is assumed to affect political support via its influence on the perception 
of political processes. Process preferences, hence, might moderate the media’s im-
pact on political support in the end. Thus, if H1 and H3a are considered together, 
and if H2 and H4a are considered together, assumptions of moderated mediation 
follow (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). The assumption of moderated mediation 
is that process preferences moderate the indirect effect of media information on 
political support via the perception of political processes. More precisely, I assume 
the following hypotheses. These hypotheses are illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
• H5: The impact of television use on political support via consensus perception is 
stronger for subjects with high levels of consensus preferences than it is for sub-
jects with low levels of consensus preferences. 
• H6: The impact of television use on political support via efficiency perception is 
stronger for subjects with high levels of efficiency preferences than it is for sub-
jects with low levels of efficiency preferences.  
 
 










Strong effect for subjects with high consensus 
preferences
Strong effect for subjects with high efficiency 
preferences
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The chronic accessibility of the preference-perception relationships is argued to 
be high for people with high levels of political awareness and to be low for people 
with low levels of political awareness. Because a chronically accessible preferences-
perceptions relationship might increase the likelihood of effects of the preferences-
perceptions relationship on political attitudes, I assume that the impact of the prefer-
ences-perceptions relationship might be stronger for people with high levels of po-
litical awareness compared to people with low levels of political awareness. More 
precisely, I assume that the relationship between process perceptions and prefer-
ences has a stronger impact on political support for individuals with high levels of 
political awareness compared to subjects with low levels of political awareness.  
• H7: For subjects high in the magnitude of the discrepancies between process 
preferences and process perceptions, the relationship between preferences and 
perceptions has a stronger impact on political support of individuals with high 
levels of political awareness compared to subjects with low levels of political 
awareness. 
7.2. Method 
The experimental study presented in Chapter 6 was embedded in a series of surveys, 
an initial survey that was conducted at Time 1 in the forerun of the experimental 
study (see Chapter 6), and a final survey that was conducted at Time 2 after the 
experimental treatment. Data from those two surveys are the basis for the analyses 
presented in this chapter. Hence, the data analyses in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are 
partly based on the same data set. Section 7.2.1 describes the variables and opera-
tionalization. The data collection procedure is outlined in Section 7.2.2. The meth-
ods of data analysis are discussed in Section 7.2.3. 
7.2.1. Variables and Operationalization 
In the following, the operationalization of the variables is described (see Appendix 
10.2 for precise item wordings; the survey questionnaires (in German language) can 
be requested from the author). The measurement of concepts is based on multi-
operational measures if possible, so that latent variables can be modeled in SEM. 
The use of political information in newspapers and television was assessed at Time 
1, together with socio-demographic variables. Process perceptions and preferences, 
political support and the impression raised by the stimulus articles were measured 







Table 7.1. Intercorrelations between Manifest and Latent Variables Included in the 
Study  
 
Process preferences were measured at Time 2 with six items that that relate to 
two dimensions of political processes, namely consensus-orientation and efficiency 
(for more information see Floß, 2008). Three items refer to preferences regarding 
the consensus-orientation of political processes (Cronbach’s α = .70), and three 
items refer to preferences regarding the efficiency of political processes (Cronbach’s 
α = .79). All items were measured on a 7-point scale and had the stem ‘In the fol-
lowing question we would like to know more about your political preferences. Citi-
zens hold different preferences regarding how political decisions should be made in 
democratic systems. Please answer according to the following scale how important 
you personally consider the following preferences to be. The scale ranges from 1 
(not important at all) to 7 (very important).’ Preferences regarding the consensus-
orientation of political processes were, for instance, measured with the question 
‘How important is it for you, that political parties sometimes concede a point to the 
other side?’ Preferences regarding the efficiency of political processes were, for 
example, measured with the question ‘How important is it for you that political 
decision-making processes are simple and short?’ 
Process perceptions were measured at Time 2 by six items that relate to two di-
mensions of political processes, namely consensus-orientation and efficiency. Three  
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items refer to the perceived consensus-orientation of political processes (Cronbach’s 
α = .74), and three items refer to the perceived efficiency of political processes 
(Cronbach’s α = .67). All items were measured on a 7-point scale and had the stem 
‘Now we would like to know how, in your opinion, political decisions are actually 
made in Switzerland. Please answer according to the following scale and indicate to 
what extent the following statements on political decision-making processes in 
Switzerland, in your opinion, apply or not apply. The scale ranges from 1 (does not 
apply at all) to 7 (fully applies).’ Perceived consensus-orientation of political  
processes was, for instance, measured with the statement ‘Political parties some-
times concede a point to the other side.’ Perceived efficiency-orientation was, for 
example, measured with the statement ‘Political decision-making processes are 
time-consuming.’ 
Political support was modeled as a hierarchical factor that refers to four objects 
of evaluation: government, parliament, politicians, and democracy (Cronbach’s α = 
.91). This conceptualization is in line with other research that conceptualizes politi-
cal support as hierarchical factors, i.e. as a general attitude of political support that 
explains the relationship between more specific attitudes towards different objects of 
political support (Fuchs, 1989, p. 62ff.).88 Political support was measured at Time 2. 
The measures build on established survey items ((e.g. European Social Survey 2008; 
Eurobarometer 1997; cf. Muller & Jukam, 1977; cf. Westle, 1989) and were adapted 
to the study’s context. Support for the government was assessed by two items, for 
example, ‘How good or bad do you consider the present general performance of the 
Swiss government?’ Support for the parliament was measured with two items, for 
example, ‘How good or bad do you consider the present general performance of the 
Swiss parliament?’ Support for politicians was assessed by three items, for instance 
‘How much do you trust politicians in Switzerland altogether to act as they really 
should?’ Support for democracy was measured with two items, for example ‘To 
what extent does democracy as it exists in Switzerland correspond to your personal 
version of an ideal democracy?’ 
Routine media use was measured with items adapted from the European Social 
Survey. Respondents were asked to indicate how much of their time – on an average 
weekday – they generally spent using news or programmes about politics and cur-
rent affairs on the radio, on television, in the newspaper or on the internet (less than 
¼ hour; ¼ to ½ hour, more than ½ hour, up to 1 hour; more than 1 hour). The televi-
sion use variable was built by recoding the answers for television into categories of 
less than ½ hour; more than ½ hour, up to 1 hour; and more than 1 hour. The news-
paper use variable was built as an additive index based on the answers for local 
newspapers and national newspapers that were recoded into categories of less than 
½ hour; more than ½ hour, up to 1 hour; and more than 1 hour. 
Political experience is an index variable based on four items (Cronbach’s α = 
.64). In line with an operationalization of direct political experiences by Wolling 
 
88  Hierarchical factor models encompass a second order factor which explains the relationship 
between first order factors (Kline, 2005, p. 198ff.) 
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(2009), two items measure political activity, the stem ‘There are different possibili-
ties to be politically active. Some of them are mentioned below. Please indicate for 
each of these activities whether it applies to you or does not apply to you’ was fol-
lowed by ‘engaging actively in party work’ and ‘hold a political mandate.’ Two 
items measure political experience in general, for example people were asked ‘Do 
you have direct experiences with political everyday business due to your profes-
sional employment or other occupations? (Yes, regularly; yes, occasionally; no)’. 
An index variable was built by counting the values indicating experience and activ-
ity; this variable range from 0 (no experience) to 4 (much experience).  
Political awareness is an additive index variable based on two items: political in-
terest and frequency of political discussions (Cronbach’s α = .66), each of them 
being measured on a 4-point scale, and ranges from 1 (low level of political aware-
ness) to 8 (high level of political awareness). The items political interest and fre-
quency of discussions were used to build the political awareness variable because 
they are closely related to political knowledge (Cassel, 1984).  
The following socio-demographic variables were included in the analysis as con-
trol variables: age (as an indicator of cumulative political experiences), gender (as an 
indicator of gender-specific aspects of socialization), education (as an indicator for 
educational influences), and political ideology (measured as left-right orientation on 
an 11-point scale, as an indicator for political preferences in general).  
7.2.2. Participants and Procedure 
The surveys were conducted as web surveys. Web surveys are commonly used not 
only in applied research but also in basic research. This study considers several 
measures in order to deal with potential weaknesses of web surveys, such as a low 
response rate, the skewed attributes of internet population, and the impersonal at-
mosphere (Evans & Mathur, 2005). The web survey design affects both the effi-
ciency in which respondents complete a survey and the non-response rates (Couper, 
Traugott, & Lamis, 2001). Hence, the instrument must be simple to understand and 
easy to complete (Couper, 2000, p. 475). The surveys were conducted using “Lime-
survey”, an open source online survey application that enables custom preferred 
layout and design.89 A progress indicator was used, because studies show that it 
might keep participants motivated to complete the survey (Couper, et al., 2001, p. 
243f.). Other findings suggested that multiple-item screen versions took signifi-
cantly less time to complete than single-item screens and result in fewer “don’t 
know” answers (Couper, et al., 2001, p. 244f.). Therefore, this study used multiple-
item screens. Moreover, the possibility to save preliminary answers and to continue 
with the survey at a later point in time was offered in order to facilitate the process 
for the participants.  
 
89  This software is written in PHP (hypertext pre-processor). 
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The target population of this study are citizens from the German-speaking part of 
Switzerland who are at least 18 years old and hold voting rights. The subjects were 
recruited in collaboration with “smartvote”, an online voting decision-making tool in 
Switzerland. An advertisement was placed in an e-mail newsletter that was sent to 
all users of “smartvote” in the German-speaking part of Switzerland on October 11, 
2007. Subjects who were interested in taking part in a social science research project 
were asked to contact the author. In total 735 citizens sent an e-mail and expressed 
their interest in participating in the study. The recruitment procedure constructed 
what Cooper’s typology would call a volunteer panel nonprobability Web survey 
(2000, p. 477ff.). 
The series of surveys encompassed an initial survey, five surveys with news arti-
cles, and a final survey. For more information on the data collection procedure see 
also Section 6.2.2. After the data collection had been finished, the data set was pre-
pared.90 The complete data set includes participants who are younger than 18 years 
old and participants who do not hold Swiss citizenship. In the complete data set, the 
number of participants in the conflict group is 209, in the inefficiency group 207, 
and in the control group 172. From the complete data set, all cases that do not be-
long to the target population were deleted. The resulting adjusted data set does not 
include participants who are younger than 18 years old and participants who do not 
hold Swiss citizenship. However, subjects who did participate in the initial survey 
only and dropped out later on are part of the adjusted data set. In the adjusted data 
set, the number of participants in the conflict group is 205, in the inefficiency group 
200, and in the control group 171. From the adjusted data set, all subjects who par-
ticipated only in the initial survey were deleted. These 53 cases were not included in 
the final data set which contains 523 cases. 
Most participants in this study’s sample (n = 523) are male. More precisely, 67 
percent of the subjects are men, and 29 percent are women. The rest did not indicate 
their gender. The average age is 43.5 years, but the sample shows a great range (SD 
= 15.37). One third of the subjects are 34 years old or younger, and one third are 50 
years old or older. The participants in general show a high level of formal education: 
52 percent have a college or university degree, and an additional 17 percent hold a 
university entrance qualification. Regarding the household income after tax, the 
income ranges from less than 1,000 CHF per month to more than 15,000 CHF per 
month.Most participants indicate a household income of 6,000 to 7,000 CHF; the 
average income is about 8,100 CHF.  
In general, the participants are very interested in politics. More precisely, 56 per-
cent say that they are very interested and 41 percent indicate that they are moder-
 
90  Limesurvey automatically generated a code for each subject so that they can be identified 
across the different surveys (initial survey, article surveys, and final survey). Based on this 
identification code, all surveys for the participants in the conflict treatment group were added 
together in SPSS with the add variables-command. The same procedure was done for the par-
ticipants in the inefficiency group and the control group. The data sets were than added to-
gether with the add-cases command. 
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ately interested in politics. Likewise, 48 percent say that they often participate in 
discussions about political issues with family and friends, and 44 percent say that 
this is the case occasionally. The variables political interest and frequency of politi-
cal discussions are highly correlated (r = .516, p < .05). The respondents are also 
rather experienced with political day-to-day business. One out of five participants 
indicates that he or she frequently has direct experiences with politics, and 41 per-
cent say that this is the case occasionally. 16 percent of the respondents frequently 
and 46 percent occasionally have indirect experiences with politics through relatives 
or friends. The subjects in general are not only interested in politics and experienced 
with the political day-to-day business; some of them also actively participate in 
politics. About one out of five participants is an active party member, 27 percent are 
engaged in an interest group and 10 percent even hold a political mandate. 
Moreover, the sample in general shows a high level of use of the media for politi-
cal information. More precisely, for at least 15 minutes on an average day, 85 per-
cent of respondents use the radio, 69 percent read a local paper, 79 percent read a 
national paper, 81 percent watch political information on television, and 79 percent 
use the internet. The use of tabloids and free papers is less intensive among the par-
ticipants. Only 15 percent of the respondents read a tabloid and 56 percent read a 
free paper for at least 15 minutes on an average day. All subjects use at least one of 
the different types of political media information for at least 15 minutes a day. 
7.2.3. Data Analysis 
In order to investigate the media’s impact on political support, structural equation 
modeling (SEM) is used as it allows modeling the presumed relationship between 
the measured independent, dependent, and mediating variables. Generally, the litera-
ture mentions several advantages of SEM compared to regression models, for in-
stance. First, SEM provides more accurate effect estimates. More precisely, if sev-
eral measures of a construct are gathered and relationships among latent variables 
are analyzed, then SEM will control for measurement errors91 and analyze unattenu-
ated relationships. Latent variables are variables that are not directly observed but 
inferred from other variables that are observed and measured (so-called manifest 
variables). The relationship between latent variables and their indicators is described 
in measurement models. The measurement models of this study are presented in 
Appendix 10.3. Hence, structural equation models have two parts, i.e. measurement 
parts and structural parts. Structural parts estimate the structural coefficients be-
tween the latent and/or manifest variables. Using latent variables, SEM permits us to 
study the influence of one error-free construct on another, eliminating potential bias 
due to attenuation. The model controls for measurement error by estimating the 
 
91  The term measurement error refers to “the extent to which random error affects the measure-
ment of a given variable” (Bedeian, Day, & Kelloway, 1997, p. 786). 
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“true” correlation between variables. These adjustments for measurement error pro-
vide results based on hypothetical rather than obtained data (Bedeian, et al., 1997, p. 
794f.). In general, measurement errors are considered a serious threat to causal 
analysis, because they affect the explained variance of an independent variable (Be-
deian, Day, & Kelloway, 1997). 
Second, SEM allows us to analyze precise processes which may explain changes 
in the outcome variables (Russell, Kahn, & Altmaier, 1998). The effect mechanisms 
are investigated by integrating mediating variables into the model. The importance 
of considering indirect effects in media effects, as well as the usefulness of SEM for 
investigations of mediation models, is emphasized by several authors (Brandl, 2004; 
Holbert & Stephenson, 2002, 2003; Matthes, 2007b). Another advantage of SEM 
compared to regression models is that more than one independent variable can be 
used and the independent variables can be highly correlated. In order to be able to 
investigate the data in this study based on SEM, the data collection took require-
ments of SEM into consideration, e.g. the use of several measures of a construct in 
order to be able to conceptualize latent variables and the recruitment of enough 
participants to ensure that the sample size is large enough. 
The SEM analyses used EQS version 6.1 software (Bentler, 2006). The data were 
tested for univariate and multivariate normal distribution and strong outliers were 
excluded from data analysis. Extreme violations (moderate ones are given in paren-
theses) on the assumption of the univariate distribution are associated with skew 
values of at least 3 (2) and kurtosis of at least 20 (7) (West, et al., 1995). These val-
ues were not reached with the original variables. Mean-centered variables92, how-
ever, showed some violations of univariate normality. Yuan, Lambert and Fouladi 
(2004) developed an extension of the Mardia test of multivariate kurtosis (1970, 
1974) that can be applied to data with missing values. The normalized estimate is 
interpretable as a standard normal variate; the hypothesis of multivariate normality 
must be rejected if it is outside the range of -3 to +3 (Bentler, 2006, p. 282f.). For 
models with mean-centered variables the variate was outside this range.93 Hence, the 
distribution-free Satorra-Bentler estimation as an alternative to Maximum-
Likelihood estimation was applied (cf. Bentler, 2006, p. 137ff.). This method uses 
the Maximum-Likelihood estimation, but corrects test statistics and the standard 
errors (Benteler, 2006, p. 136ff., 289). In addition, robust methods might correct for 
deviations from the missing-at-random assumption.  
Missing values were treated using the maximum likelihood-method (ML-
imputation algorithm), also known as full information maximum likelihood (cf. 
Bentler, 2006, p. 285ff.; Wothke, 2000).94 The appropriateness of imputing missing 
 
92  Mean-centered variables were used for the computation of latent interaction variables. 
93  Nonnormality problems in the context of estimating latent interaction effects might occur 
(Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004; Schermelleh-Engel, Klein, & Moosbrugger, 1998). 
94  The values for those participants who dropped out of the study were not imputed. Subjects 
who did not participate in the final survey or did not complete any of the article surveys were 
excluded from the final data set that is the basis for the data analysis, because for them no 
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values depends on the characteristics of the missing data patterns. However, the ML-
imputation algorithm does not necessitate that data are missing completely at ran-
dom (MCAR: missingness depends on observed values in the data set); it can also be 
used with data missing at random, a weaker kind of mechanism (MAR: missingness 
depends on unobserved values) (Benteler, 2006, p. 276). As there is no statistical 
test whether this assumption holds for a given set of data, researchers are asked to 
carefully analyze the missing data patterns. In addition, using robust methods might 
correct for deviations from the MAR assumption. Because the analysis is based on 
imputed data, I generally applied the distribution-free Satorra-Bentler estimation as 
an alternative to Maximum-Likelihood estimation. 
As regards the investigation of the assumed moderator effect, some studies use 
the arithmetic difference between preferences and perceptions (Kimball & Patterson, 
1997), an approach that is consistent with the proximity model of candidate evalua-
tion (Grynaviski & Corrigan, 2006). In proximity models of candidate evaluation, 
proximity scores indicate how close an individual’s stand is to the stand of candi-
dates, mostly with respect to policy issue positions. Other studies base their data 
analysis on comparisons between groups of people with congruent and incongruent 
preference-perception relationships (S. C. Patterson, et al., 1969). Another possibil-
ity would be to build the product of perceptions and preferences. Such an approach 
is suggested by the expectancy value model (Doll & Ajzen, 2008). To test whether 
process preferences would moderate the relationship between process perceptions 
and political support using SEM, I followed the latent interaction approach of an 
unconstrained model suggested by Marsh et al. (2004). Because process preferences 
were measured continuously, this approach appeared to be more applicable than a 
multigroup comparison based on arbitrary cut-off values. Marsh et al. (Marsh, et al., 
2004) proposed testing for latent interactions by multiplying mean-centred indica-
tors of predictor and moderator and specifying these products as indicators of the 
latent interaction factor. As suggested by Marsh et al. (2004), I estimated the latent 
interaction models with a mean structure incorporated.  
To evaluate the model fit, the following criteria were evaluated: the Chi-Square 
value divided by the number of degrees of freedom (< 3), the comparative fit index 
(CFI > .90), the Root Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA < .06) with its 
90% confidence interval (CI, lower bound < .05, upper bound < .10) (cf. Kline, 
2005, p. 133ff.). 
 
measurement of either the treatment perception or the mediating and dependent variable ex-
ists. Moreover, no systematic effects of attrition are assumed, because those who dropped out 




This section investigates the relationship between routine media use and political 
support. The correlations between variables measuring media use, process percep-
tions, process preferences and political support are displayed in Table 7.1. The per-
ceptions of political processes were significantly associated with political support in 
a way that both the perception of political processes as consensus-oriented and the 
perception of political processes as efficient are linked with higher levels of political 
support. Moreover, process preferences were significantly related to political sup-
port. Whereas high levels of consensus preferences are associated with high levels 
of political support, high levels of efficiency preferences are related to low levels of 
political support. Television use is significantly related to efficiency perception and 
efficiency preference. A high intensity of television use is associated with the per-
ception of political processes as less efficient. A high intensity of television use is 
linked to stronger preferences regarding the efficiency of decision-making  
processes. There is no significant relationship between newspaper use and process 
perceptions or political support.  
A variety of structural equation models were analyzed in order to test the as-
sumptions formulated in Section 7.3.1. The analyses presented here are based on the 
sample of participants in the two treatment groups (n = 366).95 Socio-demographic 
control variables (gender, age, education, political experience, and political ideol-
ogy) were included in all of these models. In the interest of clarity, they are not dis-
played in the figures, however. Disturbances and error terms are omitted from the 
figures for clarity as well. Besides manifest variables (i.e. newspaper use, television 
use and exposure to stimulus articles) there are latent variables included in the  
models which are measured by several indicators in order to correct for measure-
ment errors. The according measurement models are described in Appendix 10.3. In 
the figures, manifest variables are presented in squares and latent variables are pre-
sented in circles. Section 7.3.1 presents analyses of the role of routine media use as a 
predictor of political support. More precisely, the assumption that respondents’ 
process perceptions mediate the impact of media use on political support is investi-
gated. In addition, the media’s impact on preferences regarding political decision-
making processes and the discrepancy between preferences and perceptions is inves-
tigated (Section 7.3.2). In Section 7.3.3, the role of process preferences as a modera-
tor of the impact of media on political support is analyzed. Section 7.3.4 presents 
 
95  Because no measurement of respondents’ article impressions exists for the participants in the 
control group, models that include the article impression variables are based on the sample of 
participants in the two treatment groups. In order to facilitate comparisons between the mo-
dels, not only the models including the impression variables but also all other models are 
based on the sample of participants in the two treatment groups. Comparisons of results for 
models which are based on the sample with participants in the treatment groups (n = 366) 
with results for the same models based on the total sample (n = 523) show that the results dif-
fer only marginally (some path estimates differ slightly in the second digit after the decimal 
point).  
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findings concerning the moderating impact of chronic accessibility. In Section 7.3.5, 
the joint impact of situational exposure to media articles and long-term media use is 
explored. 
7.3.1. The Impact of Television Use on Process Perceptions and Political Support 
The following model tests the assumption that subjects’ perceptions of the consen-
sus-orientation of political processes and their perception of the efficiency of politi-
cal processes mediate the impact of television use on political support (see Figure 
7.2). Newspaper use and television use were specified as predictors of consensus 
perception, efficiency perception and political support. In addition, consensus per-
ception and efficiency perception were specified as predictors of political support. 
The variables television use and newspaper use were allowed to correlate. Televi-
sion use predicted the efficiency perception of political processes significantly (β =  
-0.17, p < .05), supporting H2. The more intensively television is used for political 
information, the less are political processes perceived as efficient. In contrast, nei-
ther television nor newspaper use had a significant effect on consensus perception. 
Thus, H1 is not supported. The consensus perception, however, was a strong signifi-
cant predictor of political support (β = 0.43, p < .05). Political support was also 
significantly affected by efficiency perception (β = 0.38, p < .05). The less efficient 
or consensus-oriented political processes are perceived to be, the lower is the level 
of political support. Thus, H3 and H4 were supported. The support for H2 and H4 
indicates possible indirect effects of television use on political support via the per-
ception of political processes as inefficient. The indirect effect of television use on 
political support via efficiency perception was β = -0.06 and was statistically signifi-
cant as indicated by the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982), ZSobel: 2.20, p < .05. Thus, televi-
sion use had an indirect impact on political support by shaping the efficiency per-
ception of political processes. In addition, the model shows significant effects of 
gender (β = 0.17, p < .05), education (β = 0.21, p < .05) and age (β = -0.16, p < .05) 
on the consensus perception of political processes and a significant effect of age (β = 
-0.20, p < .05) on the efficiency perception of political processes. There is also a 
significant effect of gender (β = -0.17, p < .05) on political support. This indicates 
that men, highly educated persons and persons of a younger age are more likely to 
perceive political processes as consensus-oriented than women, persons with lower 
levels of formal education and persons of older age. Persons of a younger age also 
are more likely to perceive political processes as efficient than persons of older age. 
And women are more likely to have high levels of political support than men. The 
model fit was satisfactory, with CFI = .94, RMSEA =.05 (90% CI = .04, .06), Chi-



















Note. Shown are standardized path coefficients. All the solid line paths are statistically significant at .05 or above. 
Dashed lines indicate insignificant paths. Chi-Square (df=167, N  354)  =352.40, Comparative fit index is .94, root mean 








7 = fully applies 
1 = does not apply at all
Figure 7.2. The Impact of Media Use on Process Perceptions and Political Support  
 
In order to provide answers to the fist research question on potential differences 
in predicting political support for the government, support for the parliament, sup-
port for political actors, and support for democracy, the model presented in Figure 
7.2 was tested separately for the specific objects of evaluation (government, parlia-
ment, political actors, and democracy). More precisely, in each model, newspaper 
use and television use were specified as predictors of consensus perception, effi-
ciency perception and support for the precise object of evaluation. In addition, con-
sensus perception and efficiency perception were specified as predictors of support 
for the precise object of evaluation. The variables television use and newspaper use 
were allowed to correlate. The results are presented in Table 7.2. In general, the 
results show that intensive use of political information on television is associated 
with a decrease of respondents’ perception that political processes are efficient. The 
perception of political processes, in turn, is related with support for the different 
objects of evaluation in the sense that the perception of political processes as not 
efficient and/or the perception of political processes as not consensus-oriented are 
linked to lower levels of political support. As regards differences in the predictive 
power, the findings suggest that the specified predictors have the largest predictive 
power with regard to support for politicians (r2 = .35), and the least predictive power 
with regard to support for the government (r2 = .17). Looking at the impact of the 
distinct predictors on the different attitudes of political support, the results indicate 
that there is a significant impact of consensus perception on support for the parlia-
ment, support for politicians, and support for democracy. However, there was no 
significant effect of consensus perceptions on support for the government. And an- 
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other difference is noteworthy: The efficiency perception exerts a strong influence 
on support for the government. With regard to support for politicians and support for 
democracy, however, the impact of the consensus perception on support is stronger 
than the influence of efficiency perception. The impact of the socio-demographic 
control variables on the perception of political processes as consensus-oriented and 
efficient is similar to previously reported findings (see Section 6.5.1).96 There are, 
however, differences as regards the control variables’ impact on support for the 
different objects of evaluation. In line with previously reported findings (see Section 
6.5.1), gender was a significant predictor of support for the parliament (β = -0.19, p 
< .05), support for politicians (β = -0.13, p < .05) and support for democracy (β =     
-0.10, p < .05). Support for the government, however, was significantly affected by 
political ideology (β = -0.23, p < .05). This result indicates that the more a person is 
oriented towards the political right, the lower is this person’s support for the gov-
ernment. The model fit for the model predicting support for the government was 
satisfactory, with CFI = .97, RMSEA =.04 (90% CI = .02, .06), Chi-Square = 90.46, 
df = 53. The model fit for the model predicting support for the parliament was satis-
factory, with CFI = .98, RMSEA =.03 (90% CI = .00, .05), Chi-Square = 74.03, df = 
52. The model fit for the model predicting support for politicians was satisfactory, 
with CFI = .98, RMSEA =.03 (90% CI = .00, .05), Chi-Square = 92.65, df = 66. The 
model fit for the model predicting support for democracy was satisfactory, with CFI 











96  As for the model estimating support for the government, there was a significant effect of 
gender (β = 0.19, p < .05), education (β = 0.21, p < .05) and age (β = -0.14, p < .05) on the 
consensus perception of political processes and a significant effect of age (β = -0.22, p < .05) 
on the efficiency perception of political processes. As for the model estimating support for 
the parliament, there was a significant effect of gender (β = 0.18, p < .05), education (β = 
0.19, p < .05) and age (β = -0.16, p < .05) on the consensus perception of political processes 
and a significant effect of age (β = -0.22, p < .05) on the efficiency perception of political 
processes. As for the model estimating support politicians, there was a significant effect of 
gender (β = 0.17, p < .05), education (β = 0.20, p < .05) and age (β = -0.15, p < .05) on the 
consensus perception of political processes and a significant effect of age (β = -0.23, p < .05) 
on the efficiency perception of political processes. As for the model estimating support for 
democracy, there was a significant effect of gender (β = 0.19, p < .05), education (β = 0. 91, p 
< .05) and age (β = -0.15, p < .05) on the consensus perception of political processes and a 
significant effect of age (β= -0.21, p < .05) on the efficiency perception of political processes. 
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Table 7.2. Predicting Support for Different Objects of Evaluation  
7.3.2. The Impact of Television Use on Process Preferences and Political Support 
To provide answers with regard to the second research question, referring to the 
impact of media use on citizens’ process preferences and the effect of process pref-
erences on political support, a model was tested that includes process preferences as 
a mediator of the effect of routine media use on political support (see Figure 7.3). 
Newspaper use and television use were specified as predictors of consensus prefer-
ence, efficiency preference and political support. In addition, consensus preference 
and efficiency preference were specified as predictors of political support. The vari-
ables television use and newspaper use were allowed to correlate. Both newspaper 
use (β = -0.16, p < .05) and television use (β = 0.22, p < .05) significantly predicted 
preference regarding the efficiency of political processes. The more intensively 
newspapers are used for political information, the less strong are preferences as 
regards the efficiency of political processes. In contrast, the more intensively televi-
sion is used for political information, the stronger are preferences as regards the 
efficiency of political processes. In contrast, neither television use nor newspaper 
use had a significant effect on consensus preferences. Consensus preferences, how-
ever, were a strong significant predictor of political support (β = 0.25, p < .05). Po-
litical support was also significantly affected by efficiency preferences (β = -0.25, p 
< .05). Whereas there is a positive relationship between consensus preferences and 
political support, indicating that the stronger the consensus preferences, the higher is 
the level of political support, the relationship between efficiency preferences and 
political support is negative. This indicates that the stronger the efficiency prefer-
ences, the lower is the level of political support. In addition, the model shows sig-















Note. Shown are standardized path coefficients. All the solid line paths are statistically significant at .05 or above. 
Dashed lines indicate insignificant paths. Chi-Square (df=167, N  356)  =360.66, Comparative fit index is .93, root mean 
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-0.14, p < .05) and age (β = 0.26, p < .05) on preferences regarding the consensus-
orientation of political processes and significant effects of gender (β = 0.14, p < .05) 
and age (β = 0.22, p < .05) on preferences regarding the efficiency of political  
processes. There is also a significant effect of age (β = -0.22, p < .05) on political 
support. This indicates that for political left oriented persons, people with less politi-
cal experience and persons of an older age, there is a greater probability of having 
strong consensus preferences than for political right oriented persons, people with 
intensive political experience and persons of a younger age. Persons of an older age 
and men are also more likely to prefer efficient processes than persons of a younger 
age and women. And the older a person is, the lower are the levels of political sup-
port. The model fit was satisfactory, with CFI = .93, RMSEA =.05 (90% CI = .04, 
.06), Chi-Square = 360.66, df = 167. 
 
Figure 7.3. The Impact of Media Use on Process Preferences and Political Support 
 
The results suggest possible indirect effects of newspaper use and television use 
on support via their impact on efficiency preferences. The indirect effect of newspa-
per use on political support via efficiency preference was β = 0.04 and was not sta-
tistically significant as indicated by the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982), ZSobel: 1.92, p > .05. 
The indirect effect of television use on political support via efficiency preference 
was β = -0.05 and was statistically significant as indicated by the Sobel test (Sobel, 
1982), ZSobel: 2.44, p < .05. Thus, television use decreased political support by shap-
ing citizens’ efficiency preferences regarding political processes.  
The previous findings indicate that television use may enhance the importance of 
efficient processes and at the same raise the impression that political processes are  
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inefficient. Thus, it seems warranted to suggest that television use may increase the 
discrepancy between respondents’ efficiency preferences and the perception of po-
litical processes in terms of their efficiency. In order to probe this assumption, a  
model was tested that specifies the discrepancy between consensus preferences and 
consensus perceptions (consensus discrepancy) and the discrepancy between effi-
ciency preferences and efficiency perceptions (efficiency discrepancy) as variables 
that mediate the impact of media use on political support (see Figure 7.4). Discrep-
ancy items were computed by subtracting the preferences items from the respective 
perceptions items (with reversed coded scales so that low scores indicate that a cer-
tain aspect of political processes fully applies to reality). The latent factors consen-
sus discrepancy and efficiency are modeled similar to the perceptions and prefer-
ences factors97 (for more information on the measurement models see Appendix 
10.3, for more information on the computation of discrepancy items see Section 
6.3.3). Newspaper use and television use were specified as predictors of consensus 
discrepancy, efficiency discrepancy and political support. In addition, consensus 
discrepancy and efficiency discrepancy were specified as predictors of political 
support. The variables television use and newspaper use were allowed to correlate. 
Both newspaper use (β = -0.18, p < .05) and television use (β = 0.22, p < .05) pre-
dicted the efficiency discrepancy significantly. The more intensively newspapers are 
used for political information, the smaller is the efficiency discrepancy. In contrast, 
the more intensively television is used for political information, the greater is the 
efficiency discrepancy. In contrast, neither television use nor newspaper use had a 
significant effect on consensus discrepancy. Consensus discrepancy however, was a 
strong significant predictor of political support (β = -0.19, p < .05). Political support 
was also significantly affected by efficiency discrepancy (β = -0.37, p < .05). The 
stronger the consensus or the efficiency discrepancies are (in the sense that prefer-
ences exceed perceptions), the lower is the level of political support. In addition, the 
model shows significant effects of gender (β = -0.21, p < .05), education (β = -0.14, 
p < .05), political ideology (β = -0.18, p < .05), political experiences (β = -0.13, p < 
.05) and age (β = 0.26, p < .05) on the magnitude of the discrepancy between con-
sensus preferences and consensus perceptions. There is also a significant effect of 
age (β = 0.26, p < .05) on the magnitude of the discrepancy between efficiency pref-
erences. This indicates that for women, people with lower levels of formal educa-
tion, political left oriented people, persons with lower levels of political experience 
and persons of an older age there is a greater probability of having a large negative 
discrepancy between consensus preferences and consensus perceptions (in the sense 
that preferences exceed perceptions) than men, people with higher levels of formal 
education, political right oriented people, persons with higher levels of political 
experience and persons of a younger age. And the older a person is, the larger is the 
 
97  The consensus discrepancy factor encompasses the following discrepancy items: consider 
diverging interests, concede a point to the other side and the role of compromises. The effi-
ciency discrepancy factor encompasses the following discrepancy items: fast decision-















Note. All the solid line paths are statistically significant at .05 or above. Dashed lines indicate insignificant paths.
Chi-Square (df=167, N  356)  =337.38, Comparative fit index is .94, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
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negative discrepancy between efficiency preferences and efficiency perceptions. The 
model fit was satisfactory, with CFI = .94, RMSEA =.06 (90% CI = .04, .06), Chi-
Square = 337.38, df = 167. 
 
Figure 7.4. The Impact of Media Use on Discrepancies and Support 
 
The results suggest possible indirect effects of newspaper use and television use 
on support via their impact on efficiency discrepancy. The indirect effect of newspa-
per use on political support via efficiency discrepancy was β = 0.07 and was statisti-
cally significant as indicated by the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982), ZSobel: 2.43, p < .05. 
The indirect effect of television use on political support via efficiency discrepancy 
was β = -0.08 and was statistically significant as indicated by the Sobel test (Sobel, 
1982), ZSobel: 3.07, p < .05. The results suggest that media use has an indirect impact 
on political support by shaping citizens’ efficiency discrepancies. Whereas the indi-
rect effect of newspaper use on political support was positive, indicating that higher 
levels of newspaper use are associated with higher levels of political support, the 
indirect effect of television use on political support was negative, indicating that 
higher levels of television use are associated with lower levels of political support. 
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7.3.3. The Role of Process Preferences as Moderator of Effects on Political Sup-
port 
One important objective of the present study is to explore the conditions under 
which media information about political processes affects political support. This 
study makes the argument that the impact of media-shaped perceptions of political 
processes on political support is particularly strong for subjects for whom related 
aspects of decision-making procedures are important. A variety of structural equa-
tion models were analyzed in order to test this assumption. In all of these models, 
socio-demographic control variables (gender, age, education, political experience, 
and political ideology) were included. They are not displayed in the figures in the 
interest of clarity.  
Drawing on discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), this study assumes that process 
preferences moderate the relationship between process perceptions and political 
support. More precisely, it is hypothesized that the perception of political processes 
in terms of their consensus-orientation affects support particularly for those indi-
viduals who hold strong preferences as regards the consensus-orientation of political 
processes (H3a). Likewise, it is proposed that the perception of political processes in 
terms of their efficiency affects support particularly for those individuals who hold 
strong preferences as regards the efficiency of political processes (H4a). Because 
process preferences were measured continuously, I refrained from a multigroup 
comparison based on arbitrary cut-off values. Instead I specified a latent interaction 
model to test the hypotheses (Marsh et al., 2004). For the two process perceptions-
preferences interaction factors (efficiency interaction and consensus interaction) 
there were three perception items and three preferences items each. I generated three 
indicators for each of the two latent interactions by multiplying items with similar 
factor loadings on latent predictor and moderator variables with each other (Marsh, 
et al., 2004). In order to build the discrepancy variables, the perception variables 
were recoded so that high scores indicate that the according aspects are perceived to 
not apply to decision-making processes in Switzerland. High scores on the prefer-
ence variables indicate that according aspects of decision-making processes are 
important to the respondent. High scores on the interaction variables, then, indicate a 
large negative discrepancy between process perceptions and process preferences 
(negative discrepancy = aspects are important but do not apply to reality). Process 
perceptions (with reversed scale, mean-centred indicators), process preferences 
(with mean-centred indicators) and the latent interaction thereof were specified as 
predictors of political support. All predictors were allowed to correlate. The model 
showed a significant effect of consensus perception on support (β = -0.25, p < .05), a 
significant effect of efficiency perception on support (β = -0.27, p < .05), a signifi-
cant effect of consensus preference on support (β = 0.18, p < .05), a significant ef-
fect of the latent interaction between consensus perception and consensus preference 
on support (β = -0.25, p < .05), and a significant effect of the latent interaction be-
tween efficiency perception and efficiency preference on support (β = -0.17, p < 
.05). There was also a significant effect of age on political support (β = -0.14, p < 
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.05). Model fit was satisfactory with CFI = .93, RMSEA =.04 (90% CI = .03, .04), 
Chi-Square = 674.42, df = 431.  
The significant effects of both the consensus preference - consensus perception 
interaction and the efficiency preference - efficiency perception interaction support 
the assumption that the relationship between process preferences and perceptions 
predicts political support. When interpreting interaction effects, one has to bear in 
mind that “the inclusion of a multiplicative term converts a general statement of 
relationship into a conditional statement of relationship” (Friedrich, 1982, p. 804). It  
therefore makes sense to evaluate the conditional relationship between process per-
ceptions and political support within the observed range of process preferences (cf. 
Friedrich, 1982; Ping, 2003), in order to test whether stronger effects of the percep-
tion-preference relationship on political support are associated with a larger prefer-
ences-perceptions magnitude (i.e. strong preferences regarding certain aspects of 
political processes on the one hand and the perception that these aspects do not ap-
ply to reality on the other hand). Since consensus preferences range from -4.9 to 1.1, 
the relationship between consensus perception and political support varies, over the 
observed range of consensus preference, from 3.28 to -1.20 (see Table 7.3). Simi-
larly, since efficiency preferences range from -3.3 to 2.7, the relationship between 
efficiency perception and political support varies, over the observed range of effi-
ciency preference, from -0.03 to -0.89. The negative impact of consensus percep-
tions on political support increases with increasing levels of consensus preferences. 
Hence the results indicate that the more an individual values the consensus-
orientation of political processes, the stronger a negative perception of political 
processes in terms of their consensus-orientation contributes to a decrease of politi-
cal support. Interestingly, for subjects with consensus preferences below the mean, 
negative perceptions of the consensus-orientation of political processes are related to 
an increase in support. The negative impact of efficiency perceptions on political 
support increases with increasing levels of efficiency preferences. Hence the results 
indicate that the more an individual values the efficiency of political processes, the 
stronger a negative perception of political processes in terms of their efficiency 
contributes to a decrease of political support. Thus, H1a and H2a are supported. 
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Table 7.3. Perception-Support Relation Moderated by Preferences 
 
In order to examine whether the indirect effect of television use on support via ef-
ficiency perceptions varies systematically as a function of efficiency preferences 
(H6), the mediation model in Figure 7.4 was tested with interaction effects between 
process perceptions and process preferences included. The so-called moderated 
mediation model (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) is shown in Figure 7.5. Process 
perceptions (with reversed scale, mean-centred indicators), process preferences 
(with mean-centred indicators) and the latent interaction thereof were specified as 
predictors of political support. Television use and newspaper use were specified as 
predictors of consensus perception and efficiency perception. The model showed a 
significant effect of television use on the efficiency perception of political processes 
(β = 0.17, p < .05). Efficiency perception, in turn significantly affects political sup-
port (β = -0.36, p < .05). The effect of the latent interaction between efficiency per-
ception and efficiency preference on support was significant (β = -0.16, p < .05). 
Because there is no effect of television use on consensus perception of political 
processes, H5 assuming moderated indirect effects of television use on political 
support via consensus perceptions is not supported. In line with previously reported 
findings (see Section 6.5.1), the model shows significant effects of gender (β =         
-0.18, p < .05), education (β = -0.17, p < .05) and age (β = 0.15, p < .05) on the con-
sensus perception of political processes and a significant effect of age (β = 0.28, p < 
.05) on the efficiency perception of political processes.98 There is also a significant 
effect of gender (β = -0.12, p < .05) on political support. Model fit was satisfactory 




98  Differences in the signs of coefficients are caused by the reversed recoding of process percep-























Note. Shown are standardized path coefficients. All the solid line paths are statistically significant at .05 or above. 
Dashed lines indicate insignificant paths. Chi-Square (df=481, N  346)  =867.78, Comparative fit index is .90, root mean 
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Figure 7.5. Differential Effects on Political Support Depending on Process Prefer-
ences 
 
The finding of a significant effect of the interaction between efficiency preference 
and efficiency perceptions on political support does not necessarily warrant the 
suggestion that the indirect impact of television use on political support via the per-
ception of political processes as inefficient is moderated by efficiency preferences. 
In order to test this assumption, the conditional relationship between television use 
and political support via efficiency perceptions can be evaluated within the observed 
range of process preferences (cf. Friedrich, 1982; Ping, 2003). Since efficiency pref-
erences range from -3.3 to 2.7, the indirect relationship between television use and 
political support via efficiency perception varies, over the observed range of effi-
ciency preference, from -0.01 to -0.14 (see Table 7.4). The results show that the 
negative effects of television use on political support via efficiency perceptions 
increased with increasing levels of efficiency preferences. Hence the findings sug-
gest that the impact of television use on political support via its influence on the 
perception of political processes in terms of their efficiency is particularly strong for 
individuals for whom efficient decision-making procedures are important. Thus, the 
assumption of moderated mediation formulated in H2b is supported.  
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Table 7.4. Television-Support Relation Moderated by Preferences 
7.3.4. Chronical Accessibility as Moderator 
With respect to the role of political awareness, for subjects high in the magnitude of 
the discrepancy between process preferences and process perceptions, the effects of 
the preferences-perceptions relationship on political support are hypothesized to be 
stronger for people with high levels of political awareness compared to people with 
low levels of political awareness (H7). In order to test this assumption, a model was 
investigated that tests whether the moderating effect of preferences was different for 
individuals with high levels of political awareness compared to individuals with low 
levels of political awareness. Therefore, in a first step, those participants who show 
either a discrepancy between consensus preferences and consensus perceptions (in 
the sense that preferences exceed perceptions) or a discrepancy between efficiency 
preferences and efficiency perceptions (in the sense that preferences exceed percep-
tions) were selected. Those participants who show values > 0 on either one of the 
two discrepancy factors99 were included in the analysis (n = 227). In a second step, 
groups were built based on a median split of the political awareness variable (MD = 
7). All subjects with political awareness values < 7 were put in the low awareness 
 
99  The discrepancy items were subjected to factor analysis using principal components extrac-
tion with oblique rotation. The formation of the discrepancy factors is described in Section 
6.3.3. 
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group (n = 96), and all subjects with vales > 7 were put in the high awareness group 
(n = 71). The first model on latent interaction effects described in Section 7.3.3 was 
tested in a group comparison for the low awareness and high awareness group. The 
group comparison model was estimated by constraining the paths, the factor load-
ings, and the covariances to be equal for the two groups. This constrained model 
resulted in a model whit satisfactory fit with CFI = .89, RMSEA =.05 (90% CI = 
.04, .06), Chi-Square = 1114.05, df = 886. In order to test whether the impact of the 
interaction terms is stronger for the participants in the high awareness group than for 
participants in the low awareness group, it was tested whether this fit could be im-
proved significantly by releasing equality constraints on the paths from the latent 
interaction between consensus perception and consensus preference on political 
support and constraints from the latent interaction between efficiency perception and 
efficiency preference on political support. In each case, when one of the two con-
straints was released, there was no statistically significant reduction in Chi-Square 
(Chi-Square difference =.13, df = 1, p = .72 with β = -0.21, p = .06, for political 
aware and β = -0.08, p = .54 for unaware for the interaction between consensus 
perception and consensus preference; Chi-Square-difference = 1.04, df = 1, p = .31 
with β = 0.01, p = .54, for political aware and β = -0.14, p = .28 for unaware for the 
interaction between efficiency perception and efficiency preference). This indicates 
that the assumption that the relationship between perceptions and preferences affects 
political support particularly for individuals in the high political awareness group 
compared to individuals in the low awareness group does not hold. Thus, H7 is not 
supported. 
7.3.5. The Joint Impact of Media Use and Situational Exposure 
Because the experimental study described in Chapter 6 is embedded in a series of 
surveys, there is the opportunity to investigate the joint impact of long-term effects 
of media use and exposure to stimulus articles on process perceptions and political 
support. Therefore, subjects’ article impressions (inefficiency impression and con-
flict impression) were added to the model presented in Figure 7.5. Newspaper use 
and television use were specified as predictors of consensus perception, efficiency 
perception and political support. In line with findings in Chapter 6, consensus per-
ception and efficiency perception were specified as predictors of article conflict 
impression, article inefficiency impression, and political support. Exposure to the 
stimulus articles (0 = exposure to inefficiency-focused articles, 1 = exposure to con-
flict-focused articles) was specified as a predictor of the articles’ conflict impression 
and the articles’ inefficiency impression. The article impression variables, in turn, 
were specified as predictors of political support. The variables television use and 
newspaper use were allowed to correlate (see Figure 7.6). In line with the assump-
tions, both article conflict impression (β = -0.24, p < .05) and article inefficiency 
impression (β = -0.66, p < .05) were affected by subjects’ general perception of 
































Note. All the solid line paths are statistically significant at .05 or above. Dashed lines indicate insignificant paths.
Chi-Square (df=671, N  346)  =1033.90, Comparative fit index is .90, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 


















be, the more the respondents agreed with the statement that the articles raise the 
impression that political processes are conflict-oriented. The less efficient political 
processes are perceived to be, the more the respondents agreed with the statement 
that the articles raise the impression political processes are inefficient. The conflict 
impressions that subjects gained from the experimental news articles was moder-
ately related to political support (β = -0.15, p < .05), and there was no significant 
effect for the inefficiency impression on political support. In line with previously 
reported findings, the model shows significant effects of gender (β = 0.16, p < .05), 
education (β = 0.21, p < .05) and age (β = -0.17, p < .05) on the consensus percep-
tion of political processes and a significant effect of age (β = -0.17, p < .05) on the 
efficiency perception of political processes. There is also a significant effect of gen-
der (β = -0.13, p < .05) on political support. Model fit was satisfactory, with CFI = 
.93, RMSEA =.05 (90% CI = .04, .05), Chi-Square = 518.87, df = 277. 
 





In general, then, the findings indicate that the general perception of political  
processes influences the impression that people gain from the news articles. An 
alternative version of this model with paths from conflict impression on conflict 
perception and paths from inefficiency impression on efficiency perception, how-
ever, results in a model with equivalent fit (see also Section 6.3.2). This suggests 
that the relationship between article impressions and process preferences might be 
reciprocal. The inclusion of article impressions into the model did not enhance the 
amount of explained variance of political support (r
2 
= .38 for the model without 
impression factors, r
2 
= .39 for the model with impression factors), however. Thus, 
the results suggest that there is no independent effect of article impressions on po-
litical support above and beyond the impact of process perceptions. 
7.4. Summary and Discussion 
This section presented results from analyses of the relationship between routine 
media use and political support. The analyses focused on the mechanisms by which 
media information affects citizens’ political support. In line with the assumption that 
media use influences political support indirectly by shaping the perception of politi-
cal decision-making processes, results showed that television use has a significant 
effect on political support via its impact on the efficiency perception of political 
processes. More precisely, the findings indicate that high levels of television use are 
associated with the perception of political processes as inefficient. The more a per-
son perceives political processes as inefficient, the lower are this person’s levels of 
political support. The effect of television use on the perception of political processes 
as conflict-oriented was insignificant, however. As expected, there was no signifi-
cant impact of newspaper use on the perception of political processes as consensus-
oriented and no significant impact of newspaper use on the perception of political 
processes as inefficient. Hence there was also no indirect effect of newspaper use on 
political support. Television’s impact on political attitudes may be stronger than the 
impact of newspapers, because television information is subject to dual information 
coding (audio information and visual information). In line with this assumption, 
other studies provide evidence for the assumption that dual-coding enhances media 
effects (Druckman, 2003; Van der Model & Van der Voort, 2000). 
Against the background of findings from the content analysis, the lack of effects 
of television use on consensus perception is rather surprising. Results from the con-
tent analysis showed that television newscasts frequently contained references to 
political accusations and discord, particularly when presenting decision-making 
processes within the parliament. So why did television’s strong focus on political 
accusations not affect the respondents’ consensus perceptions? One explanation is 
suggested by findings reported earlier (Section 6.4.2), which show that exposure to 
the conflict-oriented stimulus articles may not only raise the impression that political 
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processes are conflict-oriented but might also foster the impression that political 
processes are inefficient.
100
 These findings warrant the assumption that the conflict-
oriented news coverage in television might have contributed to the audience’s per-
ception that political processes are inefficient. Another possible explanation refers to 
the role of the Swiss political culture. Literature suggests that strong beliefs and 
ideologies are less susceptible to media effects: Television is the most influential “in 
cultivating assumptions about which there is little opportunity to learn first-hand and 
which are not strongly anchored in established beliefs and ideologies” (Gerbner & 
Gross, 1976, p. 191). In a consensus democracy like Switzerland, where consensus-
orientation of is of great value to the citizens (Linder & Steffen, 2006), the percep-
tion of political processes in terms of the role of consensus and compromises may 
not be prone to media effects, then. This assumption is supported by results of this 
study which indicate that aspects of political socialization are important predictors 
of both individuals’ perception of political processes in terms of consensus-
orientation and their preferences regarding the consensus-orientation of political 
processes. More precisely, consensus preferences and consensus perceptions were 
found to be significantly affected by socio-demographic characteristics (gender, 
education, and age) as well as a person’s political experiences and political ideology. 
The impact of television use on political support via process perceptions was 
tested separately for distinct objects of support, namely support for the government, 
support for the parliament, support for politicians and support for democracy. The 
explained variance was strongest for the model estimating support for politicians 
and least strong for the model estimating support for the government. This finding is 
in line with research showing that changes in political support are most dramatic for 
political authorities, a phenomenon called “skepticisms of elites” (Dalton, 1999, p. 
74). Two differences are noteworthy: Whereas the perception of political processes 
in terms of their efficiency predicted support for the government, support for politi-
cians and support for democracy were affected rather by the perception of the con-
sensus-orientation of political processes. Consensus-orientation as a central value in 
consensus democracies, hence, is linked with support for democracy. This finding is 
in line with the studies emphasizing the relationship between cultural values and 
system legitimacy (Fuchs, 1999b, 2002). 
Additional models were tested in order to probe whether process preferences me-
diate the impact of media use on political support. Both newspaper use and televi-
sion use were found to affect respondents’ preferences as regards the efficiency of 
political decision-making processes. Whereas intensive newspaper use was associ-
ated with lower preferences regarding the efficiency of political processes, intensive 
television use was related to strong preferences regarding the efficiency of political 
processes. There was an indirect effect of television use on political support via 
effects on preferences for efficient decision-making procedures. In general, then, 
television use appears to shape both the perceptions of political processes in terms of 
 
100  Although these effects are not significant, the differences between the treatment groups are in 
the direction described here. 
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their efficiency and participants’ preferences regarding the efficiency of political 
procedures. Hence a further model tested the media’s impact on the discrepancies 
between process preferences and perceptions. Both newspaper use and television 
were found to affect respondents’ preferences-perceptions discrepancies as regards 
the effi-ciency of political decision-making processes. Whereas intensive newspaper 
use was associated with smaller discrepancies between preferences and perceptions 
regarding the efficiency of political processes, intensive television use was related to 
larger discrepancies between preferences and perceptions regarding the efficiency of 
political processes. There was an indirect effect of television use on political support 
in the sense that television use increased the discrepancy between efficiency prefer-
ences and perceptions and, thus, decreased political support in turn. There was also 
an indirect effect of newspaper use on political support in the sense that newspaper 
use decreased the discrepancy between efficiency preferences and perceptions and, 
thus, increased political support in turn.  
Moreover, the results presented in this chapter suggest that the relationship be-
tween preferences and perceptions shapes political support. More precisely, findings 
indicated that the more important consensus-orientated political processes are for an 
individual, the stronger a negative perception of political processes in terms of their 
consensus-orientation contributes to a decrease of political support. Likewise, the 
more important efficient political processes are for an individual, the stronger a 
negative perception of political processes in terms of their efficiency contributes to a 
decrease of political support. With regard to the role of the media, the results 
showed that the impact of television use on political support via its effect on the 
perception of political processes in terms of their efficiency is not the same for all 
subjects. Findings indicated a strong indirect effect of television use on support via 
efficiency perceptions particularly for those subjects with high efficiency prefer-
ences. The results warrant the assumption that subjects with high preferences regard-
ing the efficiency of political decision-making processes are particularly susceptible 
to media effects, because television shapes the perception that political processes are 
inefficient. This finding is in line with an assumption by Volgy & Schwarz (1980, p. 
158):  
“Fear of turning off audiences with complex stories and situations has led regularly scheduled 
televised news programs to offer presentations that are reduced to the lowest common de-
nominator, infused with simplistic symbols and with essentially superficial evaluations of 
complex problems. It is possible that this way of presenting the world leads to a state where 
persons depending primarily on television news become more intolerant of problems or con-
flicts that require complex, uneasy, and long-term solutions.”  
Test of differences between groups of people with high vs. low levels of political 
awareness did not indicate significant differences. This finding might suggest that a 
chronically accessible preferences-perceptions relationship does not increase the 
impact of the preferences-perceptions relationship on political support for subjects 
that are high in the magnitude of discrepancies between process preferences and 
process perceptions. However, methodological reasons might account for this null 
finding. The variance of the political awareness variable is particularly low  
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(M=7.03, SD= 0.95). Furthermore, political awareness might not have been a good 
indicator for the individuals’ chronic accessibility of the relationship between  
process preferences and perceptions. Political awareness might indicate the indi-
viduals’ awareness of the relationship between process preferences and perceptions 
rather than the chronic accessibility of the relationship. Considering the political 
awareness variable as an indicator for the people’s awareness of the relationship 
between process preferences and perceptions, the findings reported here are in line 
with the assumption that awareness is not a precondition for the relationship be-
tween preferences and perceptions to shape evaluative attitudes (Higgins, 1987). 
Future studies based on samples with individuals that are particularly low in their 
political awareness and individuals particularly high in their political awareness 
would be needed to shed more light on the role of political awareness. In addition, 
studies that test alternative indicators of chronic accessibility would be needed. The 
general intensity of media use might be an appropriate indicator. In general, the 
examination of the model’s conditionality to levels of political awareness by means 
of group comparisons appeared to be an applicable procedure. However, in order to 
be able to make use of group comparisons, future studies should ensure that the 
group variables show the necessary variance. In addition, a sufficient number of 
subjects in each group is required. 
Further analysis showed that there is no independent effect of situational exposure 




Mass media’s impact on political support has been the subject of extensive research 
in recent years. The present study aimed to contribute to this research by asking the 
following research question: How and under which conditions do mass media’s 
presentations of political decision-making processes affect citizens’ political sup-
port? The objective of this study was to expand on previous research in three re-
spects. First, this work investigated the impact of mass media’s presentations of 
political decision-making processes on citizens’ political support, because little is 
known about the impact of media presentations of routine political processes 
(Arnold, 2004; Morris & Clawson, 2007). Previous research has concentrated on the 
effects of media information in the context of election campaigns, “but there have 
been no attempts to tie media coverage of legislative process to citizen approval” 
(Morris & Clawson, 2007, p. 3). The second objective of the present study was to 
probe the mechanisms by which media information about political processes affects 
citizens’ political support, since previous studies focused on outcomes and tended to 
neglect the investigation of effect mechanisms. Moreover, the empirical findings on 
mass media’s impact on political malaise are ambiguous. Hence research is needed 
that probes the precise conditions under which the mass media may contribute to a 
decline of political support. Studies in political science indicate that the relationship 
between the perception of political realities and related preferences is a relevant 
predictor of political support. Research on media effects has so far neglected to 
investigate whether media’s impact on political support is contingent upon indivi-
dual preferences.101 Thus, the third objective of this study is the analysis of the me-
dia’s impact on political support as a function of individual preferences as regards 
political processes. Because research lacks a standardized measurement of process 
preferences and perceptions, a further aim of this study was the development and 
validation of standardized scales to measure both.  
In order to provide answers to the research question, a preferences-perceptions 
model of media effects on political support was developed. This model describes 
both the mechanisms by which media information on political decision-making 
processes affects political support and the conditions under which the media’s im-
pact is particularly likely. It takes central account of the relationship between media 
information, individual perceptions of political processes, individual preferences 
regarding political processes, and political support. As regards the effect mecha-
nisms, the model draws on cultivation theory (W. P. Eveland, Jr., 2002) and argues 
that the way media cover political decision-making processes shapes the perception 
 
101  Previous research addressed media effects as a function of preferences in the sense of ideo-
logical orientations, for instance (e.g. Zaller, 1992). This study, however, looks at the role of 
individual preferences in the sense of importance attached to certain process aspects. 
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of political processes by the recipients. The perception of political processes, in turn, 
is assumed to predict levels of political support. With respect to the conditions that 
make those effects particularly likely, the model builds on discrepancy theory 
(Higgins, 1987; Kimball & Patterson, 1997; S. C. Patterson, et al., 1969). Discrep-
ancy theory assumes that “evaluations of individual, social or political objects are 
partly grounded in disparities between expectations and perceptions” (Kimball & 
Patterson, 1997, p. 703). Thus, the model proposes that the impact of the perception 
of specific process aspects on political support is particularly strong if a person 
holds strong preferences towards these aspects of political processes. Based on the 
distinction between consensus democracy and majoritarian democracy, this study 
distinguishes between preferences with respect to the efficiency of political  
processes and preferences concerning the role of compromise-seeking endeavors. In 
addition, the model assumes that media information might shape the temporary 
accessibility of the preferences-perceptions relationship through priming. As a re-
sult, the impact of the relationship on political support is assumed to be stronger. 
Likewise, chronic accessibility may foster the impact of the preferences-perceptions 
relationship on political support. 
In order to test the theoretical assumptions and to provide answers to the research 
question, this study investigated the impact of both routine use of political informa-
tion in the mass media and exposure to specific news articles on political support. A 
series of standardized online surveys with 523 citizens from the German-speaking 
part of Switzerland was therefore conducted. The surveys embedded an experimen-
tal study. In the experimental setting, the participants were randomly assigned to two 
treatment groups and a control group. One treatment group received news articles 
that contained critical information about the consensus-orientation of political proc-
esses. The other treatment group received news articles that included critical infor-
mation about the efficiency of political processes. In addition, data from a compre-
hensive content analysis of media presentations of political decision-making  
processes in Switzerland provided the background for the interpretations of findings.  
Regarding the mechanisms by which media information affects political support, 
the results indicate, overall, that media may decrease political support by shaping the 
perception of certain aspects of political processes. Findings from the content analy-
ses that were presented in this study suggested that television news referred to po-
litical discord and power struggles as well as the inefficiency of political decision-
making processes, the latter especially when reporting on political processes within 
the parliament. These media coverage patterns appeared to be not without conse-
quences for citizens’ political support. The survey results indicated that television 
use enhanced the perception of political processes as inefficient. This finding cor-
responds to studies which show that media information shapes recipients’ perception 
of political institutions (Pfau, Moy, & Szabo, 2001). The perception of political 
processes as inefficient, in turn, led to a decrease in political support. Hence televi-
sion use was found to decrease political support indirectly via the perception of 
political processes as inefficient. The use of television for political information was 
not directly related to the respondents’ levels of political support. This result is in  
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line with previous research, which shows that there is no direct association between 
television use for political information and support for the government or parliament 
(Bennett, et al., 1999; Holtz-Bacha, 1990; Moy, et al., 1999; O'Keefe, 1980). 
The results indicate that the media particularly affect the perception of those as-
pects of political processes which are not closely related to central values and beliefs 
of a citizen’s political culture. Although television newscasts were found to focus on 
political discord, power struggles, and accusations, this study’s results indicated that 
there is no significant relationship between television use and the perception of po-
litical processes as consensus-oriented. Building on the assumption expressed in the 
literature, that attitudes which are rooted in beliefs and ideologies are less prone to 
media effects (Gerbner & Gross, 1976, p. 191), the lack of significant media effects 
on the perception of political processes in terms of consensus-orientation appears to 
be reasonable. Considering the context of political culture in Switzerland, the fol-
lowing explanation might account for the findings: The political culture in Switzer-
land is characterized by values of consensus and compromises (Linder & Steffen, 
2006). This warrants the assumption that the perception of political processes in 
terms of consensus-orientation is deeply rooted in citizens’ beliefs and is based on 
information from a variety of sources other than news media. Thus, the mass  
media’s impact on perceptions of aspects of political processes that are related to 
these central values might be limited. Further comparative studies would be needed 
in order to investigate whether in competitive democracies like the U.S. – where 
endeavours for compromises and consensus are not important for the citizens 
(Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002) – television use is significantly related to consen-
sus perceptions.  
Concerning the impact of exposure to specific newspaper articles, this study 
found that exposure to distinct media articles did not contribute to direct changes in 
the perception of political processes. Both exposure to newspaper articles that con-
tained critical information about the consensus-orientation of political processes and 
exposure to newspaper articles that contained critical information about the effi-
ciency of political processes did not change the perception of political processes by 
the recipients. Thus, it seems warranted to suggest that mass media’s impact on 
reality perceptions may be subject to long-term changes rather than short-term 
changes. This assumption is in line with cultivation research that conceptualizes 
attitude changes as long-term processes (W. P. Eveland, Jr., 2002).  
With regard to the conditions under which the impact of media’s presentations of 
political processes on political support is particularly likely, the findings support the 
assumption that individual preferences concerning political processes matter. The 
media’s impact on political support via the perception of political processes ap-
peared to be particularly strong for those citizens for whom according aspects of 
political processes are very important. More precisely, this study found that televi-
sion use had an indirect impact on political support via the perception of political 
processes as inefficient, particularly for those respondents for whom efficient deci-
sion-making procedures are important. In contrast, for those respondents for whom 
efficient decision-making procedures are unimportant, the impact of television use  
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on political support via the perception of political processes as inefficient was not 
significant. This finding is consistent with other research using the discrepancy con-
cept (Moretti & Higgins, 1990). Moreover, the results are in line with findings from 
previous studies that showed that the impact of satisfaction with results of govern-
ment policy on trust in the government is stronger for people who perceive that this 
policy issue is an important issue (Kleinnijenhuis & van Hoof, 2009). Hence the 
assumption that political preferences in the sense of importance rankings are a sig-
nificant moderator of media effects appears to be applicable to media effects re-
search in general. For instance, the impact of strategy frames on political cynicism 
might be contingent upon individual preferences as regards the role of motives and 
strategies of political actors.  
Regarding role of accessibility of the preferences-perceptions relationship, the 
preferences-perceptions model of media effects assumes that situational exposure to 
information may increase the temporary accessibility of already available discrepan-
cies between process preferences and perceptions through priming. The findings 
presented in this study did not support this assumption, however. Because methodo-
logical reasons might be responsible for this null finding, future research is needed 
with respect to priming effects on the temporary accessibility of preferences-
perceptions relationships. Moreover, the model assumes that a chronically accessible 
preferences-perceptions relationship does increase the impact of the preferences-
perceptions relationship on political support. Because the findings reported here are 
less compelling, further studies that test alternative indicators of chronic acces-
sibility are needed in order to gain more evidence as regards the moderating role of 
chronic accessibility.  
In general, the empirical evidence presented here support the preferences-
perceptions model of media effects in some parts. With regards to other parts, how-
ever, further research is needed. The assumption that media information shape citi-
zens’ perceptions of political processes in the long-term receives empirical support. 
Moreover, process perceptions were found to impact attitudes of political support 
(Proposition 1). In addition, the impact of process perceptions on support was found 
to vary as a function of process preferences (Proposition 2). Whereas the assumption 
that the process-preferences relationship predicts political support receives support, 
further research is needed with respect to the moderating role of the accessibility of 
the preferences-perceptions relationship (Proposition 3). Furthermore, future studies 
shall investigate in more detail the media’s impact on process preferences in order to 
test the stability of such political preferences and to specify the conditions under 
which media information might alter preferences. Looking at the diagram of the 
model in Figure 3.1, it appears that the middle part of the model is backed up by 
empirical evidence presented in this study. Future research, hence, could focus on 
the investigation of assumptions that are illustrated in the left part of the model.  
This study provides several methodological contributions. The scales measuring 
process perceptions and process preferences were found to encompass three dimen-
sions each, namely consensus-orientation, competition, and efficiency. The devel-
oped scales are a first step towards a standardized measurement of process prefer- 
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ences and perceptions. Further research, however, shall investigate the role of addi-
tional process dimensions, such as transparency, responsiveness or inclusiveness. 
The use of confirmatory factor analysis with structural equation modeling appeared 
to be valuable for the development and validation of the scales measuring the per-
ception of political processes and according preferences. In further analyses, the 
cultural equivalence of the process preference scale was confirmed. In addition, the 
study provided empirical evidence which support the assumption that the scale is 
invariant as regards different objects of assessment. The invariance as regards the 
object of evaluation was investigated with a multi-method-multi-treat approach. This 
appeared to be an applicable procedure which could be used in future studies that are 
interested in the issue of scale invariance in terms of different objects of evaluation.  
Furthermore, the use of structural equation modeling appeared to be useful to in-
vestigate media effects on complex political attitudes. In order to account for the 
factorial structure of attitudes such as political support (Wolling, 1999, pp. 33-36), 
these variables can be modeled as latent factors that are reflected by several indica-
tors that measure different dimensions of a concept. Moreover, structural equation 
modeling facilitates the investigation of mediation (Holbert & Stephenson, 2002, 
2003). Investigating indirect effects with mediation analysis is considered to be 
important for the further development of theories (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 
Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Preacher, et al., 2007). Structural equation modeling might 
also contribute to future studies that apply a cross-cultural comparative research 
design in ascertaining measurement equivalence as a pre-condition for comparisons 
of effects over samples from different cultures. This study applied latent interactions 
to test moderating assumptions in structural equation models. Based on the experi-
ences, I may suggest using latent interactions in future studies as an applicable alter-
native to group comparisons in cases when moderator variables are measured con-
tinuously.  
Several limitations of this study deserve special consideration. First, this study’s 
reliance on media use measures as surrogate for media content data limits the valid-
ity of its findings. Studies that are based on media use measures cannot provide 
answers to the question which aspects of media coverage contribute to the explana-
tion of political attitudes. In order to be able to trace back the media’s impact on 
citizens’ process perceptions to precise aspects of how political processes were pre-
sented in the news coverage, a study that is based on a data set which links content 
measures and attitude measures would be needed. Such a data set should match 
measures of presentations of political decision-making processes in those media 
outlets that an individual was exposed to with measurements of this individual’s 
political attitudes. Only such a design can provide evidence for the assumption that 
media presentations of political processes account for the variance in process per-
ceptions and rule out the possibility that other aspects, such as a general negativity 
in media content, are responsible for the effects. A content analysis of the news 
coverage that was used by the survey participants was beyond the scope of this 
study, however.  
Second, the investigation of media effects in this exploratory study is based on a  
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non- representative sample of highly educated and politically interested citizens. 
Although using specific samples is considered to be appropriate for exploratory 
research, the generalizability of the findings reported here is limited. Thus, it is not 
possible to determine from these data whether the effects of television use on the 
perceptions of political processes and political support also hold for people with low 
levels of political interest and/or lower levels of formal education. Studies that test 
the preferences-perceptions model of media effects based on a representative sample 
would be needed to enhance the generalizability of the findings presented here. 
Moreover, the findings of this study are restricted to Switzerland as a typical con-
sensus democracy. Hence it remains an open question whether the findings pre-
sented here would also hold with regard to the relationship between media informa-
tion and political attitudes in other cultural settings, such as competitive democra-
cies. Future research that investigates the media’s impact on political attitudes as a 
function of political preferences in different political cultures could contribute to the 
understanding of the moderating role of process preferences. 
Third, the findings on the impact of television use on the perception of political 
processes and political support are based on cross-sectional survey data. Thus, the 
results of this study cannot be taken as evidence for the assumed causality of effects. 
Although this study’s consideration of effect mechanisms may contribute to the 
investigating of causality, it is not a test in a strict sense. The results of this study 
indicate that there is an indirect effect of television use on political support via the 
perception of political processes as being inefficient. It seems more plausible to 
argue that television use shapes the perception of political processes than to assume 
that subjects with certain process perceptions use television for their political infor-
mation more often than individuals which do not share these process perceptions. 
However, future research based on experimental designs or panel surveys is needed 
in order to put the assumed causal mechanisms to a strict test. 
Despite its preliminary character, the findings do suggest that media may affect 
citizens’ political support by shaping the perception of certain aspects of political 
realities. The less these perceptions are related to established ideologies or beliefs, 
the stronger might the relationship between mass media and political perceptions be. 
Hence the findings of this study do suggest that it may be useful to include social 
reality perceptions as a mediating variable in the prediction of political attitudes 
from media use measures. Future research interested in explaining the mechanisms 
by which media effects occur could, hence, consider reality perceptions. The prefer-
ences-perceptions model of media effects, for instance, might be used to explain 
dynamic changes in opinion levels as a response to shifts in perceived political reali-
ties due to changes in the media information that a person is exposed to. 
However exploratory, this study may offer some insight into the role of prefer-
ences as a moderator of media effects. The study thus contributes to the specification 
of conditions under which media coverage might negatively influence citizens’ po-
litical support by showing that long-term effects of routine television use on political 
support in some circumstances are contingent upon political preferences. Similar 
arguments were already made in other contexts. For instance, Kleinnijenhuis & van  
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Hoof (2009) argue that ambiguous media information on policy plans of the gov-
ernment decrease recipients’ support because the news content is not in line with 
citizens’ preferences of decisive governmental plans. Mutz & Reeves (2005, p. 3) 
found that incivility in political debates significantly decreased trust in politicians 
and argued that what it is about those conflicts in the media that makes people angry 
is that political actors then “violate the norms for everyday, face-to-face discourse.” 
These studies do not provide empirical evidence for their assumptions that recipi-
ents’ preferences matter, however. The present study, then, presents the first empiri-
cal evidence for the role of individual preferences – in the sense of importance rank-
ings – in moderating the effects of media information on political attitudes. 
However, this study’s findings on the role of preferences are restricted to process 
preferences. It is not possible to conclude from this study that preferences with re-
spect to policy issues or characteristics of political actors are an important moderator 
of media effects. Despite its preliminary character, the research reported here would 
seem to indicate that the preferences concept is fruitful and could be incorporated 
into future research, not only with respect to process preferences, but also with re-
spect to preferences regarding other aspects of political life. The preferences-
perceptions model of media effects specifies in greater detail than previous research 
how media information interacts with existing political preferences in forming indi-
vidual attitudes of political support. In that sense, the model might be used in future 
studies to explain the relationship between perceptions of political realities and po-
litical support as a function of related preferences of the citizens. Based on the pro-
posed model, then, the general statement that negative or critical media coverage 
tends to contribute to a decline in political support might be further differentiated. 
The model proposes that negative media content does not, per se, decrease political 
support. Rather, the model assumes that media information threatens political sup-
port if it opposes citizens’ preferences. Moreover, the model allows defining cir-
cumstances under which media information might contribute to an increase in politi-
cal support: In situations when media information is in line with the audience’s 
individual preferences, media information might enhance political support.  
In general, then, the research reported here would seem to indicate that the way 
mass media presents political decision-making processes is not without conse-
quences for the political support that the audience holds for political actors, institu-
tions, and democracy. The information in the mass media is shaped by journalists’ 
selection and interpretation processes (Altheide & Snow, 1979; Marcinkowski, 
2000; Maurer, 2003a, 2003b; Sarcinelli, 1998). As results from the content analysis 
of media presentations of political decision-making processes showed, the news 
coverage focuses on political discord and power struggles and refers to the inef-
ficiency of political decision-making procedures. This distinct presentation of politi-
cal processes by the mass media may shape the perception of political realities and 
challenge citizens’ political support.  
Although the media’s presentations of political processes are not without conse-
quences for political support, the findings indicate that media information does not 
unfold its effects on all citizens in a similar wary. The findings presented here rather  
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suggest that mass media’s impact on political support is contingent upon citizens’ 
individual preferences. More precisely, media content was found to challenge citi-
zens’ political support if it contradicts their individual preferences. The findings 
shed new light on the democratic performance of citizens in suggesting that they are 
less vulnerable to media effects than, for instance, assumed by videomalaise theory 
(Robinson, 1976). To get back to the definition of political distrust by Barber (1983) 
that was quoted at the outset, this study suggests that political distrust is a critique of 
political processes as perceived based on media information in the light of individual 
preferences. It seems warranted to suggest that citizens’ political support is not af-
fected by media information per se but, rather, that it is shaped by rational reasoning 
of the citizens as to whether aspects that are important to them apply to political 
reality. The media information may contribute to this reasoning, but individual pref-
erences of the citizens might matter also. 
Based on the preferences-perceptions model of media effects, then, two different 
strategies of how the media could in fact contribute to citizens’ political approval 
can be discussed. This study agrees with Hibbing & Theiss-Morse (2002, p. 161ff.), 
who argued that in order to enhance citizens’ political support, people should not 
necessarily be given the processes they want. One possible measure to enhance 
political support, then, would be to suit citizens’ process preferences to political 
processes (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002, p. 245). Clearly, agents of socialization 
such as family or schools would be asked to teach people to tolerate conflict, for 
instance. But mass media might also have a role to play. This study’s findings indi-
cated that the media may not only shape the perception of political processes, but 
also citizens’ process preferences. More precisely, news coverage in television was 
found to strengthen the audience’s preferences as regards the efficiency of decision-
making processes. The preferences as regards efficiency were found to be associated 
with a decrease in political support. Instead, journalists could contribute to a con-
solidation of political support by being less impatient and by accepting that political 
decision-making processes may take their time. The other strategy could be to suit 
political processes to citizens’ process preferences (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002, 
p. 245). In the light of this study’s findings, this would mean that the media’s infor-
mation could be suited to citizens’ process preferences, because the media are an 
important source of information about political processes. Just as the media might 
contribute to the political malaise if they focus on those aspects of political proc-
esses which are particularly unfavorable in the eye of the citizens, media could also 
contribute to an increase in political approval by strengthening those aspects of po-
litical processes that are considered favorable by the majority of citizens. Such as-
pects are shaped partly by the political culture of a nation. Hence it seems to be 
important that journalists consider dominant political values when informing about 
political processes. Routines of news production that are closely linked to the politi-
cal culture of a nation might foster a style of news reporting that facilitates the citi-
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10.2. Overview of Items Used in the Study 
Process preferences: In the following question we would like to know more about 
your political preferences. Citizens hold different preferences regarding how politi-
cal decisions should be made in democratic systems. Please answer according to the 
following scale, how import 
ant you consider the following preferences. The scale ranges from 1 (not important 
at all) to 7 (very important). How important is it for you, that… 
… political parties sometimes concede a point to the other side? [concede] 
… politicians give consideration to diverging interests when searching for solutions?     
     [div interests] 
… political decisions are based on compromises? [compromise] 
… political problems are solved as fast as possible? [fast] 
… political decision-making processes are simple and short? [simple process] 
… politicians do avoid delays when making political decisions? [avoid delays] 
… politicians are decisive and force their points? [force points] 
… one political side is able to put their plans through? [put plans through] 
… certain politicians could give hierarchical orders, if a decision has to be taken?   
     [hierarchical orders] 
… politicians tread each other with respect. [respect] 
… politicians treat each other fairly. [fair] 
… there are no losers of political decisions. [no losers] 
… political actors give clear orders as to how to proceed further after a decision has  
     been taken. [clear orders] 
… political decisions are not hampered by quarrels between political parties.  
     [no quarrels] 
… political decisions are not hampered by power struggles. [no power struggles] 
… political opponents do not insist on their opinions. [no persistence] 
 
(Given in parentheses are denotations of variables in figures and tables.) 
 
Process perceptions:  
Now we would like to know how, in your opinion, political decisions are actually 
made in Switzerland. Please answer according to the following scale and indicate to 
what extent the following statements on political decision-making processes in 
Switzerland, in your opinion, apply or not apply. The scale ranges from 1 (does not 
apply at all) to 7 (fully applies).  
Political parties sometimes concede a point to the other side. [concede] 
Politicians give consideration to diverging interests when searching for solutions.  
[div interests] 
In Switzerland political decisions are based on compromises. [compromise] 
In Switzerland political problems are solved as fast as possible. [fast] 
Political decision-making processes in Switzerland are time-consuming.* [simple 
process] 
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Swiss politicians postpone decisions over and over again.* [avoid delays] 
Swiss politicians are decisive and force their points. [force points] 
In political discussions in Switzerland one political side mostly put their plans 
through. [put plans through] 
In Switzerland, certain politicians can give hierarchical orders if a decision has to be 
taken. [hierarchical orders] 
Swiss politicians tread each other with respect. [respect] 
Swiss politicians treat each other fairly. [fair] 
In Swiss decision-making processes, there are no losers of political decisions. [no 
losers] 
Political problems in Switzerland are solved as efficient as possible. [efficient proc-
esses] 
Swiss political actors give clear orders as to how to proceed further after a decision 
has been taken. [clear orders] 
In Switzerland, political decisions are not hampered by quarrels between political 
parties. [no quarrels] 
In Switzerland, political decisions are not hampered by power struggles. [no power 
struggles] 
In Switzerland, political opponents do not insist on their opinions. [no persistence] 
 
(* = reversed scale, given in parentheses are denotations of variables in figures and 
tables.) 
 
Political Support: In the following we would like to ask or you opinion on Swiss 
politics. Please tell me on a score of 1-10 how much you  personally trust each 
of the following institutions.  1 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 
means you have complete trust.   
… government,  
… parliament (National Council and Council of States) 
How good or bad do you consider the present general performance of the govern-
ment? Please answer according to the following scale, 1 indicates very bad, 10 indi-
cates very good. 
How good or bad do you consider the present general performance of the parlia-
ment? 
Please answer according to the following scale, 1 indicates very bad, 10 indicates 
very good. 
How good or bad do you consider the present general performance of politicians in 
Switzerland altogether? 
Please answer according to the following scale, 1 indicates very bad, 10 indicates 
very good. 
How satisfied are you with the way politicians in Switzerland altogether solve the 
nation’s problems? Please answer according to the following scale, 1 indicates not 
satisfied at all, 10 indicates very satisfied.  
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How much do you trust politicians in Switzerland altogether to act as they really 
should? Please answer according to the following scale, 1 indicates no trust at all, 10 
indicates very much trust. 
On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Switzerland? 
Please answer according to the following scale, 1 indicates not at all satisfied, 10 
indicates very satisfied.  
To what extent does democracy as it exists in Switzerland correspond to your per-
sonal version of an ideal democracy? Please answer according to the following 
scale, 1 indicates no correspondence to personal vision at all, 10 indicates full corre-
spondence to personal vision. 
 
Article impression: To begin with, we would like to ask you some questions on the 
news articles that we have sent to you last week.  What impression did these articles 
raise with respect to the way political decisions are made?  
Have the articles, all in all, raised the impression that political decision-making 
processes are shaped by conflicts and power struggles? Would you say this applies, 
rather applies, does rather not apply, or does not apply? 
And have the articles, all in all, raised the impression that political decisions are 
made uncompromisingly? Would you say this applies, rather applies, does rather not 
apply, or does not apply? 
And have the articles, all in all, raised the impression that political decision-making 
processes are time-consuming? Would you say this applies, rather applies, does 
rather not apply, or does not apply? 
And have the articles, all in all, raised the impression that political decisions are 
postponed over and over again? Would you say this applies, rather applies, does 
rather not apply, or does not apply? 
 
Television & newspaper use: On an average weekday, how much of your time is 
generally spent using news or programmes about politics and current affairs in the 
radio, in television, in the newspaper or in the internet?  (None; Less than ¼ hour; ¼ 
to ½ hour, more than ½ hour, up to 1 hour; more than 1 hour; Don’t know) 
Local newspaper, National newspaper, Tabloid, Free newspaper, Television, Radio, 
Internet 
 
Political experiences: There are different possibilities to be politically active. Some 
of them are mentioned below. Please indicate for each of those activities whether it 
applies or does not apply to you.  
… engaging actively in party work. 
… hold a political mandate. 
Do you have direct experiences with political everyday business due to your profes-
sional employment or other occupations? (Yes, regularly; yes, occasionally; no) 
Do you gain insight into political everyday business through friends or acquaintan-
ces and their occupations? (Yes, regularly; yes, occasionally; no) 
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Political awareness: How interested would you say you are in politics? (very inter-
ested, somewhat interested, not much interested, or not at all interested, don’t know) 
When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters 
frequently, 
occasionally, rarely, or never? (frequently, occasionally, rarely, never, don’t know) 
 
Political ideology: In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would 
you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 11 where 1 means the left and 11 means the 
right?  
(European Social Survey). 
 
Age was measured with an open question and recoded into categories of 18 thru 32; 
33 thru 43; 44 thru 54; 55 thru 96 (percentiles). Education was measured on a 6-






























10.3. Measurement Models of Latent Factors Used in the Analyses 
Measurement Model for Political Support (Hierarchical Factor Models that Encom-


































Note. All the solid line paths are statistically significant at .05 or above. 
Chi-Square (df=23, N 339)  = 109.67, Comparative fit index is .94, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 


































Note. All the solid line paths are statistically significant at .05 or above. 
Chi-Square (df=8, N  351)  = 18.33, Comparative fit index is .98, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is 
.06 with a 90% confidence interval .02 - .10.
 



















Note. All the solid line paths are statistically significant at .05 or above. 
Chi-Square (df=8, N  343)  = 20.04, Comparative fit index is .96, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is 























Note. All the solid line paths are statistically significant at .05 or above. 
Chi-Square (df=8, N  350)  = 11.04, Comparative fit index is .99, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is 
.03 with a 90% confidence interval .00 - .08.
 
Measurement of Article Impression (Uncorrelated Factors Model) 
Impression of conflicts and 
quarrels













Note. All the solid line paths are statistically significant at .05 or above. 
Chi-Square (df=4, N  364)  =15.30, Comparative fit index is .92, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is 
.08 with a 90% confidence interval .04 - .13.
 
 
